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This study of sympathy is best described as an 
historically-grounded feminist critique in response to a 
contemporary critical debate. Recently, "sympathy," 
"compassion," and "care11 have been promoted by many scholars 
interested in positing alternatives to a clearly masculinist 
ethical tradition derived from Kant, Hegel, and others. Yet 
missing from this work is a critical examination of the 
ethical tradition extending from Hume's writings in the 
eighteenth century to Max Scheler's in our own. My major 
purpose within this context is to demonstrate how sympathy 
functions as a major term in systems of value no less male- 
biased than the ethics of reason it is sometimes presumed to 
replace.
Drawing upon insights from post-structuralist feminisms 
and Michel Foucault, I first examine A Treatise of Human 
Nature, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and eighteenth- 
century accounts of the sympathetic sublime. Here "mutual 
sympathy"— a presumably egalitarian social ideal— turns upon 
an identification with a principle of pleasure and power from 
which "woman" (or the "feminine") is clearly excluded. The 
moral communities promoted by Hume, Smith, Burke, and 
Wordsworth are, I argue, paralleled by overtly political ones 
in writers such as Rousseau. The discourse of sympathy thus 
had immediate implications for eighteenth-century women who 
struggled, like middle-class men, to articulate a place for 
themselves within the social order, and through the systems 
of value available to them at the time. In Part Two of this
study, I examine how Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary Mays, and 
Hannah More (despite their different political agenda) all 
employ the language of sympathy in compensatory arguments 
that women are the "natural" source of social bonds more 
important to the state than the "mutual sympathy" celebrated 
by and confined to "virtuous" men.
From this historicist perspective, I pinpoint the 
emergence of two competing versions of community naturalized 
during the nineteenth century. Finally, through analyses of 
Max Scheler's The Nature of Sympathy and Carol Gilligan's A 
Different Voice, I demonstrate in the conclusion that these 
gendered versions of community are, for better or worse, 
still being promoted today.
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Introduction: Sympathy and/in History
According to popular wisdom, women are more compassionate 
than men. That is why, some would argue, women are the 
primary caretakers of children; why women are drawn to low- 
paying "people professions"; and why, even given their 
comparatively reduced economic circumstances, women are more 
likely than men to be involved in philanthropical and 
charitable work. This association between women and 
compassion, moreover, is at least two centuries old. In the 
late-eighteenth century, for example, Hannah More argued that 
women have a distinct and special moral sense— an almost 
physical openness to the pains of others— that makes them 
more adept than men at fulfilling humanitarian obligations: 
"charity is the calling of a lady," she insists, and "the 
care of the poor is her profession" (Works II: 409). And in 
an 1839 conduct book so popular that it went through sixteen 
editions in two years, Sarah Stickney Ellis noted what she 
called women's "moral greatness," the "ability to seek their 
own happiness in the happiness of others" (1640). Finally, in 
this century, Carol Gilligan has argued in her study of 
women's psychological and moral development, that women, 
unlike men, tend to "define themselves in a context of human 
relationship," to "judge themselves in terms of their ability 
to care11 (17). On the basis of these few examples, 
supplemented by one's own common sense, it is possible to see
why women have often been so instrumental in local reform,
and why so many women have proudly asserted what Ellis calls
their "disinterested kindness.”
Historically, however, as other feminists have pointed
out, such claims to a "separate" moral disposition have been
allied with woman's removal to the home and her secondary
social status.* It is a commonplace of social history, for
example, that the notion of a separate moral nature for men
and women is directly related to changing economic and
2domestic arrangements in England and America. The mid­
eighteenth century marked the rise of a market economy in 
which, according to one critic, "for the first time in 
English history the middle-class family seemed to need only 
the work of the man" (Todd 1986, 17). Correspondingly, in 
articles entitled "There is a Sort of Sex in Souls” and "The 
Virtues have respectively a Masculine and Feminine Cast," 
popular writers such as Addison and Steele began to promote a 
"doctrine of sexual virtues" by which women's removal to the 
home and family was cast as part of some seemingly "natural" 
domestic arrangement (1986, 20). As Steele writes, "Women 
were formed to temper Mankind and sooth them into Tenderness 
and Compassion" (Spectator No. 411). while this power of 
positive "influence" over men undoubtedly marked an 
improvement over traditional views of women as evil 
temptresses or self-effacing saints, it nevertheless 
supported the idea that women are moral creatures only 
insofar as they are removed from public power where "real" 
decisions were made.
The public-private dichotomy, and the doctrine of sexual 
virtues by which it is justified, has thus provided a knotty 
problem for feminists, all of whom desire to obviate women's 
secondary social and moral status. The solutions to this 
problem, however, change from writer to writer throughout the 
history of feminism. Generally speaking, what More, Ellis, 
and Gilligan have in common is a desire to increase the 
social value alloted to women without denying traditional 
female roles: caring wife, loving mother, loyal helpmate and 
friend. Their solution, instead, is to re-value the roles to 
which women have been assigned. Critics of nineteenth-century 
culture, for example, will immediately recognize this 
celebration of woman's compassionate qualities as part of 
what Judith Newton has called "the ideology of woman's proper 
sphere," through which middle-class women sought to "extend 
to themselves the sense of meaningful work, social 
significance, and social power" that were already part of the 
class and gender identity of middle-class men (Newton 1987, 
127). Yet given the historical relationship between the 
assertion of some "feminine" moral disposition and women's 
limited social roles, it is often difficult to discern 
whether writers such as More, Ellis, and Gilligan are in 
collusion with a male-biased culture, or whether their 
arguments, as they seem to think, are indeed strategies 
through which that culture might actually be reformed.
Critics of their position, for example, have sometimes 
suggested that the limited roles of women are responsible for 
the fact that women are devalued, so that the roles
themselves must be called into question— that is, expanded,
reformed, or simply denied. Much like Virginia Woolf, they
desire to "kill" the "angel in the house" so that women, like
men, can practice a socially-valued profession. At times,
these different "solutions” to a common political problem
have appeared to create a seemingly irreconcilable tension
3within feminism itself.
The purpose of this study, at the broadest level, is to 
place this tension within the context of eighteenth-century 
ethical writing which, I believe, was partly responsible for 
creating the divisions that still inform feminist theory and 
practice today. However, unlik,e the critics mentioned above,
I take it as axiomatic that at issue in each of these 
arguments for a moral nature peculiar to women— or, for that 
matter, in the arguments against them— is not simply a causal 
relation between ethics and economics, which might be 
resolved through reforming one or the other.^ It is also, and 
perhaps more fundamentally, a complicated relationship 
between moral writing, one's sense of worth, and the social 
roles which (for better or worse) both men and women have 
learned to play— the way that people have been force to 
respond to themselves as moral and social subjects. While 
traditional feminist arguments for ethical or economic reform 
are more or less politically viable reactions against the 
symptoms of an asymmetrical culture, they cannot take into 
account the powerful influence of a history of ethical 
writing itself— both the way in which it helped give rise to 
this asymmetry in the first place, and the way in which, I
believe, it continues to sustain it today.
The Writing of Value
Ethical discourse not only creates particular emotions and 
dispositions for men and women; it places what is created 
within a hierarchy of values which maintains woman's 
traditional status as man's social and moral inferior. This 
hierarchy of values is immediately apparent in the history of 
traditional Christian morality, in which even the "best" 
woman must be regarded as the "weaker vessel," as friend and 
helpmate to man. It is less apparent, however, in the more 
secular accounts of morality as promoted by Addison, Steele, 
and others, in part because the "compassionate" qualities of 
women appear to be roundly celebrated, and even held up as an 
example to less compassionate men. In other works, however, 
the hierarchy of values intrinsic to the doctrine of sexual 
virtues is much more explicit. For example, in his second 
Moral Essay ("Of the Characters of Woman"), Pope, like 
Addison and Steele, attempts to convince women that they 
possess a special morality, distinguished from that of men: 
But grant, in Public Men sometimes are shown,
A Woman's seen in Private life alone:
Our bolder Talents in full light display'd,
Your Virtues open fairest in the shade. (199-203) 
Women's "virtues,” he maintains, are best suited to family 
life, while men's are best suited to the public world. While 
he appears to be outlining a "separate but equal" doctrine of 
morality, the doctrine of sexual virtues in fact actually
works to promote the greater moral glory and power of men. 
Thus, inadvertently perhaps, Pope makes woman's secondary 
moral and social role in the family explicit: the "ideal" 
woman, he writes, "Charms by accepting, by submitting 
sways,/Yet has her humor most, when she obeys" (263-4). In 
the end Pope suggests that the real power of the virtuous 
woman is little more than the ability to conceal from men 
that she has any power at all.
If this poem can be taken as representative of eighteenth- 
century writing, it is clear that women occupied an 
ambivalent place on the social and moral scale.^ To endow 
women with such obviously secondary virtues, after all, is 
something of a back-handed compliment, which takes away as 
much as it gives. Yet precisely because this status is 
intermediate it was difficult for eighteenth-century women 
writers to confront. It is telling, for example, that Pope's 
portrayal of the ideal woman provoked a variety of responses 
from women: whereas Hannah More appropriated it for her 
argument that women, who are different from and perhaps even 
morally superior to men, should end their "petty and absurd 
contentions for equality" (Works VI: 142), Mary 
Wollstonecraft attacked him for erecting a "false system of 
female manners" that "robs the whole sex its dignity" (Rights 
of Woman 53). It is equally significant that the responses to 
Pope's poem all turn on the question of the relationship 
between manners and one's social value, or, to use 
Wollstonecraft's word, the "dignity" of the sex. This 
suggests that the problem of women's social and moral
secondariness— and the problematical history of feminism to 
which it gives rise— involves not merely a relationship 
between ethics and economics, but the ways in which women 
internalize the values and norms by which they are 
defined— the way in which we respond to ourselves as moral 
subjects. As Agnes Heller puts it, "Without our commitment, 
noirms are mere shadows" (1988, 12). From this point of view, 
at stake in the arguments for or against a separate morality 
is more than social history, a history of ethics, or even a 
history of gender roles. At stake is also the history of 
value, or the claims by which various social arrangements are 
promoted and justified.
This shift from traditional realms of inquiry to what I 
call the "writing of value" is intended to uncover the 
problematical relationship between ethics and politics, or, 
more precisely, to uncover the intrinsically political nature 
of ethical language. This, however, is a complicated issue. 
The "writing of value" must be regarded as a self-reflexive 
term that signifies two interrelated aspects of ethical 
practice. First, it assumes with post-structuralist feminists 
that Western culture is inherently male-biased, and that 
language is instrumental in this process. As one writer puts 
it, "Language is the place where actual and possible forms of 
social organization and their likely social and political 
consequences are defined and contested" (Weedon 21). As one 
language among many, moral writing serves to "shape" the 
social, to give it form on the written page, even as it 
creates embodied selves upon which those forms of social
organization are dependent.
Yet within the realm of representation ethical language 
serves a peculiar function. Unlike law, medicine, science, or 
a host of other discourses, ethical language is axiological 
language, which means that it is involved in the self- 
conscious writing of value, that is, in establishing the 
half-spoken rules of combination which enable something to be 
regarded as valuable or worthy in the first place. These 
rules or standards are themselves as male-biased as the 
cultures from which they derive, as the latin root word for 
"value" attests (valere means "to be strong"). Secondly, 
then, the "writing of value" also refers to the strategies by 
which some thing, behavior, or person is accorded intrinsic 
value or worth, where those strategies reflect and reinforce 
a culture in which "masculine" virtues serve as the universal 
standards by which all people should be judged. This point is 
central to feminist analysis, since it means that the 
"virtues" of women, in so far as they are different from 
those of men, will never be equally esteemed. That difference 
in social value has less to do with the nature of the virtues 
themselves than it does with the masculinist bias of ethical 
inscription, the way it determines what is to be valued— what 
is worthy of esteem— within an historically-specific context.
The "writing of value" thus does not refer to a body of 
ethical writing, but to the process by which 1 believe 
ethical writing works. Ideally, this more flexible view of 
ethical language enables one to analyze ethics as a pervasive 
social practice in which both women and men participate. In
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this sense, my purpose is to "problematize" ethical language, 
to raise it, paraphrasing Foucault, as a problem that is at 
once a constituent of our history and one that is constituted 
by our history (1984, 376). To that end, I shall here analyze 
the ethics of sympathy, a tradition of moral writing 
extending roughly from Shaftesbury and the British 
benevolists in the eighteenth century to Max Scheler and 
others in our own. While this tradition of ethical writing 
has been almost wholly ignored by post-structuralist theory 
(one of whose major projects is to deconstruct the 
nineteenth-century fetishization of reason)® in their 
celebration of "humanity," "sympathy," and the "domestic 
affections," these eighteenth-century ethics are, arguably, 
the philosophical tradition closest to mainstream feminist 
theory and practice. It is thus particularly important that 
critics approach it with the same analytical tools that in 
the past have helped to uncover the male-biased logic in the 
more "totalizing" ethics of reason. My purpose here is to 
examine the ways in which the ambivalent moral status of 
women is created through the writing of men, but also, in a 
related move, to analyze how, through the writing of women, 
the male-biased system of sympathy is supported, challenged, 
subverted, or simply revised.
I have already suggested the way in which I believe these 
strategies work in the examples from More, Ellis, and 
Gilligan with which this section began. While each writer 
follows male moralists in representing a gender-specific 
morality, each differs from them in challenging the ways in
which the coles of women have traditionally been valued. 
Although the "source" of women's compassionate nature is 
variously described (as a God-given, culturally necessary, or 
socially enforced moral role) More, Ellis, and Gilligan are 
united in their claims that women's compassionate nature 
should be held in equal or even higher regard than the 
rational, judgmental, or competitive nature of middle-class 
men. All three women thus attempt to invert an implicit 
hierarchy of values in which women's compassion is 
represented as an inferior moral disposition, the result of 
her secondary social role.
Finally, the last purpose of this study is to raise a 
question central to feminist theory and practice: is the 
effort to build a feminist ethics around some supposedly 
"feminine" ability to care a politically viable solution to 
the historical secondariness of women? While such analysis as 
I propose cannot hope to answer this question, it can insist 
that the question be addressed. Implicit in this methodology 
is a resistance to any ethics— whether promoted by men or 
women— that seeks to normalize domestic arrangements, or, 
more specifically, to normalize the place of men and women 
within them. In this I am again in agreement with Foucault, 
who, toward the end of his life, claimed that the purpose of 
ethics is not to provide a blueprint of society, but to 
resist any system that, in theory or in practice, and however 
radical in its original intent, threatens to become 
totalizing, or appears to maintain a problematical status 
quo. I believe this to be the case with the ethics of
sympathy themselves. In the twentieth century, as I have 
suggested, debates surrounding the nature and value of 
sympathy are very much alive. In addition to standard texts 
on sympathy being incorporated into college classes on 
ethics— e.g., works by scholars Lawrence Blum and Philip 
Mercer— within the last decade, feminist theory and politics 
have begun to appropriate various structures of sympathy as 
viable ethical alternatives to more clearly masculinist 
ethics, that is, systems based upon appeals to reason or to 
one or another version of the transcendental self.^ But are 
they really alternatives, and does the place of women within 
them truly indicate what Carol Gilligan would call a 
"different" and potentially revolutionary voice? Given the 
relationship between the discourse of sympathy and what I 
shall argue is its alliance with a male-biased ethico- 
political system, I am skeptical of this attempt to make 
sympathy central to a feminist ethical practice.
Sympathy and Community
In order to argue for a "feminine" moral disposition set 
against the "masculinist" morality of men, one must believe, 
as I suggested above, that the history of ethics is a history 
of reason. One must also believe that women's "compassion" is 
a phenomenon that arises sui generis, or, at least, that is 
not derived from the same system of masculinist values that 
it hopes to reform. Only from this relatively purified 
position can a "feminine" morality serve as the basis of a 
viable critique. My argument, however, is that masculinist
ethical language is largely responsible for creating the 
association between women and compassion in the first place, 
even while it places that association within a hierarchy of 
value which many women have chosen, by valorizing that role, 
to legitimize and to defend. Correspondingly, I maintain that 
ethical language should be seen as one discourse among many 
through which individuals are endowed with particular mores, 
manners, and values, all of which will reflect and reinforce
Othe asymmetrical culture from which they are derived.
For the purposes of this argument, a "discourse" may be 
defined as mode of knowledge production, a principle through 
which relations are structured or organized: between 
individuals and institutions, between one group of 
individuals and another, or between an individual and himself 
or herself. As Foucault points out, while these relationships 
will always be cast as a structure of power, the function of 
a discourse cannot be thematized— it cannot be regarded, for 
example, as a narrative of some "all-encompassing opposition 
between rulers and ruled" (1980, 94). Instead, he claims, a 
discourse functions as a "series of discontinuous segments 
whose tactical function is neither uniform nor stable" (1980, 
100). Foucault's insistence that power relations are 
dispersed is a significant point for feminist analysis. While 
it is possible to "read" any discourse in terms of the power 
relations it seeks to deploy, it is also important to look 
for the ways in which a discourse creates the conditions for 
its demise. As Foucault writes, a discourse "transmits and 
produces power; it reinforces it, but it also undermines and
exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to 
thwart it” (1984, 101). From this point of view, it is not 
possible to speak of a "dominant" and "dominated" discourse, 
which might be reflected in some "masculine" or "feminine"
Qmorality. The concept of discourse thus suspends, at least 
temporarily, traditional notions of "patriarchy."10 At the 
same time, however, it enables one to examine the complicated 
power-relations deployed through ethical writing— to examine 
how those are promoted, sustained, challenged, or displaced, 
by both women and m e n .
While the discourse of sympathy has been traced back to 
the late sixteenth century,11 in the eighteenth century it 
begins to assume a peculiarly modern form. As Hans-George 
Gadamer explains it, Shaftesbury and eighteenth-century 
philosophers borrowed from the Roman classics the humanist 
concept of sensus communis, or sympathy (24). While we 
undoubtedly think of sympathy as signifying an emotion much 
like compassion, it is best described as an impulse which 
Shaftesbury presumed to promote. "It is not so much a feature 
given to all men, a part of the natural law, as a social 
virtue, a virtue of the heart more than the head" (Gadamer 
24). Subsequent ethical writers such as Hutcheson, Hume, and 
Smith made sympathy central to systematic ethics, to a 
morality created for an emergent middle class, whose 
interests were compatible neither with the overtly 
competitive theories of Hobbes, nor with traditional 
Christian piety, nor with the "new philosophy" in France, 
promoted by many British dissenters (Heilbroner 16-39).
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Altering the terms of moral discourse, the British 
benevolists de-emphasized the role of reason and power in 
social arrangements and promoted, instead, secure 
relationships between individuals, based upon the ability to 
sympathize.
Within these broad parameters, one can find any number of 
slightly different versions of sympathy scattered throughout 
eighteenth-century writing, each serving to support a 
particular polemical end: moral, epistemological, 
metaphysical. In A Treatise of Human Nature, for example,
Hume sometimes appeals to the concept of sympathy to counter 
the Hobbesian notion that the basic principle of society is 
self-love, to argue, in other words, that men are 
distinguished from other less "civilized" animals, "in all 
creatures," he writes, "that prey not upon others . . . there 
appears a remarkable desire of company, which associates them 
together, without any advantages they can ever propose to 
reap from their union" {Treatise 363). He claims that this is 
most "conspicuous in man . . . who has the most ardent desire 
of society" (Treatise 363). Alternatively, in Burke's 
Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful (1757), this mark of civilized man is 
internalized, so that sympathy more closely resembles an 
emotion than a social virtue. As such, it can serve as the 
basis of an affective aesthetics: the "business" of poetry 
and rhetoric, Burke claims, is to "affect rather by sympathy 
than imitation; to display rather the effect of things on the 
mind of the speaker, or of others, than to present a clear
15
idea of the things themselves" (172). A third and more 
"metaphysical" version of sympathy appears in Mary 
Wollstonecraft's letters to Gilbert Imlay. Here 
Wollstonecraft describes her emotions upon finding herself 
alone after a difficult evening in a strange land. "What," 
she asks, "are these imperious sympathies?"
How frequently has [sic] melancholy and even 
misanthropy taken possession of me, when the 
world has disgusted me, and friends have 
proved unkind. I have then considered myself 
as a particle broken off from the grand mass 
of mankind;— I was alone, till some 
involuntary sympathetic emotion, like the 
attraction of adhesion, made me feel that I 
was still part of a mighty whole, from which 
I could not sever myself. (Letters 17)
While these representations are alike in insisting upon the 
intensely "familial" nature of human beings— the fact that 
humans are somehow connected— there are subtle differences 
between them.
These differences suggest that sympathy .is an unstable 
term having no single referent. Given this, sympathy is best 
read as a kind of literary topos of potential community, 
where particular versions of the "commmunal" were in fact 
being created. Much of this dissertation is devoted to 
exploring those differences— to examining the contours of 
community, for example, in the writings of a Tory humanist, 
an anti-*jacobin, and a radical feminist Dissenter. Arguing
16
from a principle of resemblance, Hume, Burke, Wollstonecraft, 
and others will represent a community of feeling— a common 
sense, if you will— as somehow being prior to the social as 
such. This desire to naturalize sympathy is, of course, a 
self-legitimizing move. The important point, then, is to 
analyze how previous versions of sympathy are appropriated, 
ignored, subverted, or displaced.
My desire to highlight difference and discontinuity in the 
discourse of sympathy is not merely a critical exercise. Any 
account of the history of the writing of sympathy must also 
account for its detractors, for writers who pointed out that 
women and other groups were excluded from its contours, 
excluded, that is, from the "family of man." The most famous 
of these texts is Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. While this 
novel falls outside the chronological bounds of this study, 
because Frankenstein is such a familiar text, it can serve as 
an immediately-recognizable counterpoint to the hopeful 
visions of sympathy outlined above.
In Frankenstein, sympathy reappears as a key term in 
portraying social being. This time, however, sympathy is 
represented as a dangerous desire for a sembable— for another 
who is just like oneself— that gives rise to a series of 
disastrous events. Desiring "the company of a man who could 
sympathize with me" (19), Frankenstein creates a good and 
benevolent creature whose heart "was fashioned to be 
susceptible of love and sympathy" (221). Above all else, the 
monster desires to be accepted by his "fellow-creatures"
(120). Patiently, he learns their language, customs, mores.
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and even literature. But because he is "endued with a figure 
hideously deformed and loathsome" (120) he encounters horror 
and revulsion from everyone he meets. Outcast, alone, and 
filled with a sense of injustice, he takes revenge upon the 
man who made him. "Once," he explains, "my fancy was soothed 
with dreams of virtue, of fame, of enjoyment. Once I falsely 
hoped to meet with beings, who, pardoning my outward form, 
would love me for the excellent qualities which I was capable 
of unfolding" (221). Now, however, having murdered at least 
some of the people whose esteem he had hoped to enjoin, the 
monster abandons the search for "fellow-feeling" and is 
"content to suffer alone" (221).
This gothic novel is thus finally a devastating critique 
of sympathy, an allegory of a social experiment that failed.
For the already marginalized, the completely disempowered, 
this dream of some pre-existent social bond manifest in the 
company of generous and benevolent men can but shatter in the
face of social reality. In the passages from Burke, Hume, and
Wollstonecraft, above, sympathy had been figured as a 
universal if not natural source of social coherence. In 
Frankenstein, this figure of "natural" sympathy is revealed 
to be a twisted dream of resemblance upon which every action 
in the novel turns. As the monster quickly learns, a common 
"sensibility"— language, feelings, customs, and mores— does 
not guarantee one a place in community. "No sympathy," he 
laments in the end, "may I ever find. When I first sought it,
it was the love of virtue, the feelings of happiness and
affection with which my whole being overflowed, that I wished
18
to be participated [sic]. But now, that virtue has become to 
me a shadow, and that happiness and affection are turned into 
bitter and loathing despair, in what should I seek for 
sympathy?" (221). That question is left unanswered, of 
course, but the clear implication is that the monster can 
only find company in pain and suffering which he shares, not 
coincidentally, with Frankenstein_himself.
Central to this novel, then, are issues that Hume, Burke,
and even Wollstonecraft were unable or unwilling to address,
issues such as how sympathy is constructed, how it is
manifest, and how, given its contours, some people are
excluded from "the mighty whole." As David Marshall argues,
"Mary Shelley focuses upon the epistemology and the rhetoric
of fellow-feeling— which, she shows, raises questions about
identification, resemblance, likeness, difference,
comparison, and the ability to transport oneself into someone
12else's thoughts and sentiments" (1988, 198). In this sense 
Frankenstein locates a blind spot at the heart of eighteenth- 
century ethics— its failure to tolerate difference— and 
renders that dramatically in the form of the monster's 
experience. The monster attributes his exclusion to his 
inferior social status— to the fact that he has "no money, no 
friends, no kind of property" (220). This social exclusion, 
however, is intimately related to his physical appearance, 
or, more precisely, to the fact that— despite his would-be 
resemblance to "man"— he is physically different. These 
issues should not be separated. In early nineteenth-century 
Britain, his total lack of social status would be as apparent
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to others as the "shrivelled complexion and straight black 
lips" with which the monster has been endowed (57). It is 
possible to argue, in fact, that it would also be as 
threatening.
Yet the part of the novel most central to analysis here is 
that the monster is a prisoner of moral promises denied to 
him by his birth. He is a being "fashioned" to long for the 
"esteem" of others. Ironically, however, it is precisely by 
virtue of his fashioning that he will never enjoy that 
esteem. This paradox, or conflict, or ethical double bind 
serves as a kind of thumbnail sketch of the problem of 
sympathy as I have formulated it— of the complex relationship 
between ethical writing, the creation of difference, and 
one's sense of self worth. In order to explore this 
relationship in more depth, it is necessary to turn away from 
Shelley's fictional monster to the writing of men, where, as 
I shall argue, the problematical moral sensibility 
underwriting Frankenstein is systematically deployed.
The Production of Gender
A fundamental pretext of much feminist analysis is that 
cultural discourse— including ethical discourse— is 
intrinsically male-biased. One purpose of such analysis, 
consequently, is to foreground the extent to which any single 
cultural formation— philosophy, aesthetics, religion, law, 
psychology, or sexuality— is practiced in such a way as to 
create, reinforce, promote, or justify unequal relations of 
power. Similarly, one purpose here is to discover how the
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ethics of sympathy serve to "shape" what is best defined as 
the "social"— the world of values, morals, relationships, 
desires, and public roles. Although the term "social" 
encompasses a myriad of behaviors, desires, qualities, and 
goals, for the purposes of this dissertation I will focus 
upon a single one that radiates in many directions, the 
cultural production of gender.
"Gender" is a complicated issue, but here I shall rely
upon Joan Wallach Scott's discussion of the term in Gender
and the Politics of History. Any definition of gender, Scott
argues, must rest upon an "integral relationship" between two
propositions: "Gender is a constitutive element of social
relationships based on perceived differences between the
sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying relations of 
13power" (42). Given that broad definition, it is also 
important to understand that both "masculine" and "feminine" 
traits are organized by a discourse, that both sexes, in 
other words, are engendered. As one critic puts it, "From the 
perspective of social relations, men and women are both 
prisoners of gender, although in highly differentiated but 
interrelated ways" (Flax 629). The challenge, then, is to 
account for how women and men internalize the values and 
mores by which they are both inscribed.
One way to do this is to isolate a source of those 
values— in this case, ethics— so as to analyze the gender- 
specific logic of ethical writing itself. At the heart of 
ethical writing is a host of binaries that, once located, can 
be used to explicate the intrinsic gender-specific logic of
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the discourse as a whole. These binaries appear under various
guises— feeling vs. reason, mind vs. body, public vs.
private, and weakness vs. strength. Each set, however, will
be used to create gendered subjects whose functions, thought,
and behaviors will— to a greater or lesser degree— both
reflect and reinforce the asymmetrical structures of the
14society from which they emerge.
What makes the discourse of sympathy such a fascinating 
subject for critics is that in these ethics, the expected 
hierarchy of values is obscured, displaced, written into the 
logic of the text itself, which, moreover, always speaks in 
the name of "humanity." In order to illustrate— or at least 
to foreshadow— this hierarchy of values, I would like to 
return, briefly, to the passage from Hume above (13). Here 
Hume offers a "general view of human nature" in which humans 
are represented as members of a benign, even benevolent 
species, "who has the most desire for company, and is fitted
for it by the most advantages" (Treatise 363). This view
accords with his earlier description of human nature in 
Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding, finished in 1736, 
but not published until 1748. Here, Hume takes it as takes it
as axiomatic that "the interests of society are not, even on
their own account, entirely indifferent to us":
It is needless to push our researches so far
as to ask, why we have humanity or fellow-
feeling for others. It is sufficient, that 
this is experienced to be a principle in
human nature. We must stop somewhere in our
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examination of causes; and there are, in 
every science, some general principles, 
beyond which we cannot hope to find any 
principle more general. No man is entirely 
indifferent to the happiness and misery of 
others. The first has a natural tendency to 
give pleasure; the second, pain. That every 
one may find in himself. (ECHU 219-20n)
"Humanity," in this account, is a presumably universal 
impulse to respond in some benign or even favorable way to 
others. As an a priori principle of human nature, this vision 
of "humanity" simply serves as a starting point for 
eighteenth-century ethical writers reacting against Hobbes, 
for whom all social good is derived from self-love.
Unlike humanity, in this text "sympathy" signifies neither 
an impulse nor sentiment. It serves, instead, as a principle 
of communication through which painful or pleasurable 
emotions might be "transferred" from one person to another.
"In general," Hume writes, "it is certain, that, wherever we 
go, whatever we reflect on or converse about, everything 
still presents us with the view of human happiness or misery, 
and excites in our breast a sympathetic movement of pleasure 
or uneasiness" (ECHU 221). Yet in the eighteenth-century 
benevolists, the sympathetic imagination was being re­
trained, as it were, to identify more readily with a 
principle of pleasure than with a principle of pain. This 
passage below, for example, is drawn from Hume's analysis of 
how sympathy creates "an esteem for power and riches, and a
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contempt for meanness and poverty" {Treatise 362):
In general, we may remark, that the minds of 
men are mirrors to one another, not only 
because they reflect each other's emotions, 
but also because those rays of passion, 
sentiments and opinions may often be 
reverberated, and decay away by insensible 
degrees. Thus the pleasure, which a rich man 
receives from his possessions, being thrown 
upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and 
esteem; which sentiments again, being 
perceiv'd and sympathiz'd with encrease the 
pleasure of the possessor; and being once 
more reflected, become a new foundation for 
pleasure and esteem in the beholder. . . .
(Treatise 365)
This emphasis upon "pleasure and esteem," or the desire to 
align sympathy with a principle of power, is not only 
implicit in the examples Hume selects, but in his description 
of the workings of the sympathetic imagination itself which, 
he argues "goes easily from the view of a lesser object to 
that of a greater" (Treatise 357). This form of sympathetic 
response consistently turns on identification with values 
thought to be intrinsic to "the good life"— conversation, 
friendship, "correspondence of feeling"— and away from the 
pain caused by its deprivation.
Undoubtedly, Hume's relationship between sympathy and 
pleasure (which will be discussed at length later) seems odd
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to many of us; today "sympathy" usually signifies a positive 
openness to suffering easily equated with an emotion such as 
compassion or pity. Yet in eighteenth-century writing, "pity" 
and "compassion" are subject to ongoing revision. Hobbes, for 
example, had argued that pity signifies a spectator's fear of 
being cast in the position of the sufferer, and is thus a 
species of self l o v e . ^  Hume, rather surprisingly, retains 
this association between compassion and fear, and even 
represents it as the most "natural" and automatic form of 
sympathetic response. Since "all human creatures," he writes, 
"are related to us by resemblance" their "pains and pleasures 
must strike upon us in a lively manner, and produce an 
emotion similar to the original one” (Treatise 369). This is 
particularly true, he continues, of "affliction and sorrow" 
(Treatise 369). But perhaps because Hume wants to distinguish 
this reactive and largely self-interested emotion from 
sympathy with pleasure, a potentially self-empowering social 
force, he attributes the former to women and children who, 
because they "are most guided" by the imagination, are "most 
subject to pity" (Treatise 370). In a sense, compassion is 
little but "raw" sympathy, a "womanish" hypersensitivity to 
potential pain. It is not so much a positive concern for the 
other as it is proof of one's fears of being cast in a 
similar position. "The same infirmity," he concludes, "which 
makes them faint at the sight of a naked sword, tho' in the 
hands of their best friend, makes them pity extremely those, 
whom they find in any grief or affliction" (Treatise 370).
Humanity, sympathy, and compassion, then, stand in a
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complex relation to one another. Humanity signifies the 
benign nature of man; sympathy, the proof of humanity; and 
compassion, the automatic response to suffering that, in 
order to make sympathy the basis of ethical judgment, Hume 
must explain away. He does this largely by representing 
compassion, or sympathy with pain, as a feminine trait which, 
he implies, one should learn to control. By virtue of this 
distinction, Hume is able to displace compassion— now seen as 
a feminine form of fear and trembling— from the "normal"
(that is, preferable) path of sympathetic response. It is 
possible to argue that the real issue in the writing of Smith 
and Hume, then, is not to "prove" the goodness of man, or to 
promote what we know as "humanitarian" response, but to 
promote a particular vision of the "good" society from which 
women, who are also being re-defined, are simultaneously and 
rather self-consciously cast as "inferior" moral creatures.
Because it promotes a gender-specific account of 
sympathetic response, Hume's theory of sympathy both reflects 
and reinforces the doctrine of sexual virtues that 
characterizes eighteenth-century writing as a whole. In fact, 
it makes explicit what had been implicit in the doctrine of 
"separate moral spheres" all along: that because of women's 
private status, "natural" responses such as compassion and 
humanity are the only moralities to which women may aspire.
Both Hume and Smith, for example, adopt a classical 
distinction between the "amiable" and the "awful" virtues—  
the virtues of women and men, respectively— which correlate 
to the private and public realms. In Smith's account, the
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former are "the soft, the gentle, the amiable virtues, the 
virtues of candid condescension and indulgent humanity" (23). 
Even though these moral qualities are represented as being 
pleasant and necessary, they carry connotations of weakness 
inappropriate for public duty. As Smith writes, "Humanity" 
consists merely in the exquisite fellow- 
feeling which the spectator entertains with 
the sentiments of the persons principally 
concerned, so as to grieve for their 
sufferings, to resent their injuries, and to 
rejoice at their good fortune. The most 
humane actions require no self-denial, no 
self-command, no great exertion of the sense 
of propriety. They consist only in doing what 
this exquisite sympathy of its own accord 
would prompt us to do. (TMS 200)
Woman's "humanity" is set against man's "generosity," an 
active virtue that requires the ability to represent oneself 
in some appropriate way— to "exert" a "sense of propriety." 
Following the logic of this passage, moreover, it is 
precisely by virtue of their "humanity," their "exquisite, 
sympathy," that women are excluded from the behavior thought 
to be necessary to the public realm.
In promoting a gender-specific morality, the ethics of 
sympathy are intimately involved in establishing and 
naturalizing a cultural division of labor that characterizes 
early modern society, whereby women are confined to home and 
motherhood, while men are shaped and molded for some public
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role. While that phenomenon, in turn, bears some relation to 
the exigencies of an emergent economy, to marriage laws, to 
the middle-class family, and to other issues of social 
history, I am frankly less interested in exploring such 
connections than I am in analyzing the politics of sympathy 
itself, the strategies by which it creates a doctrine of 
sexual virtues, while promoting and obscuring the hierarchy 
of values around which the discourse of sympathy is written. 
Rather than being accidental, this obfuscation is a necessary 
part of eighteenth-century ethical writing itself. The impact 
of any ethical writing is dependent upon the proscriptive 
nature of ethical language as that interacts with concrete 
political practice. By obscuring the implications of its 
public/private dichotomy and the gender-specific morality 
upon which that is based, the discourse of sympathy, I 
believe, is able to do two things: to promote the presumably 
"universal" message of "humanitarianism," and to exclude 
women from the institutions from which so-called humanitarian 
practice and public power emerge.
Sympathy in History
Any historically-specific account, but particularly a 
feminist one, is immediately faced with the problem of 
historiography, or how history is constructed.*® The reading 
of sympathy outlined above is, of course, in conflict with 
traditional accounts of the sympathetic imagination, most of 
which are themselves male-biased: either women's writing is 
excluded, or there is no attention to the way women are
represented, or some totalizing construction of history is 
consistently deployed. The effect of such tactics is to 
suppress the intensely social and sexual structures at the 
heart of sympathy, the structures to be explored in this 
dissertation. Before moving on to that analysis, however, it 
is helpful to understand why those have not been addressed 
before, in the following section, l shall discuss the 
limitations of representative histories by "intellectual," 
"political," and "social" historians.
From both a feminist and historicist perspective any 
account of sympathy that argues for a continuous development 
or gradual evolution in the history of the term is 
automatically suspicious. We can see the effect of such 
historiography clearly in the work on sympathy by 
intellectual historians, where sympathy appears as part of a 
relatively purified aesthetic and/or philosophical tradition 
The classic treatment of sympathy from this point of view is 
Walter Jackson Bate's, in From Classic to Romantic; Premises 
of Taste in Eighteenth-Century England. In this text Bate 
serves as an apologist for romantic poetry, as one who would 
redeem the works of Wordsworth and others from charges of 
"expansive egocentricity" and "aimless sentimentality" (166) 
To that end, Bate attempts to expose their relationship to 
classical aesthetic, philosophical, and moral values. His 
discussion of sympathy is central to this process.
Focusing upon the relationship of sympathy to radical 
empiricism, Bate argues that the British benevolists so 
successfully undermined reason as the basis for moral
judgment (1945, 129), that subsequent writers were forced to 
rely upon individual feeling as "a means of effective 
aesthetic and moral insight" (132). Sympathy emerges as the 
faculty through which this insight is assumed to be conveyed. 
Yet for Bate, this reliance upon "feeling" as a way of 
"knowing" the world is a tragic story; it culminates, he 
argues, in nineteenth-century subjectivism, where "an ego . . 
. creates and projects its own world, and which has little 
real hope of knowing anything else" (160). The failure of 
sympathy— or "individualism" or "feeling"— to provide a 
stable basis of moral judgment results in the solipsistic 
poetry of Coleridge, Keats, and Shelley, where the poet, like 
Keats' nightingale, is doomed to express his own subjectivity 
or solitude.
Although Bate's account of sympathy as a philosophical
problem undoubtedly did much to redeem romantic poets from
charges of excessive emotion, in the end it emerges as a
barely-veiled critique of the values of "individualism,"
dramatized through a purified history of sympathetic
imagination. To put it another way, Bate reifies one aspect
of sympathy— the claim to effect "union" between some subject
and object— and casts that as a moral, aesthetic, and
epistemological problem related to "individualism" which, in
turn, can be judged according to its failure or success. This
"history" of sympathy, and the tradition of criticism to
17which it gave rise, contrasts sharply with a parallel 
tradition of the writing on sympathy practiced by 
intellectual historians within less "literary" fields, and,
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arguably, by historians of a less conservative stamp.
in more socially-based accounts of the sympathetic
imagination, sympathy is allied with benevolism, charity,
altruism, or compassion— with any number of impulses which we
now associate with the rise of Christian or secular humanism
(ee Fiering; Acton; and Radner). Norman S. Fiering, for
example, associates sympathy with an automatic impulse toward
social good— with an "irresistible compassion"— represented
in early eighteenth-century ethical writing. He argues that
what began as a valorization of charity in the early
eighteenth-century— the patho-sympathetic tradition
associated with Christianity— gradually became secularized as
a principle of social progress in its own right through the
ethics of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Smith, and Hume (212). "By
mid-eighteenth century, " he writes, "the opinion that a
person who is unmoved by the pains and joys of others is a
kind of monster, and that God has given men and women inborn
feelings of compassion, sympathy, and benevolence as a way of
directly guiding mankind to virtue, this opinion became a
virtual philosophical and psychological dogma" (205). This
emphasis upon compassion, in turn, is thought to play a large
part in the establishment of Western humanism. As Fiering
continues, "Humanitarianism in this sense is a historical
18stage in the education of the emotions" (212). Although 
Fiering admits that this humanitarian ideal was eventually 
perverted in romanticism, where identification with the 
sufferer "became an end in itself" (212), his larger view of 
the telos of sympathy accords with those of political
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theorists equally intent upon advocating a vision of 
humanitarian reform. In the words of another historian, "in 
insisting that the suffering of others can never be a matter 
of indifference, Hume and others opened up the road that 
leads to the demand for equal treatment of equal needs"
(Acton 66). In the above constructions of history, sympathy 
appears as part of a progressive sensibility, coinciding with 
an egalitarian politics.
It is impossible and even undesirable to attempt to 
reconcile these two disparate and seemingly contradictory 
accounts of the sympathetic imagination. It is important to 
recognize, however, the mutually-repressive function of both. 
For Bate, sympathy is essentially apolitical; primarily a 
literary phenomenon, it occurs (or does not occur) in the 
literary space between some generalized self and other. It 
is, to repeat, the singular expression of an act of mind 
signifying the failure of reason as a form of social 
coherence. For Fiering, in contrast, sympathy is a positive 
and even involuntary feeling created by and created for a 
well-meaning society, an "impulse" rather than an act, which 
has little to do with the "literary" as such. Yet these 
disparate conclusions are drawn from many of the same texts, 
and even some of the same passages.
Their disparate conclusions point to different political 
assumptions. Hore fundamentally, however, they point to a 
failure of intellectual history itself. In foregrounding one 
aspect of sympathy— in separating the "aesthetic" from the 
"political"— Bate and Fiering are very much the children of
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their age, for whom philosophy and politics are (and should 
be) discrete endeavors. This modern impulse toward 
territorialization, however, belies the history of British 
"moral philosophy" itself. Adam Smith, for example, who is 
often represented as the most influential writer on sympathy 
(see Bate 1945, 135) was a professor of Moral Philosophy in 
Glasgow, where, as one critic pointed out long ago, Moral 
Philosophy "covered Natural Theology, Ethics, Jurisprudence, 
and Political Economy"— any number of disciplines which we 
now take to be discrete and even antithetical (Heilbroner
40). "It thus ranged," he continues, "all the way from man's 
sublimest impulse toward order and harmony to his somewhat 
less orderly and harmonious activities in the grimmer 
business of gouging out a living for himself" (Heilbroner 40-
41). Both R.H. Brissenden and, more recently, Carol Kay have 
made the same point (Brissenden 35; Kay 1983; Kay 1986).
Arguing that what we now call "political science,"
"aesthetics," "ethics," and even "women's studies" were once 
indistinguishable and regarded simply as a part of "moral 
philosophy," Kay insists that all forms of eighteenth-century 
writing constitute a single social practice (1986, 66-67).
The writing on sympathy, by implication, is self-consciously 
political, in the broadest sense of that term (Kay 1983, 77- 
78). To isolate what now seem to be separate traditions so as 
to write a continuous and unproblematical account is not only 
to privilege one or another discipline but to expose a 
peculiarly modern and perhaps masculine fetish for 
disciplinarity itself.
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in its most fundamental aspect, the history of sympathy is 
part of the history of value, which has always interacted 
with aesthetics, philosophy, literature and "great history" 
in complicated ways. What seems to be called for, then, are 
social-based histories that treat sympathy within a 
circumscribed historical period, informed by several writing 
practices. The most interesting accounts of sympathy within 
this context are by-products of the writing on "sensibility" 
or "sentimentalism." Both R.H. Brissenden's Virtue in 
Distress and Janet Todd's Sensibility; An Introduction, for 
example, have done much to dispel the notion that "sympathy" 
can be divorced from any number of mutually implicated 
practices that take place in concrete social settings 
{Brissenden 31; Todd 1988, 10-31). In each text, "sympathy" 
is treated as a psychological, physiological, and social 
phenomenon, loosely allied with benevolist impulses thought 
to establish and sustain the "good society," where that is 
variously defined.
However, because these histories of "sensibility" assume 
such a broad and finally teleological view, they create the 
rather hazy impression that "sympathy"— as one term in a 
larger structure of feeling— emerged, flourished, and died.
This is undoubtedly due to a meta-historical scheme which 
Brissenden and Todd employ, although in different ways. Each 
traces the rise of "sensibility" literature from Richardson's 
Clarissa in 1759 through its culmination in the Revolutionary 
era to its demise after the Terror. Brissenden argues that 
sensibility literature describes an enlightened optimism in
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man that "became increasingly more difficult to sustain as 
the century drew toward its close" (49). Todd differs from 
Brissenden mostly in her desire to qualify that note of 
optimism. From its inception, she argues, "sensibility" 
literature, including the writing on sympathy, was opposed to 
the "individualistic" values of Britain's dominant and 
increasingly capitalistic culture (129). Yet it remained 
sensitive to attacks from the more highly codified and 
"gentlemanly elite" against which it was defined— it was, she 
argues, "always on the defensive" (129). This defensiveness, 
she claims, is expressed "directly through its nostalgic 
visions of harmonious fellowships and virtuous men and women" 
(129). And its demise was finally ensured by the rise of 
conservatism following the French Revolution, and by the 
subsequent attack on sensibility spearheaded by Godwin,
Austen, and others (130).
Recent critics of eighteenth-century writing have begun to
turn away from such meta-historical schemes, and to rely,
instead, on what might be called "transdiscursive" models,
where sympathy is examined in relation to other practices, or
19modes of representation. David Marshall, for example, has 
published two books on sympathy as an aesthetic and 
epistemological problem central to the anti-theatrical 
tradition. While The Surprising Effects of Sympathy is thus 
undoubtedly in the tradition of Bate, Marshall consistently 
gestures toward the fact that for some women sympathy 
represents a real political problem (181-227). John Mullan's 
more ambitious book, Sentiment and Sociability, examines the
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relationship between the ethics of sympathy, the novel of 
sentiment, and (following Foucault) eighteenth-century 
medical practices, all of which, he argues, attempt to create 
"gendered sensibilities" (81) and thus to engender selves. My 
own project is distinguished from these in foregrounding the 
way in which the ethics of sympathy not only created a 
gender-specific morality, they provided eighteenth-century 
women with a language in which to respond to it. It also 
attempts to establish sympathy as an issue that is still 
central to feminist theory and practice today.
Within ethical writing proper at least, the discourse of 
sympathy was very much alive throughout the nineteenth 
century and even into our own. It simply continues to mutate, 
to assume any number of forms, in the early part of this 
century, for example, Max Scheler, a student of Husserl and 
contemporary of Heidegger and Althusser, published The Nature 
of Sympathy, in what is now regarded as the most systematic 
and scholarly attempt to institute an ethics based on 
"feeling" since Hume, Scheler characterizes the problem of 
sympathy as the "essential, existential, and epistemological 
foundations of the interconnection between human selves and 
human souls" (Scheler 213). Scheler's ontologism, about which 
Heidegger complained (see Heidegger 72-74, 178, 252-53) has 
since been revised by others, mostly radical and Christian 
humanists, many of whom are actively publishing today.
Nor was Scheler alone in his preoccupation with 
sympathetic response. Shortly after Scheler published his 
monumental phenomenology of sympathy, Virginia Woolf
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presented a paper to the Women's Service League in England, 
in absolute but unwitting contrast to Scheler, she describes 
sympathy in cultural and historical terms as part of a gender 
role that women— much to their disadvantage— have simply 
learned to play. The "Angel in the House," this "intensely 
sympathetic" woman, is represented as a product of history 
whose only art "was the difficult art of family life": "she
was so constituted that she never had a mind or a wish of her 
own, but preferred to sympathize always with the minds and 
wishes of others" ("Professions" 1365). Consequently, in 
order to become a professional woman— in order to claim her 
emotional, intellectual, and economic freedom— Woolf claims 
that she had to kill the Angel, to catch "her by the throat" 
(1385). "My excuse," she continues, "if I were to be held up 
in a court of law, would be that I acted in self-defense. Had 
I not killed her, she would have killed me" (1385).
These two accounts suggest that the discourse of sympathy 
is still wending its way through the modernist project, which 
is, among others things, to represent a stable basis for 
individual and social progress— to constitute, in short, a 
stable basis for culture. The fascinating thing about this 
comparison, however, is that Woolf and Scheler attempt to do 
so in two apparently contradictory ways. While Scheler 
desires to "naturalize" sympathy— to represent it as part of 
the ontology of man through which he may be redeemed— Woolf 
wants to rescue women from this attempt to naturalize what 
she believes to be a product of history, or, more precisely, 
of family life. Read paradigmatically, these two accounts
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expose the issues at the heart of sympathy: how its 
representation of sensus communis, "interconnection," or 
simply a shared nature, is somehow in conflict with the 
concrete social positions of middle class women, for whom 
(according to Woolf, at least) sympathy means exclusion from 
public life, if, as her comments suggest, the ethics of 
sympathy and the secondary social position of women are 
somehow historically implicated, it is imperative that any 
history of sympathy find a way to represent what was implicit 
in the discourse all along: that as a cultural discourse, 
sympathy has implications for men and women that cannot be 
divorced from concrete structures of social power. It must, 
in other words, foreground that conflict, rather than 
promoting what Foucault calls "the metahistorical deployment 
of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies" (1984,
77) by which the place of women has been denied, suppressed, 
or obscured. To that end— and with the limitations of the 
"histories" above in mind— it is possible to lay out a few 
preliminary guidelines for my own account of sympathy that 
will follow.
First, in order to represent sympathy adequately, it is
necessary to abandon the master narrative and focus, instead,
on the struggles and inconsistencies at the heart of the
20discourse of sympathy itself. At the simplest level, this
21is a problem of signification. Even on its own terms, the 
discourse of sympathy is volatile, unstable, and double- 
edged, changing across disciplines and through time. Given 
that sympathy constitutes a discursive field through which
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several modes of sympathetic response were actively being 
contested, it makes little sense to assume, with intellectual 
historians, that it is possible to unearth a "dominant" mode 
of feeling, thought to characterize an age. Even the two 
brief examples drawn from Woolf and Scheler illustrate the 
futility of this enterprise. For Scheler, sympathy is a 
positive mode of knowing, while for Woolf, the same word 
signifies a learned emotion, a responsiveness on the part of 
women that has played a central role in their secondariness.
Any attempt, then, to isolate a characteristic "structure of 
feeling"— to borrow a term from Raymond Williams— is, however 
qualified, a hopelessly idealist enterprise (Williams 1977, 
128-141).
Second, in the same way that it is necessary to abandon 
the idea of history as an unbroken telos of "dominant" 
feeling, it is necessary to decenter the texts through which 
intellectual history supports its conclusions. As I have 
suggested, the history of sensibility is thought to be best 
conveyed from the work of Shaftesbury (in philosophy) and 
Richardson (in fiction), through the works of the British 
romantic poets. This androcentric approach is misleading. 
Obviously, no society is so homogeneous, no tradition so 
intact, that the moral sensibility reflected or promoted in 
any single or multiple of canonized texts can truly be 
regarded as representative. Such spokespersons of "high 
culture,” moreover, are not typically characteristic of any 
age, much less of their own. Host importantly, in assuming 
that male writers are the legitimate bearers of moral
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coherence, critics simply buy into the universalistic claims 
of literature— that, in the words of Shelley, male poets (and 
presumably, philosophers)— are the "moral legislators of the 
world."
Third, it is necessary to disabuse ourselves of the notion 
that morality is prior to other social structures, as Shelley 
would have us believe. Moral language, including the 
language of sympathy, is axiological language. This means 
that, despite its frequent claims to transcendence and 
universal applicability, it is always involved in the self- 
conscious writing of value. This aspect of moral discourse in 
the eighteenth century has been explored most systematically 
by John Mullan, who argues that philosophical texts and cheap 
novels are together involved in creating normative social 
models. "Neither type of text," he argues, "simply reflects 
social conditions or relations: both produce society; both 
seek to make society on the page" (25).
Given that this society is inevitably asymmetrical— one, 
for example, where women are valued differently from men— we 
can expect that "difference" and others to be manifest in the 
language and structures of morality itself. The "problem" of 
sympathy, from this point of view, is not simply a matter of 
historical reconstruction, but of how, at least through the 
early modern period, the discourse of sympathy has functioned 
to construct embodied selves— to regulate emotional 
structures and concrete ways of social interaction. It is to 
represent how the discourse of sympathy is intrinsically and 
self-consciously political, in immediate if sometimes evasive
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ways. From this point of view, the history of sympathy is not 
the history of a sentiment or the history of a sensibility.
It is instead a history of exclusion, a story of gaps and 
ruptures in its representations of community. Though there is 
no way to trace the "evolution" of sympathy within this dense 
and ongoing field of contention, it i_s possible, as Foucault 
suggests, to "isolate the different scenes" where sympathy 
engages "in different roles" (1984, 76).
O v e rv ie w
In the body of this study, I shall be working upon a 
circumscribed time period, extending roughly from the 
publication of Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature in 1739-40 
to the close of the eighteenth century. Given that my project 
spans a particular number of years, this dissertation makes 
some pretense to being a history of sympathy, but only in a 
very narrow sense of that term— only insofar as "history" can 
be represented through the literary, which is itself an 
attempt to re-construct and re-form it. In order to provide 
the most varied field of reading possible, I will be focusing 
upon paradigmatic examples or "scenes" of sympathetic 
response in mid-eighteenth-century texts by a number of 
writers— David Hume, Adam Smith, Edmund Burke, Dorothy and 
William Wordsworth, J.J. Rousseau, Mary Wollstonecraft, Mary 
Hays, Hannah More— that span several genres: aesthetics, 
ethics, political treatises, the novel, travel literature, 
and poetry.
From Hume to Rousseau, the idea that women possess a
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natural humanity is being institutionalized through a 
literature whose determination is to promote a superior form 
of morality in men. By attending to what are deemed 
"representative" structures of sympathetic response, I hope, 
first, simply to make this once-pervasive and even formative 
discourse visible again. To that end, I shall examine in Part 
One what I take to be the two most widespread paradigms of 
sympathetic response promoted in the writings of men. Chapter 
One contains an analysis of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. In that book, and despite its pretensions to 
universalism, sympathy promotes a cultural hegemony from 
which the feminine is excluded. Its major project is to 
ensure "fellow-feeling" for every upwardly-mobile man, or to 
promote an economy from which women are displaced. Men are 
encouraged, through appropriate self-representation, to 
identify with a principle of pleasure and power, and women, 
to identify with the suffering of disempowered others whose 
situation more nearly approximates their own.
This tension between "masculine" and "feminine" forms of 
sympathetic response is underwritten by an economy of 
pleasure and pain also apparent in eighteenth-century 
aesthetics. In the chapter that follows I demonstrate the 
close relationship between ethics and aesthetics by examining 
the gender-specific subtext of William Wordsworth's 
"sympathetic sublime," where sympathy is pressed in the 
service of aesthetic and "literary" goals. This observation 
opens up an issue central to literary criticism. Several 
critics have noted the absence of the sublime moment in the
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writing of William's sister Dorothy. While this absence has 
sometimes been attributed to a thwarted imagination or some 
"feminine" moral disposition, I argue, in contrast, that 
Dorothy Wordsworth's representation of the sympathetic 
imagination constitutes a partial challenge to the male- 
biased ethico-aesthetic system of William.
Together, the discussions of Smith and Wordsworth point to 
an issue that is central to the second half of this study: 
the way women writers appropriated a male-biased discourse to 
represent the "feminine" in more concrete and socially- 
empowering ways than the male moralists had allowed. The 
first generation of "liberal" feminist writing, represented 
here by Mary Wollstonecraft and Hannah More, was forced to 
contend not only with an ethics and aesthetics that promote 
different moralities for men and women but, more 
significantly, with a hierarchy of values in which those 
moralities are cast— with the way that gender-based relations 
of power were somehow represented not only as "natural," but 
"preferable," or "good." In Chapter Three, I demonstrate that 
Wollstonecraft's purpose is to endow moral women with moral 
"autonomy," in part by reforming "compassion" and revising 
the structure of the impartial spectator, outlined by Smith.
Yet Wollstonecraft shares with Smith, Hume, and even Rousseau 
a belief in the primacy of the "domestic affections," or in 
the role that the family plays in ensuring the stability and 
progress of the state. Correspondingly, she does not 
challenge the public/private dichotomy with which women's 
compassion had been allied. Instead, in an attempt to re-
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value the private role of women, she insists that the "good 
society" is founded upon "mutual sympathy" between a mother 
and her child. In effect, Wollstonecraft displaces the 
doctrine of sexual virtues at the level of moral judgment, 
only to replace it at the level of moral function.
In her partial challenge to the doctrine of sexual 
virtues, however, Wollstonecraft differs from Hannah More, 
the subject of Chapter Four. This presumably conservative 
and, according to modern accounts, anti-feminist writer 
claims with Smith and Rousseau that men and women are endowed 
with different moral dispositions. Given her Christian 
assumptions about the degraded nature of the public world, 
however, this claim enables More to elevate the moral status 
of women, to insist that they enjoy a valuable and even 
superior moral role to that of men, so long as the difference 
between them is maintained. Yet More's distrust of "mutual 
sympathy” and her elevation of compassion is not only related 
to her feminist politics, but to her desire to endow the 
roles of women with moral value. As I shall illustrate 
throughout this chapter, this largely compensatory gesture is 
directly related to conservative political practices whereby 
the compassionate qualities of women serve the greater 
interests of middle class men, that is, to suppress 
dissatisfaction in the increasingly restless laboring poor.
By making the relationship between sympathy, feminism, and 
party politics explicit, I hope to cast light not only upon 
the discourse of sympathy in early feminist writing, but upon 
its relationship to contemporary feminist theory and
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practice, where sympathy is perhaps too quickly regarded as a 
radical and unifying force, while its historical place in a 
relatively conservative middle-class political agenda is too 
easily obscured.
These disparate approaches to sympathy should serve to 
place this presumably "positive” feminine trait within a 
broader historical context. Since the eighteenth century, I 
maintain, sympathy has been allied with various 
humanitarianism impulses and pleas for social reform, from 
both the right and the left. It also appears as a trope in 
aesthetic writing, which would appear to promote no politics 
at all. Yet it is possible to argue that in each of these 
contexts, the discourse of sympathy itself functions as a 
bifurcated program of social control. Whether one agrees with 
the specifics of this argument or not, it is imperative, I 
believe, that the previous successes and failures of sympathy 
be subject to the same kind of scrupulous analysis that 
feminism has brought to the discourse of reason. The fact 
that this protean topos of sympathy, which appears in 
virtually every form and every period of eighteenth-century 
writing, is so familiar to us that it is only now receiving 
some modicum of critical attention, perhaps indicates the 
success of a humanist project systematized by this diverse 
group of eighteenth-century writers. It also, however, 
indicates a need for analyzing sympathy more carefully— for 
asking, again, with Nary Wollstonecraft, "what are these 
imperious sympathies?" What are their contours? How are they 
effected? And, finally, to what extent have they changed?
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Notes to introduction
1. While everyone agrees that with the rise of a market 
economy eighteenth-century women and men began to perform 
different social roles, the precise nature of the 
public/private dichotomy alluded to here is subject to 
ongoing debate. For a useful analysis of this problem, see 
Zaretsky, who argues that until the nineteenth century "while 
there was an intense division of labour within the family, 
there was scarcely a division between the family and the 
world of commodity production" (29). The classic treatment of 
the public/private dichotomy from a feminist point of view is 
Rosaldo 1974, but also Rosaldo 1960, which is a critique of 
the earlier article. See also Jaggar, who discusses the 
public/private dichotomy in relation to both political and 
feminist theory, and Scott (15-50), who offers an excellent 
overview of the problem.
2. See, for example, Raymond Williams' argument in The 
Country and the City (1973); Janet Todd's recapitulation of 
it in Sensibility; An Introduction (1986); and Judith 
Newton's response in "Making— and Re-making— History: Another 
Look at Patriarchy" (1987).
3. While this division, as Alice Browne has noted, is 
intrinsic to the history of feminism itself, the most recent 
example of this tension is the relationship between liberal 
and radical feminism. See Eisenstein.
4. I share this assumption with Michel Foucault, who, toward 
the end of his life, began writing a genealogy of ethics. 
Foucault consistently maintained that while it is impossible 
to locate an "analytical" or "necessary" relationship between 
ethics and "the great political and social and economic 
structures," it is possible to write "a historical ontology 
in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves 
as moral agents" (1984, 350). My project is in that spirit. 
Other accounts of the relationship between ethics and 
politics include Foucault 1988, 373-390. One of the best 
discussions of Foucault's relationship to ethics is 
Davidson's.
5. Nussbaum comments upon a similar ambivalence in her 
discussion of Pope's poem (137-58). For other discussions, 
see Ehrenpreis; and Spacks 1971 and 1976.
6. While this preoccupation with the history of reason is a 
mark of post-structuralist critiques, it is particularly 
apparent in feminist ethical writing, where reason is often 
identified as the single greatest myth of a masculinist 
philosophy. Among psychoanalytic writers, Dorothy Dinnerstein 
was influential, although Chodorow and Gilligan have more 
contemporary followers. One would also have to include 
Irigaray, Kristeva, and Clement and Cixous in this list.
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7. In moral philosophy, as Kathryn Pauley Morgan predicted, 
there are no such "stars" (161) as we find in feminist 
theory, but Lloyd's book (1984) is foundational. Recently, a 
fine collection of essays has been devoted to the problem of 
an "alternative" ethics. See Kittay and Meyers, especially 
the essays by Baier, Held, Friedman, Ruddick (1987), and 
Katzenstein and Laitin.
8. Ideally, a discursive analysis enables one to focus upon 
the differences within a system of what must be regarded as 
cultural codes without either thematizing them or attributing 
such changes to an individual. To read something as a
discourse it is necessary to de-emphasize the speaking
subject, or, in the words of Foucault, to obscure the one who
speaks in order to focus upon the "things said" (1972, 239).
9. Foucault is very clear about this. "There is not, on the 
one side, a discourse of power, and opposite it, another 
discourse that runs counter to it. Discourses are tactical 
elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations; 
there can exist different and even contradictory discourses 
within the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, 
circulate without changing their form from one strategy to 
another, opposing strategy" (1980, 102). While it may be 
possible to speak of "reverse discourses" in which feminists 
and other groups appropriate the practices by which they are 
inscribed, and turn it to their own ends, I do not consider 
this to be a possibility with ethical discourse, since, by 
its very nature, it operates through binaries which can be 
reversed without ever being displaced. For an opposing point 
of view, see Kathleen Jones.
10. It should be said, in passing, that a discursive 
analysis, from some points of view, is in conflict with the 
feminist assumptions outlined above. It has been argued, for 
example, that in treating subjects and subjectivity as 
gender-neutral terms, a discursive analysis undermines the 
feminist project to recover a history from which women as 
subjects have already been excluded. This objection often 
emanates from "her-story" or psychoanalytic critics who would 
preserve, in one way or another, the primacy of the 
engendered subject over discursive formations themselves 
(see, for example, Balbus 1987). In response to this 
objection, I would point out that even in Foucault, the 
subject is not dissolved into an interplay of anonymous 
discursive practices; instead, she or he is concretely 
situated within a discursive space which enables meaning 
within particular bounds. To put it another way, in 
opposition to the idea of a sovereign subject who stands 
outside of linguistic codes, and who would "deposit in the 
discourse the indelible traces of his liberty," Foucault 
posits an author-function whose role and operations, as they 
are exercised by different "discoursing" subjects, might be 
studied (1972, 236). No writer, then, can be said to 
originate meaning, but every piece of writing enables it, in 
more or less immediate ways. Discursive analysis is therefore
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no more or less intrinsically male-biased than any other 
historical methodology. For discussions of the relationship 
between feminism and Foucault, see Weedon 107-135; Diamond 
and Quinby ix-xx; Lydon 135-147. In relation to the problem 
of the writing subject, see Nancy K. Miller for an 
alternative point of view.
11. See Foucault 1973 (17-25), where he argues that 
convenientia, aemulatio, analogy, and sympathy constitute an 
episteme, a  way of ordering knowledge, based upon a series of 
resemblances.
12. The absence of a central female character in a novel 
about a man and his hideous progeny has given rise to any 
number of interesting feminist interpretations, as well. Anne 
K. Mellor, for example, argues quite convincingly that 
Shelley's novel exemplifies the failure of a masculinist 
morality that "rapes" Nature, only to discover that Nature, 
which is feminine, always takes her revenge. "Frankenstein," 
she concludes, "should have better balanced the obligations 
of great and small, of parent and child, of creator and 
created" (230). This interpretation, derived from Gilligan's 
study of feminine moral development, stands in an interesting 
conjunction with the argument here.
13. Other of Scott's distinctions are equally useful. As a 
constitutive, or formative, element of social relationships 
that is dependent upon (shifting) representations of sexual 
difference, gender involves four "interrelated elements": 1) 
culturally available symbols perpetuated by religion or meta- 
ethical systems, such Eve and Mary in Western Christianity;
2) "normative" concepts that "set forth interpretations of 
the meaning of the symbols, that attempt to limit and contain 
their metaphoric possibilities" in religious, legal, 
scientific, and political doctrine; 3) the relationship of 
both the symbols and their meanings to social institutions 
and organizations— to the "political" in the broadest sense 
of that word; and 4) how the preceding relationships 
contribute to subjective identity (43-44).
14. According to Scott, this is the nature of binary logic, 
which normative concepts necessarily promote. They "typically 
take the form of a fixed binary opposition, categorically and 
unequivocally asserting the meaning of male and female, 
masculine and feminine. In fact, these normative statements 
depend on the refusal or repression of alternative 
possibilities, and sometimes overt contests about them take 
place....The position that emerges as dominant, however, is 
stated as the only possible one" (43).
15. See Fiering 198. Hume retains Hobbe's idea that the 
emotion of pity has reference to self-preservation, and is 
thus a species of self-love emanating from personal fear. 
Creating a "fiction of future calamity to ourselves," Hobbes 
had claimed, and provoked by the misfortune of another, we 
respond with "pity."
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16. Feminist approaches to history are myriad and sometimes 
in conflict with one another. In literary criticism, they 
range from reconstructive histories (her-story) and gender 
studies to theoretically-grounded critiques. For discussions 
of the relationship between feminism or women and history, 
see Newton and Rosenfelt, xv-xxxxiv; Fraser and Nicholson; 
Scott 1-50; Smith-Rosenberg; and Allen. Unlike most feminist 
critics, Allen in fact argues that the "professional 
discipline of history is axiomatically phallocentric" in ways 
that are not "amenable to some simple reform of content or 
approach" (187).
17. This ahistorical view of sympathy has done much, of 
course, to create and then reify a myth of romanticism that 
more recent criticism of the period defines itself against. 
M.H. Abrams, for example, reinforces many of Bate's arguments 
in The Mirror and the Lamp (245, 247, 332), where sympathy is 
represented as a hopeful (but deluded) attempt to create a 
bridge between self and other, self and nature. This focus 
upon some subject/object relationship is further exemplified 
in the work of Bloom, Hartman, and De Man, all of whom are 
within a hermeneutic tradition that is implicated in the rise 
of sympathy as a mode of knowledge. This work contrasts 
sharply with those romantic critics who insist that romantic 
poetry is intrinsically social. See, for example, McGann.
18. At least one article has been devoted to challenging 
Fiering's thesis that sympathy is unmediated. John Radner, 
who traces the writing of sympathy from Hutcheson to Dugald 
Stewart, argues convincingly that in most accounts, sympathy 
must be regarded as a deliberate mental exercise rather than 
as an automatic force for social good.
19. Within the past three years, both mainstream literary 
criticism and feminist criticism have shown a renewed 
interest in the problem of sympathy. The major books in the 
first category are Marshall 1986; Marshall 1988; and Mullan 
1988. The writer whose treatment is of sympathy is closest to 
my own, however, is Carol Kay, whose articles are repeatedly 
cited throughout the text.
20. Here, I am dependent upon Foucault's notion of genealogy 
for my analysis of sympathy, in case it is still necessary to 
provide a summary of "genealogy" here goes. Any analysis, 
claims Foucault, is necessarily contingent and radically 
incomplete. It is no longer possible, to assume that words 
have "kept their meaning," or that desires still point "in a 
single direction," or that ideas retain their logic. (1984, 
76). The genealogist recognizes, instead, that the "world of 
speech and desires has known invasions, struggles, 
plunderings, disguises, ploys" (1984, 76). From this point of 
view, history is not only discontinuous and evasive, but in a 
more immediate sense, the product of struggle and contention 
among and within particular discursive practices: ethics, 
aesthetics, psychology, legal codes, etc. Because it is 
impossible to discover all such practices— much less the
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logic by which they are governed— it is necessary, Foucault 
continues, to "record the singularity of events outside of 
any monotonous finality," to seek the events which constitute 
history "in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to 
feel is without history— in sentiments, love, conscience, 
instincts"— not in order to "trace the gradual curve of their 
evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they 
engaged in different roles" (1984, 76).
21. T.D. Campbell points out that the equation between 
sympathy and an emotion was promoted by A. L. Macfie in The 
Individual and Society (95n). Within philosophy, most 
scholars now assume with Campbell that "sympathy is not 
itself a sentiment and it is certainly not to be equated with 
benevolence or pity" (95), although there is some 
disagreement about what it is, or whether or not the concept 
signifies the same thing in Hume and Smith. John Jenkins and 
Glen Morrow argue that sympathy in both cases is essentially 
a principle of communication, by which one person's emotions 
are transferred to another. Campbell agrees with this 
description in the case of Hume, but claims that Smith's 
account of sympathy is closer to Hutcheson's concept of 
"public sense," in which sympathy serves as a standard of 
judgment (95). In order to avoid this debate as much as 
possible and still be fair to the distinctions between Smith 
and Hume, I have found it useful to analyze the various 
structures of sympathy according to whether they promote 
identification with pleasure, or identification with pain.
Part One: Ethics and Aesthetics
’Tis woven in the world's great plan, 
And fixed by Heaven's decree,
That all the true delights of man 
Should spring from Sympathy....
Cowper, "Lines Addressed to Miss 
on Reading 'The Prayer for 
Indi fference'
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Chapter I: The Logic of Sympathy
To insist that sympathy has a history— much less such a 
concretely political one— may, admittedly, seem to be 
counter-intuitive. As literary critics, we tend to think of 
sympathy in one of two ways: immediately, as having reference 
to an emotion promoted by sentimental literature— by scenes 
of "virtue" in "distress"— or more generally, perhaps, as an 
important term in the patho-sympathetic tradition derived 
from Aristotle and perpetuated by modern aesthetics as a 
whole.* Yet as a part of ethical discourse, value terms— -even 
such "friendly" ones as sympathy— are intimately involved in 
the creation of social relationships that, throughout 
history, have elevated the moral status and power of men at 
the expense of their women counterparts. Why, then, have 
Hume, Smith, Hutcheson and others not been subjected to a 
thoroughgoing feminist critique?
One explanation is that, unlike many philosophies, those 
of the British moralists have traditionally been associated 
with "feeling" as distinct from "reason," in part because 
feminist philosophers such as Genevieve Lloyd have set the 
precedent for equating a tradition of philosophical writing 
dependent upon "reason” with woman's secondariness in the 
moral and political realms. Prom this point of view, the 
theories of the British moralists appear, at first glance, to 
be less "totalizing" than those of Kant, Hegel, and others
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who still serve as the bastions of a masculinist intellectual 
2culture. As one critic has commented a propos of Hume's 
theory of judgment, its "most striking feature” is the 
"reduced role assigned in it to reason" {Miller 24). Yet at 
the level of moral judgment, the difference between an ethics 
of reason and the ethics of sympathy is not in fact so 
pronounced as many feminist analyses assume. Although reason 
is displaced as the basis of moral judgment, for example, its 
proscriptive function— to promote a society of reasonable and 
virtuous men— is retained in the impartial spectator, who, 
according to Smith, simply replaces the "casuistic rules" of 
conduct (TMS 227). This point requires no deep reading or 
subtextual analysis. As David Marshall has explained the 
impartial spectator, "He {and he is clearly masculine) is 
alternatively characterized as an ideal observer, an ordinary 
bystander, the voice of the people, an omniscient deity, the 
normative values of society, a relativistic social code, 
absolute standards, the personification of conscience, the 
internalization of social repression, the superego, and 
simply a hypothetical, abstract third person" (1986, 167). In 
each case, the ethics of sympathy promote a set of public 
norms with which, it is apparent, only men can identify.
A second and related explanation for this omission, then, 
is that the reason/feeling binary upon which so many feminist 
analyses depend is an unreliable method for discussing the 
biases of eighteenth-century ethical writing. In short, the 
binary outlined by Lloyd and appropriated by Gilligan and 
others does not always hold. It is increasingly apparent, for
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example, that the ethics of sympathy proper, even though they 
cannot be categorized with the tradition of reason, are only 
peripherally related to "feeling" as such. As John J. Jenkins 
has argued of Hume, "sympathy" is "essentially Hume's account 
of how a sentiment or an emotion is, under certain 
conditions, transferred from one person to another":
It is therefore not itself the name of a 
sentiment. Our temptation to think of it as 
such is a strong one because we now associate 
it with pity or compassion. But, for Hume, 
sympathy is the means by which pity and 
compassion, among other sentiments, may be 
communicated, and hence must be distinguished 
from them. (91)
"To sympathize with others," then, is not to feel a 
particular emotion for them. It is, instead, either to 
project one's feeling upon an (equally sympathetic) audience, 
or to receive by communication the inclinations and 
sentiments of others. In this sense, sympathy is an act of 
imagination, a philosophical fiction by which one imagines 
himself or herself in the situation of another, or the 
principle by which another's responses affect one's own. "As 
we have no immediate experience of what other men feel,"
Smith writes,
we can form no idea of the manner in which 
they are affected, but by conceiving what we 
ourselves should feel in the like 
situation....By the imagination we place
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ourselves in his situation...we enter as it 
were into his body, and become in some 
measure the same person with him, and thence 
form some ideas of his sensations, and even 
feel something which, though weaker in 
degree, is not altogether unlike them. (TMS 10)
As an act of imagination, sympathy is implicated in both 
reason and feeling, even though it is reducible to neither.
It is by virtue of this intermediate position that some 
modern ethical texts, as X shall discuss later, are still 
devoted to arguing whether or not an ethics of sympathy is 
"viable."
Rather than aligning myself with either an ethics of 
feeling or reason, then, I will attempt to treat the ethics 
of sympathy— as other feminist critics have treated reason—  
as an intrinsically male-biased mode of inscription. My 
argument is that the relative merits of any single "moral 
faculty" is less important than the fact that all ethical 
discourse, despite its pretensions to universality, will 
necessarily reflect and reinforce the values of a male-biased 
culture— as the masculinist nature of the impartial spectator 
attests. In this chapter, however, I will examine a second 
way in which the ethics of sympathy, as those involve a 
presumable universal act of the imagination, are 
intrinsically male-biased. The ethics of sympathy, as I have 
suggested, are underwritten by an economy of pleasure and 
pain, through which both Hume and Smith attempt to inscribe 
what they regard as "appropriate" ethical response.
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Significantly, this response differs for men and women. While 
men are encouraged to repress or displace pain and to 
identify with a principle of pleasure, women are represented 
as embodying a "natural" response to the suffering of others.
In effect, then, this "feminine" form of sympathetic response 
is what the ethics of sympathy are written against— it is 
what, through practicing the ethic of "self-command," men are 
told they should overcome. Before drawing conclusions about 
what this gender-specific morality "means," however, one 
should place in it a larger cultural context; one should 
examine the parallels between eighteenth-century theories of 
sympathy and eighteenth-century aesthetic writing, which, by 
virtue of the sympathetic imagination, similarly appeals to a 
principle of pleasure in the attempt to create 
"correspondence of feeling" among already-similar men. From 
this point of view, sympathy appears not simply as a reaction 
against some "feminine" morality, but as a necessary part of 
a larger middle-class ethico-political vision through which 
that association between women and compassion is both de­
valued and reinforced. This has less to do with the "real" 
moral dispositions of eighteenth-century women, than it has 
to do with the exigencies of ethical writing itself, which 
must always operate by creating hierarchies of value.
In making this argument, I shall focus upon Hume's 
Treatise on Human Nature and Smith's Theory of Moral 
Sentiments. While these texts differ on many points, my 
intention is not to explicate them, or to duplicate their own 
intrinsic logic. It is, instead, to examine through a series
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of paradigmatic readings significant points at which they not 
only intersect with each other, but with other discourses, 
such as politics and aesthetics. This amounts to reading 
three distinct but interrelated "moments" in the texts.
First, by examining the relationship between ethical and 
aesthetic discourse, I shall foreground the implicit 
relationship between sympathy and an ethics of reason, where 
one's measure of sympathy (and thus one's measure of 
humanity) is inextricably bound to the desire to represent 
oneself in such a way as to conform to established social 
norms, embodied in and inscribed by the impartial spectator. 
Second, I shall discuss how in this new role— as a self­
regulating principle of communication— sympathy not only 
replaces reason as the basis of ethical judgment; it 
encourages men to identify with a principle of pleasure and 
power, from which women, by virtue of the gender-specific 
subtext of sympathy itself, are excluded. This exclusion, 
moreover, is guaranteed through the "state of nature" 
metaphor that holds up friendship between virtuous men as the 
ne plus ultra of sympathetic response. Consequently, the last 
section of this chapter is devoted to discussing what this 
masculinist economy means.
Correspondence of Feeling
What complicates any analysis of sympathy is that the 
discourse is constantly in flux. Even a brief survey of the 
eighteenth-century literature reveals that the writers 
exploring sympathy were simultaneously inscribing various and
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often contradictory versions of "appropriate" sympathetic 
response, some of which emphasis the importance of "pity" and 
"compassion" in creating the "good society"— or, at least, in 
creating the better man. Generally speaking, however, in the 
ethics of Hume and Smith, while sympathy still serves as the 
vehicle of social progress, its function and telos are more 
closely allied to contemporary aesthetic than contemporary 
Christian doctrine.^ Perhaps the most familiar account of 
sympathetic response, for example, is Hume's "mind of man as 
mirror" metaphor, drawn from the Treatise. Because of its 
importance, I, for the second time, quote from it at length:
In general, we may remark, that the minds of 
men are mirrors to one another, not only 
because they reflect each other's emotions, 
but also because those rays of passion, 
sentiments and opinions may often be 
reverberated, and decay away by insensible 
degrees. Thus the pleasure, which a rich man 
receives from his possessions, being thrown 
upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and 
esteem; which sentiments again, being 
perceiv'd and sympathiz'd with encrease the 
pleasure of the possessor; and being once 
more reflected, become a new foundation for 
pleasure and esteem in the beholder. . . .
(Treatise 414)
The first thing one notices here is the mutuality of 
sympathetic response, whereby sentiments are "reverberated"
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between the spectator, the object of perception, and then
back to the spectator, until they "decay away by sensible
degrees." This emphasis upon mutuality and relationship is 
the hallmark of the discourse of sympathy, and the basis of 
its largely specular structure. The second thing one notices,
however, is the way in which this specular structure is
underwritten by pleasure or "esteem," so that this version of 
sympathetic response is sharply distinguished from theories 
of benevolism and compassion. Together, these two aspects of 
sympathetic response point to something new and peculiarly 
"romantic" about the discourse of sympathy, i.e. that it 
shares the tendency of eighteenth-century aesthetics to 
create social bonds by appealing to principles of "pleasure" 
with which, Hume seems to imply, all human beings may 
"sympathize."
In erecting a social model based on pleasure, Hume and 
Smith are most convincingly reflective of their place and 
time. In the mid-eighteenth century, as Colin Hercer has 
noted, pleasure came to function as a "sort of social 
grammar" (88-89). Through various economies of the emotions—  
through a kind of cost/benefit analyses of pleasure and pain- 
-"utilitarian" writers from Shaftesbury to Malthus to Shelley 
sought to regulate the emotions of distinct groups and 
classes, to organize them in the interests of "greater 
society." Within this context, both ethics and aesthetics 
have a political function. The purpose of ethics is to 
encourage appropriate behavior; the purpose of aesthetics is 
to encourage the refinement of perception upon which behavior
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might eventually be based. Given the mutually-reinforcing 
relationship between ethics and aesthetics, each discourse 
not only appeals to the other, but both appeal to some larger 
normative notion of "the good life1' underwritten by the 
desire for pleasure, and the corresponding desire to avoid 
pain. Any analysis of sympathy, then, must answer this 
question: who, or what, is being organized by sympathy, and 
how does that organization contribute (in theory at least) to 
the utilitarian ideal— "the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number"? Yet this is not easy to do. Precisely 
because ethics and aesthetics are so closely allied, the 
normative impulses behind the ethics of sympathy are easily 
obscured.
Like eighteenth-century aesthetic writing, the discourse 
of sympathy is aligned with metaphors drawn from the world of 
natural forces, popular events, and concrete objects, through 
which, one could argue, each seeks to "ground" itself as a 
natural function. Writers who wish to establish sympathy as a 
universal intuition, for example, often draw upon Newtonian 
physics or recent discoveries in electromagnetics to suggest 
that there is an analogy between such natural physical 
processes and the seemingly natural workings of the mind.
Thus in his explanation of sympathy, Alexander Gerard writes 
that "As the magnet selects from a quantity of matter the 
ferruginous particles, which happen to be scattered through 
it...so imagination, by a similar sympathy, equally 
inexplicable, draws out from the whole compass of nature such 
ideas as we have occasion for, without attending to any
others" (173-74). Other writers of sympathy, as David 
Marshall has illustrated, depend upon the ancient tradition 
of the at rum tnundi to explain the nature and function of 
sympathetic response, in which everyone serves as spectacle 
and spectator (1986, 168). And yet others draw upon an 
equation between the workings of the imagination and the 
"sympathetic system," or the way in which different bodily 
organs were thought to communicate with other (Mullan 228- 
29). However these figures differ from another, each 
functions to explain, promote, or encourage relations between 
people by appealing to some more familiar and concrete 
principle outside the relationship itself.
Hume and Smith share this desire, but unlike many of the 
writers above, rather than simply "proving" sympathy, they 
want to cultivate particular social relationships, to direct 
sympathy in certain ways. For this reason, while they often 
rely upon many of the metaphors above, both Hume and Smith 
appeal to the ancient ideal of social harmony, manifest in 
the correspondence of minds.^ Hume likens the mind of man to 
"strings equally wound up," which "communicate" their 
vibrations to each other (Treatise 576) thereby asserting the 
universal nature of sympathetic response, but also appealing 
to a notion of regularity through which such a universal 
process may be disciplined, regulated, or controlled. The 
same can be said of Smith, who claims that the great pleasure 
of conversation and society "arises from a certain 
correspondence of sentiments and opinion, from a certain 
harmony of minds, which like so many musical instruments
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coincide and keep time with one another” {TMS 337). The 
musical metaphors point to an ideal which certain forms of 
sympathetic response are thought to promote.
This gesture toward universal harmony, should not,
however, obscure the extent to which mutual sympathy is
represented in each text as something of a rare phenomenon,
one dependent, in fact, upon similar experiences, values,
goals— and even {despite the musical metaphor) upon a shared
language itself. To borrow a phrase from Paul De Nan, the
5structure of sympathy is strictly temporal. In the Treatise 
of Human Nature, for example, Hume represents sympathy as a 
universal potential, not as fait accompli: "No quality of 
human nature," he writes, "is more remarkable, both in itself 
and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to 
sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their 
inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even 
contrary to our own" (Treatise 316). This propensity to 
respond "naturally" to the emotions of "others," however, is 
clearly meant to sustain a kind of cultural homogeneity. 
Consequently, Hume's account of sympathy is soon qualified. 
Despite this "general resemblance of our natures," Hume 
writes, any similarity of manners, character, country, or 
language, "facilitates sympathy" (Treatise, 316). Similarly, 
in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, sympathy is even more 
closely associated with a shared language and mutual 
adherence to some pre-existent social authority. Following 
Hume, Smith argues that while the possibility of sympathy 
derives from the assumption that human beings share the
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"seeds and first principles" of all emotions, its actuality 
is dependent upon the familiarity of a particular emotion and 
upon its effective representation. "General lamentations," he 
writes, can create some vague "curiosity" along with the 
"disposition to sympathize," but they cannot provoke any 
"actual sympathy that is very sensible" (TMS 11). Moreover, 
in a kind of back-handed qualification of "universal" 
sympathetic response, Smith claims the following: while "we 
enter more readily into the sentiments, which resemble those 
we feel everyday, no passion, when well-represented, can be 
entirely indifferent to us" [emphasis added] (TMS 22).
The possibility of "correspondence of feeling" turns upon 
effective self-representation. This self-representation, in 
turn, must be regarded as "appropriate," or in conformity 
with pre-established social and cultural norms. One must be 
able to modulate his emotions so that they will conform to—  
"harmonize with"— the emotions of others around him. As Smith 
writes of the character who suffers:
He longs for that relief which nothing can 
afford him but the entire concord of the 
affections of spectators with his own. To see 
the emotions of their hearts, in every 
respect, beat time to his own, in the violent 
and disagreeable passions, constitutes his 
sole consolation. But he can only hope to 
obtain this by lowering his passion to that 
pitch, in which the spectators are capable of 
going along with him. He must flatten . . .
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the sharpness of his natural tone, in order 
to reduce it to harmony and concord with the 
emotions of those who are about him. (TMS 22)
In effect, Smith's sympathetic individual "tunes" and "re­
plays" his emotions until they are harmony with those of the 
people who are watching him. By making "fellow-feeling" 
dependent upon a shared culture or a common language— even 
upon a well-constructed narrative of the emotions— Smith, 
like Hume, implies that sympathy involves a calculated act of 
self-representation that— like language, one assumes— itself 
reflects the values and norms of a previously-shared culture.
Because sympathy functions as a self-regulating principle 
of appropriate emotional response, it is able to replace 
reason as the foundation of moral judgment. In essence, the 
individual, by virtue of the ability to sympathize, is 
simultaneously made the embodiment of culturally-inherited 
notions of right and wrong. In Part VII of his Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, for example, Smith argues against Cudworth 
and other moralists that while "reason is undoubtedly the 
source of the general rules of morality . . .  it is 
altogether absurd and unintelligible to suppose that the 
first perceptions of right and wrong can be derived from 
reason" (TMS 320). Instead, he argues that these first 
impressions are derived from "sense and feeling," from the 
comparative pleasure or pain with which one views the actions 
and emotions of others. In this sense, society— or, more 
precisely, the people within it— provides a "mirror" of one's 
character, insofar as "social man" will respond approvingly
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or disapprovingly to the men or women around him:
[Society} is placed in the countenance and 
behavior of those he lives with, which always 
mark when they enter into, and when they 
disapprove of his sentiments; and it is here
that he first views the propriety and
impropriety of his own passions, the beauty 
and deformity of his own mind. (TMS 110)
In other words, society provides the opportunity for "self- 
reflection" (TMS 111-112) that sympathy, as a self-regulating 
vehicle of social judgment, will exercise and maintain.
Sympathy is dependent upon a concentrated act of self­
representation in a society that will "mirror" one's actions 
and demeanor with approval or disapproval. As the above 
passages suggest, Hume and Smith rely heavily upon visual and 
aural metaphors in describing the normative aspect of 
sympathetic response. Their reliance upon metaphors drawn 
from an expressivist aesthetics, however, creates a problem 
in the realm of moral judgment, since according to that
logic, an appropriate member of society must always be
present for moral judgment to occur— in order for one to 
"view . . . the beauty or deformity of [his] own mind" (TMS 
110). The British moralists simply elide this problem by 
raising the specular structure of sympathy to a higher level. 
Both appeal to a principle of "disinterested" judgment which, 
in each account, will be internalized by every social actor.® 
Following Shaftesbury, Smith claims that one "divides" 
himself into two persons, the "examiner" or "judge" and the
"one who is judged" (TMS 113). The effect of this splitting 
is to internalize the impartial spectator, an "imaginary
third person” who serves as the embodiment of societal
expectations and norms.^ In effect, one "enters into" (and 
thus internalizes) the ethos of a society, and through that 
act, one modulates one's behavior, passions, and desires. "We 
suppose ourselves the spectators of our own behavior," writes 
Smith, "and endeavor to imagine what effect it would, in this 
light, produce on us. This is the only looking-glass by which 
we can, in some measure, with the eyes of other people, 
scrutinize the propriety of our own conduct" (TMS 112).
This account of a self-correcting morality has its 
advantages for feminist critics interested in erecting a
moral system distinct from Kantian ethics, or from any ethics
of reason. At least one philosopher has seen in Hume's 
account of moral judgment an alternative to rule-based 
ethics, which may qualify Hume as "the women's moral 
theorist" (Baier 40). "To become a good fellow-person," she 
writes, "one doesn't consult some book of rules, but 
cultivates one's capacity for sympathy, or fellow feeling, as 
well as for that judgment needed when conflicts arise between 
the different demands on us such sympathy may lead us to
Qfeel" (Baier 40). One wonders. Admittedly, there is perhaps 
nothing intrinsically male-biased about an imaginary third 
party that serves as a "mirror" of pre-existent cultural 
norms, particularly when those are cast, as they are here, 
into an historicist account of morality; and the goal of 
sympathy— to create "correspondence of feeling"— does not
66
automatically mark the ethics of sympathy as a masculinist 
enterprise. Yet the discourse of sympathy, I have insisted, 
does more than mirror the desire for "correspondence of 
feeling" among already similar creatures; its greater 
project, as we have seen in the preceding section, is to 
provide concrete models of social coherence, to "produce" a 
society based on pleasure from which women, 1 would argue, 
are necessarily excluded. In order to see how this works, it 
is necessary to leave the theory of moral judgment, with all 
its mirrors, music, spectators, and spectacles, and to 
examine the gender-specific behaviors which, through those 
trappings, both Hume and Smith hoped to promote.
Like the ethics of reason, the discourse of sympathy is 
intrinsically male-biased, a s  we have seen, despite the 
seemingly universal metaphors with which sympathy is allied, 
sympathy, as one critic has flatly stated, is "based upon the 
desire for self-preservation of equal, independent, and 
competitive men of the world" (Mizuta 127). In the following 
section, I shall illustrate how sympathy is a social virtue 
promoted by men for each other. The ability to sympathize 
with the pleasure or power (and, simultaneously, to control 
and regulate pain) is part of a masculine ideal, the "ethic 
of self command," which both Hume and Smith actively promote. 
This masculine ideal which may lead to "commerce of feeling" 
is clearly distinguished from the moral disposition of women, 
who are encouraged to practice "humanity," the automatic 
compassion that Hume and Smith would have their male readers 
rise above. The doctrine of sexual virtues is thus cast into
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an implicit hierarchy of values, underwritten by pleasure and 
pain. The effect of this double-edged mode of engenderment is 
to displace women from the realm of mutual sympathy. And 
that, in turn, is to deny that women are capable of ethical 
judgment at all.
The Ethic of Self-Command
It has often been argued by more skeptical critics than Baier 
that the greatest contribution of the British benevolists was 
to underwrite a market economy with a moral system whereby
all would seem to benefit from an individual's success, to
*
cast ambition and individual improvement as an intrinsically 
moral enterprise.*® Yet without extensive scholarship, one 
can only speculate about the relationship between economics 
and sympathy, as those reflect actual social conditions, in 
other words, it is impossible to determine exactly how the 
"real" and the "social imaginary"— to borrow terms from 
contemporary critical theory— interact in eighteenth-century 
ethics, so that relationship will not be discussed in any 
depth here. What is apparent, however, is that while both 
Hume and Smith are often regarded as optimists, their texts 
reveal an insecurity about the rapidly changing social forces 
that middle-class men were forced to confront. On the one 
hand, passages such as the following seem to mark Smith, as 
popular opinion holds, as one who has a kind of blind faith 
in social progress.*1 "What can be added," he writes, "to the 
happiness of the man who is in health, who is out of debt, 
and who has a clear conscience?" (45) "This situation," he
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continues, "may very well be called the natural and ordinary
state of mankind" (45). Yet, as though Smith were not sure
that this optimistic view is entirely convincing, in the
following sentence, he repeats himself: "Notwithstanding the
present misery and depravity of the world, so justly
lamented, this really is the state of the greater part of
men" (TMS 45). This insecurity, or instability, about the
present state of the world perhaps helps explain why much of
the Theory of Moral Sentiments is devoted to promoting
admirable behavior when one is forced to confront the
12"present misery and depravity of the world." His warning 
that men should avoid self-indulgence or self-pity in the 
face of financial misfortune is typical. If a man "should be 
reduced to beggary and ruin," he writes, and "if he should 
even be led out to a public execution, and there shed one 
single tear upon the scaffold, he would disgrace himself for 
ever in the opinion of all the gallant and generous part of 
mankind" (TMS 49).
Reasoning from the above examples, it becomes apparent 
that ethical writing emerges from a culture that Hume and 
Smith wanted to shape, to control, or to transcend, in part 
by re-writing the codes of "appropriate" sympathetic response 
so as to displace whatever threatens equanimity, hope, or 
repose. Much of Moral Sentiments is devoted to this task.
Smith painstakingly outlines the passions as unsocial, 
social, and selfish (27-43); describes the proper objects of 
gratitude and resentment (69-71); explains our natural regard 
for ambition and the distinction of ranks (50-61), justice
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and beneficence (78-92), and the sense of duty (171-179). 
Underwriting all of these "descriptions," however, is Smith's 
attempt to inculcate a particular ethos based upon "the ethic 
of self-command" set against what he regards as "passive" 
emotional response, or a willingness to respond to pain.
In marked contrast to so-called "sentimental literature" 
(with which the ethics of sympathy are nevertheless sometimes 
associated) the Theory of Moral Sentiments is peppered with 
allusions to "weakness" and "effeminacy"— almost 
interchangeable terms— in the face of suffering that Smith 
would have his male counterparts rise above. A commonplace of 
"sentimental" literature, for example, is (as Belford tells 
Lovelace in Clarissa) that "tears . . . are no signs of an
unmanly, but contrarily of a humane nature; they ease the
overcharged heart, which would burst but for that kindly and 
natural relief." Smith inverts this "natural" order by 
representing such tears as being inconsiderate to the company 
by which one is surrounded. "When we attend to the 
representation of a tragedy,” he writes:
. . .  we struggle against that sympathetic 
sorrow which the entertainment inspires as 
long as we can, and we give way to it at 
least only when we can no longer avoid it: we 
even then endeavor to cover our concern from
the company, if we shed any tears, we
carefully conceal them, lest the spectators, 
not entering into this excessive tenderness, 
should regard it as effeminacy and weakness.
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(THS 46)
Although this example is meant to illustrate a presumably 
"natural" reluctance to sympathize with sorrow, it 
simultaneously associates the "passive virtue" of sympathetic 
sorrow with "effeminacy and weakness" and sets up Smith's 
discussion of active virtue promoted through the ethic of 
self-command.
The ethic of self-command is responsible for "mutual" 
sympathetic response as that was outlined in the previous 
section, and to the desire to suppress pain as outlined here.
In his chapter "On Propriety," Smith describes the effect of 
some "more than mortal" character who maintains magnanimity 
"amidst great distress" (THS 47-48). Much like the would-be 
tearful spectator in the preceding example, this fictional 
hero is able to control his response to suffering and thus to 
"enter into" the thoughts and feelings of the largely 
compassionless crowd. "We feel," he writes,
. . . what an immense effort is requisite to 
silence those violent emotions which 
naturally agitate and distract those in his 
situation. We are amazed to find that he can 
command himself so entirely. His firmness, at 
the same time, perfectly coincides with our 
insensibility. He makes no demand upon us for 
that more exquisite degree of sensibility 
which we find . . . that we do not possess.
There is the most perfect correspondence 
between his sentiments and ours, and on that
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account, the most perfect propriety in his 
behavior. (TMS 48)
The "firmness" of this character, his "immense" act of 
repression in the face of suffering marks this fictional hero 
as a decidedly masculine ideal, set against "weakness" and 
"effeminacy" in the face of pain.
Significantly, such self-control is dependent upon one's 
own consciousness of publicness, that is, upon an awareness 
that one is already in the public eye. He provokes the 
"complete sympathy and approbation of the spectators," Smith 
continues, by removing his thoughts from the "naturally 
terrible or. disagreeable in his situation" (THS 49). Instead, 
he "fixes his thoughts" upon the only thing that he finds 
"agreeable," that is, "the applause and admiration" of the 
crowd (TMS 49). This awareness of public approbation, 
combined with the feeling that he has control over his own 
behavior, then "animates and transports him with joy," Smith 
writes, "and enables him to support that triumphant gaiety 
which seems to exult in the victory he thus gains over his 
misfortunes" (TMS 49). The crowd, in turn— "under no fear 
that [such sympathy] will transport [it] to anything that is 
extravagant and improper" (TMS 49)— responds with "mutual" 
sympathy combined with "strength and astonishment at that 
strength of mind” (TMS 48). The end result of this process is 
"admiration"— both in one's own eyes and in the eyes of 
others.
Such a desire to suppress or to displace pain may at first 
sight appear to contradict the regard for others upon which
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any ethic of sympathy is presumably based. Smith, however, 
anticipating this objection, simply incorporates "humanity" 
into the ethic of self-command as a sensibility to sorrow 
that must be suppressed, controlled, and finally overcome. 
First, he argues that "our sensibility to the feelings of 
others, so far from being inconsistent with the manhood of 
self-command, is the very principle upon which that manhood 
is founded" (TMS 152). in his formulation,
The man who feels the most for the joys and 
the sorrows of others, is best fitted for 
acquiring the most complete control of his 
own joys and sorrows. The man of the most 
exquisite humanity, is naturally the most 
capable of acquiring the highest degree of 
self-command. {THS 152)
This apparent paradox is perfectly in keeping with Smith's 
description of the function of the impartial spectator. 
According to his characterization, we recall, one will 
"naturally" modulate his emotions so that they will 
correspond with the emotions of the people around him. The 
"man of the most exquisite humanity," then, because he has 
more practice in controlling those emotions, will in that 
sense be capable of "acquiring the highest degree of self- 
command. "
Second, Smith, posits a "higher" humanity based upon the 
ability to control one's emotions and thus to identify more 
completely with the impartial spectator. The fact that one is 
able to control one's response to sorrow— or, more properly.
to displace it— enables men to perceive and to act upon the 
"higher beauty" of "utility#" or to recognize and enter into 
the systems through which the greater good of society might 
be served (TMS 192). Self-command is thought to lead, in 
turn# to a host of public virtues# including "generosity" and 
"public-spiritedness" (TMS 190-193). From this point of view, 
those who exercise the ethic of self-command— those who 
sacrifice their "personal” feeling for the public good— are 
akin to "good soldiers" who, serving a "greater humanity," 
are willing to follow the design dictated by the great 
Director of the universe. "They cheerfully resign their own 
little systems," Smith writes, "to the prosperity of a 
greater system" (TMS 236).
What is this "greater system"? Significantly, Smith's 
higher good has a clearly conservative component. Arguing 
both against English radicals, inspired by the French 
Revolution, and against moralists who advocate charity for 
the poor, Smith claims that the "peace and order of society," 
which depends on some "natural respect for the rich and 
powerful" is of "more importance than even the relief of the 
miserable" (TMS 226). He is interested in preserving the 
distinction of ranks and order in society, in maintaining the 
status q u o . "The man whose public spirit is prompted 
altogether by humanity and benevolence," he claims, "will 
respect the established powers and privileges even of 
individuals, and still more those of the great orders and 
societies into which the state is divided" (TMS 233). As this 
reliance upon established social order suggests, the Theory
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of Moral Sentiments is a book haunted from two directions: 
from fear of the political tyrant, on the one hand, and from 
fear of the crowd in England, on the other {see Thompson 
1974, 395). More importantly, perhaps, this clearly 
conservative aspect of the text suggests that Smith's 
determination to ensure social order is directly and 
unavoidably related to the desire to obscure or smooth over 
pre-existent structures of inequality in the society itself, 
so as to focus upon the joys and rewards of individual self- 
improvement .
If any man hopes to "distinguish himself," Smith writes,
"he must be patient in labour, resolute in danger, and firm 
in distress. These talents he must bring into a public view, 
by the difficulty, importance, and, at the same time, good 
judgment of his undertakings" (TMS 55). In short, he must be 
able, through "appropriate" self-representation, both to 
identify with public expectations and, through acting upon 
them, to be capable of evoking admiration and respect. In 
describing the effects of individual ambition, in fact, Smith 
borrows metaphors from another aesthetic construct, the 
sublime. "With what impatience does the man of spirit and 
ambition," he writes, "look round for some opportunity to 
distinguish himself?":
No circumstances, which can afford this 
appear to him undesirable. He even looks 
forward to the prospect of foreign war, or 
civil dissension; and, with secret transport 
and delight, sees through all the confusion
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and bloodshed which attend them, the 
probability of those wished-for occasions 
presenting themselves, in which he may draw 
upon himself the attention and admiration of 
mankind {THS 55).
In this passage, the middle-class male (any middle-class 
male) is represented— in potential at least— as a modern hero 
whose own self-improvement is inextricable related to the 
success or failure of society as a whole. Presumably, in 
elevating his own station in society, this modern soldier is 
simply serving his public duty.
At this point, it is useful to summarize the logic of 
Smith's argument. As we have seen, the "impartial spectator" 
is represented as the embodiment of social expectations and 
norms which, as Smith makes clear, are underwritten not only 
by a principle of pleasure, but through that, by the ethic of 
self-command. Given the martial metaphors in particular, it 
is equally clear that self-command is represented as a 
masculine enterprise, set against the "weakness" and 
"effeminacy" of feeling in the face of suffering others. In 
fact, the text as a whole promotes an esprit de corps based 
upon a principle of resemblance, the mutual admiration of 
(upwardly mobile) men for each other, where, then, are women 
in this system? What is their function, and what does 
sympathy have to do with that? David Marshall, noting the 
absence of women in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
attributes that to Smith's desire to promote the ethic of 
self-command. He suggests that because Smith "stands for the
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opposite of exhibitionism" associated with sensibility, and 
because the eighteenth century "closely associated both 
sympathy and sentiment with 'feminine' sensibilities," women 
are not included in Smith's account of "appropriate" 
sympathetic response (1986, 184). Leaving aside, for the 
moment, the presumably historical relationship between women 
and sensibility, one thing is clear: the ethic of self- 
command as promoted by Smith is in no way a self-effacing 
moral structure, as Marshall implies. As we have seen, it is 
simply a vehicle to greater glory, the means by which one may 
"distinguish himself," or "draw upon himself the attention 
and admiration of mankind" (TMS 55). In promoting the ethic 
of self-command, Smith does not, moreover, exclude women 
from his system. He simply engenders them, or associates the 
"feminine" with a particular moral disposition against which 
men of good will were encouraged to react. In this sense, 
women are not really absent from the text. Instead, they and 
the "feminine" virtues they are thought to embody are present 
as a principle of difference which, by virtue of its 
difference, is simultaneously devalued.
The engendering we have seen above is duplicated in 
Smith's discussions of "other"— competing— ethical systems, 
as well. In his analysis of Stoicism, for example. Smith 
makes the point that any "extreme" sympathy with the 
"misfortunes of others whom we know nothing about, seems 
altogether absurd and unreasonable" (TMS 140). It is 
"useless," he claims, to feel for people "outside our sphere 
of activity" (TMS 140). Calling for a "moderated sensibility
to the misfortunes of others," Smith argues that, like the 
Stoics, one must "control these passive feelings" (TMS 145). 
"We esteem the man who supports pain and even torture," he 
writes, "with manhood and firmness; . . . and we can have 
little regard for him who sinks under them, and abandons 
himself to useless outcries and womanish lamentations (TMS 
244). Aligning his system with the "manly" ethics of the 
ancients, Smith establishes its superiority to the 
"desponding, plaintive, and whining tone of some modern 
systems" of morality (TMS 283). In their openness to the 
suffering and disempowered. Smith argues, such systems 
"soften" rather than "elevate" the mind (TMS 325-26). By 
virtue of this feminization in the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, the cult of benevolism practiced by Hutcheson and 
others is effectively displaced.
The most interesting aspect of this text is the way that 
sex and economics are so strangely and intimately allied.
Lest one be tempted to overemphasize one or the other— to 
read this move, for example, as a mark of Smith's "fear” of 
"feminine" sexuality, or simply as part of bourgeois 
ideology— it is useful to back away from the analyses above, 
and to consider the logic of text as a whole. Within this 
system, (to borrow a term from Luce Irigaray) the female sex 
has no "specificity" (69); instead, the "feminine" serves as 
a social accusation. To put it another way, the "feminine" is 
not so much a description of female behavior as it is a by­
product of ethical writing, a strategy by which the "other" 
is removed. This point, however subtle, has everything to do
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with how one reads the discourse as a mode of engenderment.
As I have mentioned, Carol Kay has argued that the 
moralists of the mid-eighteenth century— Smith, Hume, and 
Rousseau— were distinguished from Hobbes in taking a "more 
positive view of woman's sensitiveness" which, to a certain 
extent, they desired to share (1986, 71). Yet, she continues, 
in an "apparently contradictory move, they reintroduced a 
masculine difference" embodied in the ethic of self-command. 
This "neoclassicizing reintroduction to virtue” she calls the 
"remasculinization" of moral theory, "putting the vi r , the 
Latin word for man, back into virtue" (1986, 71). From this 
point of view, male moralists appropriated seemingly natural 
feminine qualities and shaped those their own ends. Much of 
the analysis above seems to accord with this view, yet a 
troubling question remains: when, in moral theory, did 
"feminine" virtues, including "sensitiveness," ever serve as 
the basis of an ethical system, much less as the basis of one 
that had to be "remasculinized"? And since when has the 
"feminine" served as anything other than a social accusation, 
by which other, competing, moral theories could be displaced? 
Ethical theory— produced and propagated by men— will 
necessarily serve to reflect and reinforce the structures of 
a society dominated by men, as well. Rather than making 
arguments based on some pre-conceived and empirical 
difference, then, it is important to attend to the hierarchy 
of values at the basis of any ethical system itself.
Here, these operate through an implicit binary. Both Hume 
and Smith seek to join sympathy to a principle of pleasure,
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which, they imply, is largely the province of middle class 
men practicing the ethic of self-command, in their systems, 
the "feminine" is associated with weakness and fear, an 
association that turns upon women's presumably natural 
response to pain. In this sense (again to paraphrase Luce 
Irigaray) "Woman herself is never at issue" (70). instead the 
feminine is "always described in terms of deficiency or 
atrophy, as the other side of the sex that alone holds a 
monopoly on value (69). In employing the "feminine" as a de­
valued principle of difference, moreover, Hume and Smith are 
actually drawing upon a characterization of womanish weakness 
as old as ethical writing itself. Aristotle, for example, who 
had represented women as the passive principle of life, 
argued that because "woman is more compassionate than man, 
more easily moved to tears" she is "more shrinking, more 
difficult to rouse to action"— and therefore, he adds,
"requires a smaller amount of nutrient" (49). Given women's 
seemingly natural inertia, "the nature of the man is the most 
rounded off and complete" (49). Similarly, Hume and Smith do 
not appear to be "appropriating" some natural feminine 
morality to their own ends; they are, instead, reinforcing 
women's age-old place as man's moral inferior within a 
hierarchy of values where this difference is easily obscured. 
The result is that "mutual sympathetic response" is a less 
universal phenomenon— or, a more discriminating trope— than 
we might otherwise assume.
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Naturalizing Sympathy
Zn order to naturalize the system outlined above— to 
represent it as organic, universal, and true— Smith and Hume 
must not only establish the moral superiority of men; they 
must redirect the "normal" path of the sympathetic 
imagination toward pleasure and away from pain. First Smith, 
like Hume before him, broadens the definition of sympathy to 
include a host of emotions. "Pity and compassion," Smith 
writes,
are words appropriated to signify our fellow- 
feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, 
though its meaning was, perhaps, originally 
the same, may now, however, without much 
impropriety, be made use of to denote our 
fellow-feeling with any passion whatsoever.
(TMS 10)14
Later, however, claiming that "it is painful to go along with 
grief, and we always enter into it with reluctance" (TMS 46), 
Smith seeks to align the sympathetic imagination almost 
exclusively with the ability to respond to "joy"; through a 
complicated slight of hand, he argues that "our propensity to 
sympathize with joy," is, in fact, "much stronger than our 
propensity to sympathize with sorrow" (TMS 45). Although the 
ability to respond to sorrow is, then, "an original passion" 
which even "the greatest ruffian" shares (TMS 9), the ability 
to respond to joy is somehow more authentic; "Our sorrow at a 
funeral generally amounts to no more than an affected 
gravity; but our mirth at a christening or a marriage, is
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always from the heart, and without any affectation" (TMS 47).
Given that even "ruffians" have the natural ability to 
respond to pain, sympathy derived from pleasure is 
represented as the more civilized response, as the one most 
indicative of truly social impulses. As some of the examples 
above indicate, this form of sympathy has a vested interest 
in structures of community: in "commerce of feeling," in 
christenings and marriages, and in what Smith calls the 
"distinction of ranks," or in preserving social hierarchy and 
order. It also, however, seeks to naturalize one's admiration 
for wealth and power, to make the sympathetic imagination, 
now allied with pleasure, virtually a vehicle of social 
progress itself.
We can see how this works in the ethics of Hume and Smith 
by isolating the ways in which the sympathetic imagination 
reflects and reinforces structures of power thought to 
characterize the real or ideal society. As Carol Kay has 
a r g u e d , ^  Hume holds that the sympathetic imagination is 
responsible for one's pleasurable identification with the 
wealthy and the powerful. According to Hume, for example, our 
esteem for both riches and the beautiful objects they may 
procure arises chiefly from sympathy with the imagined 
satisfaction of the owner (Treatise 359-362). Since the 
sympathetic imagination always, says Hume, "passes more 
easily to the empowered," it is also used to justify social 
difference or to obscure exclusion deemed necessary to social 
progress. " ’Tis a quality of human nature," he writes, "that 
the imagination naturally turns to whatever is important and
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considerable; and where two objects are presented to it, a 
small one and a great one, usually leaves the former, and 
dwells entirely upon the latter" (Treatise 309). We can see 
this even in Hume's description of the eighteenth-century 
family. To illustrate, in the following example Hume 
justifies and explains away fundamental male-biases of a 
culture on the basis of the "natural" workings of the 
sympathetic imagination. As "in the society of marriage," he 
writes, "the male sex has the advantage above the female,” in 
the association of ideas,
the husband first engages our 
attention...'Tis easy to see, that this 
property must strengthen the child's relation 
to the father, and weaken that to the mother 
. . . as we have a stronger propensity to 
pass from the idea of the children to that of 
the father, from the same idea to that of the 
mother, we ought to regard the former 
relation as the closer and more considerable.
This is the reason why children commonly bear 
their father's name, and are esteem'd to be 
of nobler or baser birth, according to his 
family. (Treatise 309)
The sympathetic imagination appears here to be animated by 
what Kay terms a "principle of imaginative attraction to the 
greater person" (77-78). This principle is used to explain 
the basis of the patriarchal family whose asymmetrical 
structures Hume would protect. In other places, the principle
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of attraction to the greater person becomes aligned with an 
impulse of upward mobility— indeed, the imagination serves as 
a barometer of one's ambition and taste.
Similarly, in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith 
attributes the desire to be wealthy to the notion that we 
have a "natural disposition" to sympathize with the rich and 
powerful. "The rich man glories in his riches," Smith writes, 
because he feel that they naturally draw upon 
him the attention of the world, and that 
mankind are disposed to go along with him in 
all those agreeable emotions with which the 
advantages of situation so readily inspire 
him. (TMS 50-51)
The "poor man," in contrast, "goes out and comes in unheeded, 
and when in the midst of a crowd is in the same obscurity as 
if shut up in a hovel" (TMS 51). The greater part of his 
misery is not physical discomfort. Instead, it is derived 
from the awareness that his poverty removes him from the 
mutual sympathetic response through which greater society is 
organized; poverty "places him out of the sight of mankind," 
writes Smith, or "if they take any notice of him, they have .
. . scarce any fellow-feeling with the misery and distress 
which he suffers" (TMS 51).
In each of its aspects, sympathy betrays and legitimizes a 
seemingly natural desire toward upward mobility, or, at 
least, toward identification with wealth and power. Thus 
despite Smith's seemingly compassionate references to the 
disempowered (such as the impoverished man); despite his
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condescending appreciation of woman's "exquisite humanity"; 
and despite his chapter-long accolade to the blessings of the 
"domestic affections"; the "most respectable" attachment to 
another individual in the Theory of Moral Sentiments is,
Smith argues, the friendship between or among virtuous men.
In fact, now that sympathy is allied with a "natural" 
principle of pleasure, such attachments are represented as 
being prior to culture, or, to use his term, "involuntary":
Such friendships, arising not from a 
constrained sympathy, not from a sympathy 
which has been assumed and rendered habitual 
for the sake of conveniency and accommodation 
[such as the affection for family members]; 
but from a natural sympathy, from an 
involuntary feeling that the persons to whom 
we attach ourselves are the natural and 
proper objects of esteem and approbation, can 
exist only among men of virtue [emphasis 
added]. (TMS 224)
Once again, the "involuntary" sympathy between ambitious men, 
or the "proper objects of esteem," is dependent upon their 
having exercised the ethic of self command, it is dependent, 
in other words, upon their having "distinguished" themselves- 
-upon their having controlled, suppressed, or finally 
displaced whatever is painful, or weak, or "feminine," both 
in themselves and, ultimately, in the culture they hope to 
control. It is dependent, in short, upon their having 
substituted a positive version of "natural" sympathy for a
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less positive one, now associated exclusively with women.
These strategies, I believe, support my argument that 
sympathy is a double-edged mode of engenderment, or that 
"sensitiveness" and "compassion" as peculiarly feminine 
virtues arise simultaneously with the ethic of self-command, 
so that the latter may establish a point of difference within 
that hierarchy on which its legitimacy is based.
Women and Disempowerment
As I have already mentioned, if the ethics of sympathy are 
male-biased, they are so in a complicated way, in terms of a 
constantly-shifting hierarchy of value that nevertheless 
serves to preserve unequal relations of power. By 
abstracting the language of sympathy from the concrete 
conditions of its production, I have analyzed its logic.
While in popular parlance, sympathy is usually taken to be 
humanitarian feeling for some generalized other, I have 
argued that it is finally a vehicle of ethical inscription 
which pretends to be divorced from the relations of power 
that characterize eighteenth-century society, even while it 
reflects and reinforces those relations. Sympathy functions 
as a Janus-faced phenomenon— as a (masculine) principle of 
communication and as a (feminine) openness to suffering. 
Clearly, however, this argument is deceptively simple. When 
sympathy is regarded, as it has been here, as an axiological 
term— as one involved in the self-conscious writing of value- 
-it seems to assume some meta-historical status; it seems, in 
fact, to bear the burden of culture itself. That is not the
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impression I wish to convey. Although it has been necessary, 
for the sake of analysis, to foreground a relationship 
between the ethics of sympathy and masculine power, I do not 
mean to imply that ethical discourse w.as single-handedly 
"responsible" for the secondary status of eighteenth-century 
women. The discourse, after all, is itself implicated in 
changing social conditions— including class consciousness, 
property rights, and marriage laws— which I do not address.
Nor do I mean to suggest that women were the unwilling 
victims of a dominant mode of discourse through which they 
were duped, co-opted, and eventually displaced. As I shall 
discuss later, writers such as Wollstonecraft and More 
actively sought to revise the ethics of sympathy, to amend 
the hierarchy of values outlined here. Yet only by having put 
the ethics of sympathy within a context that allows for 
analysis of the hierarchy of values that sympathy seek to 
promote, are we finally allowed to see what is at stake for 
Hume, Smith, and others: the values of middle-class 
individualism on which liberalism— and, 1 might add, popular 
conceptions of community— are based. And these values, like 
those of the ethics of sympathy, have different implications 
for men and women.
Within this context, the most significant and "novel" 
thing about the ethics of sympathy is not simply that Hume, 
Smith, and others retain the age-old association between 
compassion and "womanly weakness"; it is, instead, that they 
place this mode of feminization within a peculiarly modern 
frame, within a larger argument about the importance of the
87
"domestic affections" and "public duty," where the hierarchy 
of value intrinsic to the ethics of sympathy is easily 
obscured. We have already previewed this asymmetrical 
structure in the distinction drawn by Hume and Smith between 
the "amiable virtues" and the "virtues of esteem"— between 
"pity," a sign of weakness, and "sympathy" as a form of 
mutual response. According to Smith, women are characterized 
mostly by their ability to respond: to "grieve for 
(another's] sufferings, to resent their injuries, and to 
rejoice at their good fortune" (THS 186). Undoubtedly, these 
so-called feminine qualities are valued, but it is 
interesting that they are represented as involuntary 
responses to others that Hume and Smith, each in their own 
way, would have their male counterparts rise above. In 
Smith's account, the "soft" virtues are thought to be 
"antecedent to [one's] connection with society" (TMS 192).
The virtues of "esteem," in contrast, are represented as 
being "in consequence of that connexion," or as being 
socially-learned and exclusively male roles. Generosity, for 
example, a virtue of "esteem," is the willingness to make 
donations; the willingness to give up a desired position to a 
better man; the willingness to sacrifice one's life for one's 
country. Unlike woman's "humanity," generosity implies an 
appeal to public functions that will serve to measure one's 
worth; it is to act with "propriety" in light of the "greater 
system,” or, as Smith will write, to act "so as to deserve 
applause" (TMS 192-93). Significantly, these are virtues 
from which women, given the structure of eighteenth-century
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society, are necessarily excluded. To mark women as 
"naturally" passive receptacles for the emotions of others, 
then, (however much that reflects woman's real social status) 
is simultaneously to reinforce that status as marginalized 
figures within an asymmetrical society. In fact, in the eyes 
of the moralist, women are thereby represented as subjects of 
pity themselves: "There is a helplessness in the character of 
extreme humanity," Smith writes, "which more than anything 
interests our pity" (40).
Women occupy a precarious position in the discourse of
sympathy. While their compassionate qualities are thought to
be necessary to the good society, those, clearly, are not
held in equal esteem, in fact, they appear to be precisely
what eighteenth-century ethical theory defines itself
against. When these gender-specific virtues are placed within
the logic of sympathy as a whole, moreover, its male-biased
implications quickly multiply. Because women do not have that
previous "connexion" with society— because they are always
already marginalized and disempowered— they cannot
internalize the impartial spectator. And this means, in
effect, that they cannot serve as judges of their own moral
behavior. Endowed, perhaps, with the potential or the nascent
humanity to exercise mutual sympathy, because they are
private creatures, women have no opportunity to do so. They
are instead represented as the passive subjects of a
masculinist ethics who, in a by-now familiar formulation,
17simply have little or no access to the "higher good."
These marginalized but "feeling" others, given their economic
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and ethical dependency, can but rely on men, whose "awful" 
virtues in contrast mark them as the arbiters of social 
progress. Within this fairly self-enclosed system, humanity—  
an automatic response to the emotions of others— is 
represented as the only virtue, the only ambition, to which 
women may aspire.
The recognition that sympathy is somehow allied with 
schemes for social progress, where those are dependent upon a 
mode of engenderment, underscores the essentially political 
nature of the discourse. Although I have focused upon a few 
aspects of one small part of moral theory here, as part of an 
ideology (as distinct from a self-contained history), the 
politics of sympathy can best be analyzed in terms of their 
proliferation, in terms of how essential value-structures are 
promoted by virtue of their apparent difference from one 
another. It is thus helpful to turn away from ethics, where 
the politics of sympathy are most clearly systematized, to 
more "literary" writing, where they intersect with 
sentimentalism, sensibility, and other seemingly pervasive 
"structures of feeling" by which mid- to late-eighteenth- 
century writing is often defined.
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Notes to Chapter One
1. Indeed many critics of the "novel of the sentiment" still 
regard "sympathy" and "compassion" as equivalent terms. 
Undoubtedly, this tendency can be traced to Crane's 
foundational article on the "man of feeling," the evidence 
for which was largely drawn from Latitudinarian writings on 
compassion. Recently, in an excellent essay on the patho- 
sympathetic tradition in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
novels, Bystrom (also discussing the influence of the 
Laditudinarians) regards "sympathy" and "compassion" as being 
synonymous. An exception to this trend is Kenneth MacLean, 
who points out in an early article (1949) that Sterne, like 
Smith, distrusts unthinking compassion and sought, instead, 
to align sympathy with the "imagination."
2. It is noteworthy, for example, that Luce Irigaray has 
written critiques of Plato, Kant, Nietzsche, Freud, and 
Heidegger, but has not addressed Hume and Smith.
3. This argument is in contrast to the analyses of Radner, 
Fiering, and those critics who lump Hume and Smith together 
with religious writers. It is in essential agreement with the 
analyses set forth in Kay (1983) and Mullan, who argues that 
in the Treatise "sympathy is a ’natural' principle by which 
different positions and interests are socialized" (30).
4. Boulton has suggested that the relationship between music, 
beauty, and the "correspondence of feeling" was often 
attributed to Burke (lxxxv).
5. Paul de Man's argument in "The Rhetoric of Temporality" is 
that romanticism's apparent reliance upon the language of 
correspondences (symbol, analogy, etc.) to express a 
(perceived) relationship between man and nature may actually 
be regarded as allegory, where the union is desired rather 
than achieved. I believe that allegory is central to the 
figure of sympathy, as well, that is, the figure is dependent 
upon an appropriate narrative of the emotions. My assumptions 
about its status, however, are different, whereas De Man 
treats "sympathy" and "affinity" as figures that signify 
failed desire, I treat them as figures that serve within a 
political context to generate meaning. The telos of his 
argument also differs from mine, whereas I believe that 
sympathy works in many ways throughout eighteenth and 
nineteenth century writing, but always to ground some 
subject-object relation, De Man claims that a "relationship 
with nature" in romantic writing is "superceded by an 
intersubjective, interpersonal relationship that, in the last 
analysis, is a relationship of the subject toward itself 
(196). In a sense, then, he retains, however abstractly, the 
myth of the solitary romantic in Bate (1945 and 1961),
Abrams, Bloom, and even Marshall.
91
6. The concept of disinterestedness is also borrowed from 
aesthetic writing. While the relationship between ethics and 
aesthetics in eighteenth-century moral theory is enormously 
complex, it is usually traced to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, 
who sought to align moral judgment with contemporary 
standards of taste. The following texts serve as a passable 
introduction: Raphael 1947, 71-91; Dickie 52-77; Boulton 
xxxii-xxxix; Stolnitz 1961a and 1961b; and Cottom 1-34, who 
is more critical of this "aristocratic" desire to promote 
certain principles of taste. The social dimension of 
aesthetics is, however, easily obscured (for an analysis of 
this, see Fabricant). For an interesting discussion of this 
phenomenon in relation to critical theory, see Shapiro.
7. The best article on the impartial spectator is still D.D. 
Raphael's, but for a more recent and, in many ways, more 
Nietzchean account, see Harvey Mitchell.
8. Baier readily admits that Hume represents women as the 
"timorous and pious" sex, and that he makes any number of 
sexist remarks; she is willing to attribute these to his 
"social realism" since "what matters most, for judging moral 
wisdom, are corrected sentiments, imagination, and 
cooperative genius," qualities which women share, and perhaps 
even possess to a greater degree (53). For a partial 
corrective to this hopeful mis-reading of Hume, see MacLeod 
Burns and Marcil-Lacoste, the latter of whom argues that 
"Hume makes it impossible to distinguish an experiential 
explanation of the inferior status of women from a 
philosophical justification of this inferiority as being 
morally just" (69). Given Hume's "intellectual sexism" (what
I would call his male-biased moral economy) it is better, 
Marcil-Lacoste concludes, not to rely upon his works for any 
feminist ethics.
9. Yet this point is debatable, since the impartial spectator 
is undeniably related to what Lacanians, semiologists, and 
some structuralists identify as the male or phallic "gaze” 
through which, according to neo-Freudian theory, the object 
of the gaze "is cast as its passive, masochistic, feminine 
victim" (Moi 180n). The foundational essay on the "gaze" is 
Mulvey, whose argument is confined to the visual arts. See 
also Owens.
10. Generally speaking, the interpretation that follows is 
based upon the idea that Hume and Smith are somehow related 
to the tradition of "possessive individualism,1 an argument 
first set forth by C.B. McPherson. For more general 
discussions of the relationship between ethics and economics 
in Hume, see David Miller; in Smith, see Napoleoni 25-60. The 
best historical overviews of this problem are Heilbroner and 
Hirschman.
11. "Popular opinion," of course, refers to those eighteenth- 
century scholars who, following Louis I. Bredvold (1949, 18) 
still divide eighteenth-century writers into the "tough-
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minded" and the "tender-minded," the romantics and the 
realists. This is a curious division (meant to underscore the 
manly moral seriousness of the Tory satirists) and one, I 
suspect, that says as much about the binary structures upon 
which eighteenth-century scholars have relied as it does 
about the period or the writers in question.
12. This ambivalence may seem to underscore Arthur O.
Lovejoy's point that eighteenth-century optimism is built 
upon an inherent dualism whereby it is important to explain 
away evils so as to triumph over them (320-321). It is 
interesting, however, that this "triumph" is expressed 
through a mode of engenderment.
13. This argument is set forth by Carol Kay, in "Canon, 
Ideology, Gender," 71-72. My argument differs from Kay's in 
that I do not believe that "compassion" can be accepted as a 
moral truth of women against which men define themselves. I 
would argue, in fact, that feminization of compassion is part 
of a larger ethical program whereby moral judgment is located 
in something other than obedience and subservience to God. 
This argument is implicit in the chapters that follow.
14. See also Smith's allusions to Bishop Butler (43): "Our 
sympathy with sorrow, though not more real, has been more 
taken notice of than our sympathy with joy. The word 
sympathy, in its most proper and primitive signification, 
denoted our fellow-feeling with the sufferings, not that with 
the enjoyments, of others." Smith presents his project as one 
of "completion" when in fact, through it, sympathy as 
suffering is displaced.
13. In Kay's analysis (1983), eighteenth-century theories of 
sympathy have little to do with compassion, and everything to 
do with the attempt of Hume and others to promote an ethic of 
upward mobility. "One important clue that sympathy for Hume 
figures in an ethics that is crucially attached to a 
politics,” she writes, "is that he shows relatively little 
interest in sympathy manifested in pity or compassion, and a 
great deal of interest in sympathy as a mechanism of pride in 
or respect for power, riches, family status" (80-81). In so 
doing, she suggests, Hume displaces women and other 
"inferiors" from the society of sympathetic subjects, and 
reinforces, instead, a "rather disappointing association with 
the prevailing status quo; the respect paid to a virtuous, 
well-established gentleman" (89).
16. Given the importance placed upon the impartial spectator 
as the embodiment of masculine social norms to which only men 
may aspire, it should be clear that sympathy, despite its 
pretensions to the contrary, shares the impulse toward the 
exclusion of women apparent in eighteenth-century political 
thought as a whole: to create a society composed of men by 
privileging the dominant trope of "fraternity." As Seyla 
Benhabib has argued, early bourgeois thinkers, having reacted 
against feudal society, were dependent upon the "state of
nature" metaphor to purify the society which, in fact, they 
hoped to inscribe. They represented a society in which all 
men, or at least most men, are brothers: "in the beginning 
man was alone" (84). "The early bourgeois individual," she 
continues, "not only has no mother but no father as well; 
rather, he strives to reconstitute the father in his own 
self-image" (85).
17. This comment is based upon D.D. Raphael's argument that 
"Adam Smith's theory can certainly stand comparison with the 
best known of modern psychological explanations of 
conscience, Freud's account of the super-ego" (97). Freud's 
exclusion of women from cultural production is outlined in 
"Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction 
Between the Sexes” (1925). Given Freud's theory of 
development, "the level of what is ethically normal is 
different from what it is in men...they show less sense of 
justice... they are less ready to submit to the great 
exigencies of life...they are more often influenced in their 
judgments by feelings of affection or hostility" (25). In 
drawing an analogy between theories of sympathy and Freud, I 
am not, of course, suggesting that Freud's analysis is 
correct. Instead, I am pointing to the fact that ethical 
discourse, which includes Freudian psychology, shares the 
impulse to exclude women from value-formation even while 
rationalizing that exclusion.
Chapter II: Men, Women, and the Sympathetic Sublime
In the previous chapter, I argued that secular accounts of 
sympathy, in alliance with eighteenth-century aesthetics, 
turn upon identification with a principle of pleasure and 
power from which women, by virtue of their association with 
compassion, are simultaneously excluded. In this sense, the 
ethics of sympathy may be regarded as a kind of bifurcated 
program of social control, whose larger intention was to 
create bonds between presumably virtuous men. The question 
central to this chapter is to what extent more "literary" 
writing shares in that impulse, as well.^ In some ways, the 
relationship between sympathy and literature is well-worked 
terrain. An entire tradition of criticism on sentiment and 
sensibility, for example, has been devoted to exploring with 
R.S. Crane what, or who, makes the "man of feeling" feel. A 
second and related tradition, led by Earl Wasserman with 
David Marshall perhaps bringing up the rear, has focused upon 
theories of tragic pleasure, particularly in regard to 
sympathy and the aesthetics of spectatorship. My subject is 
considerably more defined. Here I shall examine the 
relationship between sympathy and one very specific form of 
eighteenth-century aesthetic writing, the sympathetic 
sublime.^
First, however, it is perhaps necessary to clarify my 
critical position. Because I regard both the ethics of
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sympathy and, by extension, the sympathetic sublime, as being 
part of the writing of value— where "the writing of value," 
we recall, refers to the process by which social 
relationships, roles, and values were actively being 
promoted— my assumptions are necessarily in conflict with any 
reading that pre-supposes some "masculine" or "feminine" 
theory of moral development. These, not surprisingly, 
dominate in criticism on the sublime. At least since the 
publication of Harold Bloom's essentially Freudian Anxiety of 
influence, it has become a commonplace of romantic criticism 
that the sublime is derived from the Oedipal complex, a pre­
existent and peculiarly "masculine" moral disposition 
reflected in the works of an individual writer.^ Since, given 
Freudian logic, only males participate in this from of 
development, psychoanalysis offers both a way of explaining 
the sublime— of isolating its structures— and of accounting 
for the fact that it was practiced mostly by male poets who, 
in the words of Thomas Weiskel, achieve a moment when "the 
burden of the past is lifted and there is an influx of power" 
(Heiskel 192). This genetic explanation is adopted by many 
early feminist critics, as well, who noted and sought to
explain the absence of the "sublime moment" in the writing of 
4women. Host recently, a second wave of psychoanalytic 
feminists, understandably disturbed at the thought of 
defining women's writing in terms of its relation to male 
models of development alone, have adopted the pre-oedipal 
theory of Nancy Chodorow or Carol Gilligan to locate a 
separate "feminine" model of development manifest, they
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believe, in the structure of women's writing. In this 
context, a neglected writer such as Dorothy Wordsworth can 
easily emerge as a morally-superior counterpoint to a 
"sublime" poet such as her brother William. According to 
Susan Levin, rather than attempting to expand the boundaries 
of the individual self— an imperialist movement central to 
the sublime— Dorothy "writes herself into the figure of a 
community" (1987, 147) where "shared lives and values shape 
and sustain individual desire" (148).
I would not want to deny, of course, that there are 
observable differences between the writing of William and 
Dorothy Wordsworth, or that, as far as we know, men more 
often than women appropriate the sublime mode; yet such 
theories of "masculine" and "feminine" moral development, I 
believe, have played an important role in both suppressing 
the formative role of ethico-aesthetic discourse in 
organizing gender-specific moralities, and, correspondingly, 
in obscuring the ways in which those historically-grounded 
notions of "masculine" and "feminine" morality change. This 
problem is all the more immediate because, I would argue, 
values and impulses articulated in late-eighteenth-century 
ethical and aesthetic texts continue to shape our habits of 
reading and writing.^ I would like to offer the possibility, 
in fact, that the discourse of sympathy helped to provide the 
terms by which we too-easily characterize "masculine" and 
"feminine" morality, even while those moral sensibilities 
were actively being organized and contested. Though there is 
no way to "prove" that a gender-specific morality cannot be
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explained in psychoanalytic terms, it is possible and even 
necessary to argue that one should examine historically- 
specific factors before doing so.
As Fraser and Nicholson have pointed out, Chodorow's idea 
that "women everywhere differ from men in their greater 
concern with 'relational interaction'" cannot hold up under 
close scrutiny (97), I believe it to be significant, for 
example, that in the eighteenth-century, women were not the 
primary group to define themselves in terms of the ability to 
"care.” in fact, as Lawrence Stone has argued, this language 
is associated with the rise of "affective individualism" and 
a peculiarly middle-class phenomenon, the emergence of the 
"affective" nuclear family. Between 1660 and 1800, Stone 
demonstrates, British society experienced a "major shift in 
human relations” (246). In contrast to the aristocracy who 
had long used marriage as a means of increasing their wealth 
and power, and to the lower classes who often did not marry 
at all, increasingly, writers as diverse as John Locke,
Daniel Defoe, Adam Smith, and Mary Wollstonecraft claimed 
that the best marriage was one founded upon mutual respect 
and friendship. Perhaps for the first time, such affective 
ties were regarded as being important to the parent/child 
relationship, as well. Men, for example, began to take pride 
in their roles as active and affectionate fathers. As Stone 
notes, "Even public figures like admirals now boasted on 
their tombstones of their domestic virtues, such as 'filial 
reverence, conjugal attachments and parental affection'"
(246). Similarly, women (many of whom who were now confined
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to the home) began to take a more active pact in their 
children's rearing and education. Perhaps the most tangible 
symptom of this was a renewed interest in breastfeeding.
Whereas in the seventeenth century the "more puritanically 
inclined mothers" were the first women from well-to-do 
families to breastfeed their children, by the mid-eighteenth 
century, writes Stone, this practice was a widespread 
phenomenon, particularly among the squirearchy and the upper 
bourgeoisie (284).
The discourse of sympathy intersects with the "rise of 
affective individualism” in any number of interesting and 
fairly obvious ways. One notes, for example, the emphasis in 
the writing of sympathy upon the intensely familial nature of 
man, and the idea, promoted by Burke, that sympathy is one of 
the "social passions” responsible for the propagation of the 
species. Yet this presumably universal ethos, as we have 
seen, masks what must be regarded as the unequal relations of 
power intrinsic to its operation. One also notes, in 
retrospect, the way in which the discourse of sympathy 
promotes a gender-specific morality upon which the "affective 
family" and other related phenomena were based. Rather than 
reflecting a gender-specific morality, the discourse of 
sympathy creates different roles for men and women. However 
natural or traditional these gender-specific virtues may 
appear to us today, it is important to recognize that they 
are themselves the product of an emergent middle-class 
creating models that would justify and promote, among other 
things, a cultural division of labor: through the discourse
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of sympathy, women might willingly be confined to the home, 
and men might be encouraged to represent themselves as 
productive members of (a more "humane") society, intent upon 
their own self-improvement for the greater good of the state.
In this sense, members of both sexes were encouraged to 
form relationships. The difference between their moral 
behavior emerges simply in the kinds of relationships they 
were expected to form and in the way, I would add, those 
relationships were valued, in this chapter, then, in contrast 
to critics who assume that the sublime reflects an 
imperialistic and masculine moral disposition set against 
some feminine desire for relationship, I shall read the 
sympathetic sublime as male-biased system of representation 
that actively seeks to produce social relations which differ 
for men and women. After a brief discussion of the 
relationship between sympathy, the sublime, and tragic 
response, I shall analyze William Wordsworth's "The Thorn."
In this poem, while William appears to promote sympathetic 
identification with the female character Martha Ray, I shall 
demonstrate that Wordsworth's larger purpose, much like 
Smith's, is to promote identification with a principle of 
power manifest in the language of men. Within this construct, 
women, or "the feminine," can but serve as objects of pity 
who provoke what Wordsworth calls the "real" language of men, 
with which, he argues, readers should be able to sympathize.
The effect of such poems is to extend the bonds between 
members of two different classes, but only by virtue of the 
fact that the relationship between women and "natural"
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suffering— that is, between women, solitude, powerlessness, 
and pain— remains unchanged. I shall conclude the chapter 
with a brief look at Dorothy's resistance to this structure 
in her brother's writing, and address the issue of whether or 
not that can be productively cast into some theory of gender 
identity.
Pleasure, Pain, and Power
As many critics have commented, eighteenth-century theorists 
of sympathy must all deal with an issue that goes back at 
least as far as Aristotle's Poetics: that people seem to 
delight in artistic portrayals of human suffering.** This 
apparently undeniable fact of human nature created a real 
dilemma for mid-eighteenth-century aesthetic writers, who, 
with Smith, desired to remove sympathy from its traditional 
association with pity and the sentimental tradition, to align 
it with a more stable principle of moral judgment. Thus even 
early writers of aesthetics were at great pains to represent
tragic pleasure in such a way as to preclude some seemingly
maudlin or even cruel identification with suffering. As 
Addison describes it:
When we read of Torment, Wounds, Death, and 
like Dismal Accidents, our pleasure does not 
flow so properly from the Grief which such 
Melancholy Descriptions give us, as from the 
secret Comparison which we make between 
ourselves and the Person who suffers. Such
Representations teach us to set a just and
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true value upon our own good Fortunes, which 
exempts us from the like Calamities. (No.
411)
This "secret Comparison"— the source, presumably, of tragic 
pleasure— is possible only because one is able to maintain a 
certain distance from actual pain, that is, only because the 
torments, wounds, and accidents are imitations, and therefore 
unreal. As Addison continues, "In person, our thoughts are so 
intent upon the Miseries of the Sufferer, that we cannot turn 
them upon our own Happiness" (No. 411).^
Addison's explanation of— or, more precisely, his apology 
for— the "delight" one takes in scenes of suffering is 
dependent upon a mimetic theory of art drawn from the model 
of the theatre, where sympathy functions as little more than 
a principle of audience response. Generally speaking, the 
actor's passions were thought to be "rehearsed" in the breast 
of the spectator, who, by virtue of his safe distance, was 
able to enjoy the suffering onstage. This mimetic model, 
however, was actively being contested by writers such as 
Edmund Burke, who, I shall argue, much like Hume and Smith, 
wanted to establish sympathy as an active principle of social 
progress, divorced from any association with passive 
suffering or useless pain.
In his Enquiry into...the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), 
for example, Edmund Burke dismisses Addison's notion that the 
sympathetic powers of art may be attributed either to the 
"comfort we receive from considering that so melancholy a 
story is no more than a fiction" or to the "contemplation of
our own freedom from the evils which we see represented" (44- 
45). Claiming, instead, that "we have a degree of delight, 
and that no small one, in the real misfortunes and pains of
Qothers” (45), Burke attempts to do two things: to align 
sympathy with an intrinsically moral impulse, and to make 
that sympathetic impulse central to an expressivist theory of 
art and perception. His explanation of the ethical power of 
sympathy is contained in the section on "The effects of 
Sympathy in the distresses of others" (XIV). First, asserting 
that "our Creator has designed we should be united by the 
bond of sympathy," he argues that this bond is "strengthened" 
by the "delight" we have in the distresses of others. "There 
is no spectacle we so commonly pursue, as that of some 
uncommon and grievous calamity" (46). While this desire to 
witness suffering could be regarded as a sign of moral 
indifference, Burke insists that it serves'a moral purpose. 
"The delight we have in such things, hinders us from shunning 
scenes of misery; and the pain we feel, prompts us to relieve 
ourselves in relieving those who suffer" (46).
Here, Burke represents sympathy with real suffering as a 
moral "instinct," as the signature of one's "general passion" 
for society (52) that works, almost automatically, to effect 
public good. Having joined this "new" version of sympathy to 
a principle of social action— having rescued it, that is, 
from the aesthetics of spectatorship— Burke begins to 
distinguish between two different structures of sympathetic 
response. While, in general, sympathy guarantees that "we are 
never suffered to be indifferent spectators of almost
anything which men can do or suffer" (44), Burke argues that 
the precise nature of one's response is dependent upon 
whether sympathy is aligned with pleasure or whether it is 
aligned with pain. When it turns upon pleasure, it functions 
as the source of the "social affections"— the desire for 
"generation” (the source, according to Burke, of love between 
the sexes) and the desire for "good company, lively 
conversations, and the endearments of friendship" (43). When, 
in contrast, it turns upon pain, sympathy may "partake of the 
nature of those [passions] which regard self-preservation" 
and may be "a source of the sublime" (44). Given that the 
sublime is thought to derived from the desire for "self- 
preservation," it at first may appear to be an egocentric 
construct set in opposition to the "social affections," which 
turn upon a principle of pleasure. My suggestion, however, is 
that the sublime is not so much ego-centric structure as it 
is an androcentric one. in Burke and Wordsworth, at least, 
the sublime functions much like a structure we have already 
seen, the ethic of self-command, to actively create a special 
kind of relationship which, unlike compassion, promotes 
identification with a principle of power.
The sublime is a complicated subject, even in Burke, but 
the following generalizations should suffice to make its
Qbasic logic clear. The source of the sublime is "whatever is 
fitted to excite the ideas of pain, and danger": "terrible" 
objects, or whatever is "conversant about terrible objects," 
or whatever "operates in a manner analogous to terror" (39). 
The word "ideas" here is significant, since, like all
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aesthetic experience, the sublime can only occur when pain 
and danger are distant or simply fictitious. As Burke writes, 
when ideas of pain and danger "immediately effect us" they 
are "simply painful"; when, however, they pose no immediate 
threat, they excite a kind of "delight," a mixed pleasure 
turning on pain associated with the removal of pain or 
danger. The sympathetic imagination is central to the sublime 
because it enables one to identify with the source of terror 
without actually being threatened. In fact, by virtue of this 
identification with whatever is great or terrible, sympathy 
actually serves to endow the observing subject with a sense 
of power. As Burke puts it, the mind claims "to itself, some 
part of the dignity and importance of the thing which it 
contemplates" (50-51). Elsewhere, in words that echo Smith's 
characterization of the virtuous man, Burke describes sublime 
contemplation as involving a kind of "philosophical 
fortitude" (69).
The suggestion, then, is that the sublime— even though it 
pays lip-service to the value of benevolism— marks the point 
in eighteenth-century writing where identification with the 
agent as opposed to the victim of suffering is represented as 
a desirable aesthetic event. Consequently, a major part of 
the Inquiries is devoted to listing sublime subjects, the 
forces or powers that are considered to be fitting sources of 
terror— obscurity, privation, the cries of animals, even 
particular colors. Many of these involve natural scenes, 
events, or situations which, in the telling, could provoke a 
sense of delight (images of a tower, the archangel, the
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rising of mists, the revolutions of kingdoms) whereas many 
them of them refer simply to "pure and intellectual ideas"—  
ideas like the "Deity"— to which, Burke argues, one should 
"ascend" (68). in every case, however, what is important is 
not simply the fact of power, but the way in which, through 
the sublime, one is able to appropriate it, to make it 
(however briefly) one's very own. It is in this sense, I 
believe, that the sublime is not completely unrelated to the 
intentionality of the masculine form of sympathy as we have 
seen it elsewhere— to what Kay so aptly calls "a principle of 
imaginative attraction to the greater power."
To put it another way, because the Burkean sublime 
encourages one to identify with the source of power, and not 
with the one who suffers, it shares, however ephemerally, the 
impulse of The Theory of Moral Sentiments— i.e., to promote 
an empowering form of individual sympathetic response, 
distinguished from Christian charity or even from compassion 
as such. Although there is nothing intrinsically male-biased 
about this form of sympathetic response, the impulse toward 
pleasure and power manifest in the sympathetic sublime is 
closely related to a second "social passion" in the Enquiries 
which definitely is. This passion is "ambition," a gift, like 
sympathy, "implanted" by God in man (50) which presupposes 
public relationships even while it attempts to create them.1®
As Burke describes "ambition"— in language, significantly, 
indistinguishable from that used to characterize both 
sympathy as a "social affection" and the sympathetic sublime- 
-it is "whatever either on good or bad grounds tends to raise
a man in his own opinion,"
produces a sort of swelling and triumph that 
is extremely grateful to the human mind; and 
this swelling is never more perceived, nor 
operates with more force, than when without 
danger we are conversant with terrible 
objects, the mind always claiming to itself 
some part of the dignity and importance of 
the things which it contemplates. (50)
Similarly, Smith claims in his explanation of the origin of 
ranks that sympathy and ambition combine to ensure that one 
will "pursue riches and avoid poverty" (50), since only the 
latter will "draw upon him the attention of the world" and 
make "his heart . . . swell and dilate itself within him" 
(51). In both cases, sympathy, the sublime, and the desire t 
establish a relationship with equal or even "superior" men 
are expressed in language so similarly overdetermined that i 
impossible, I believe, to separate the strands in this 
complex of intrinsically social desires which, given the 
society in which Smith and Burke wrote, would clearly be 
limited to middle-class men.
The fact that sympathy, the sublime, and ambition are 
mutually-implicated phenomena raises an interesting set of 
issues that cannot fully be developed here, including the 
suggestion that through the sympathetic sublime, an 
androcentric and clearly public morality was actively being 
formed. This suggestion, in turn, has clear implications not 
only for traditional studies of the sympathetic imagination
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in ethics and aesthetics, but also, 1 believe, for any theory 
of gender-identity which draws its evidence from that 
literature. At the very least, this form of sympathetic 
response casts a different light upon how one interprets the 
late-eighteenth century preoccupation with tragic pleasure. 
Whereas many critics have assumed, with Wasserman, that 
eighteenth-century theories of tragic pleasure turn upon 
"sympathy with the participants" of a tragic scene, it is 
also possible to argue that the victims of suffering are less 
important to the observing subject than the forces by which 
they are overwhelmed— any power, to borrow Wasserman's words, 
which "they do not control" (306). In the following section,
I shall apply this argument to what one critic regards as 
Wordsworth's most "extreme experiment in pathos" (Averill 
168), "The Thorn" (1798).
"The Thorn"
"The Thorn," published in the Lyrical Ballads, has been a 
problematical work for critics, in part because, while 
everybody agrees that it is somehow related to the tradition 
of sympathy, no one is quite sure who, or what, is the 
subject of the poem, the person with whom the reader is 
supposed to sympathize. There are three central characters in 
"The Thorn": Martha Ray, a woman half-mad with suffering, who 
hovers around the spot where her baby is rumored to be 
buried; a retired sea captain, a "superstitious" person, 
writes Wordsworth, who relays the "story" of Martha Ray's 
life (the gossip upon which her life is presumed to be
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based); and one of Wordsworth's wanderers, to whom Martha 
Ray's story is told. Yet, as James Averill points out, many 
recent critics, following Geoffrey Hartman, argue that the 
poem is actually about the imagination, about the way in 
which Martha Ray's story is filtered and re-shaped through 
the mind of the sea-captain, which may or may not be 
identified with Wordsworth's own (170n). Within this context, 
the sea captain— the "ocular man in Wordsworth," according to 
Hartman— is usually regarded as a kind of unfeeling or 
ineffectual spectator, as some kind of obsessive voyeur, it 
is only a short step from that characterization to James 
Averill's complete denunciation, which enables him to speak 
of the sea-captain's "ghoulishness," or his "morbid interest 
in human suffering" (173). Following this characterization 
and arguing, in addition, that the morbid imagination of the 
sea-captain approaches that of the sentimental artist,
Averill concludes that "The Thorn" is Wordsworth's "most 
severe portrait of the sentimental artist and his audience" 
(180).
My own reading, in contrast to these, begins with the 
assumption that "The Thorn" is only peripherally about the 
aesthetics of spectatorship, the patho-sympathetic tradition, 
or any account of the imagination which focuses upon the 
importance of suffering. It is also and even primarily about 
the power of language to create, or to destroy, the bonds of 
sympathy within a community, which includes the relationship 
between the sea captain and Martha Ray, but which is not 
confined to them. The sea captain's voice, after all, is set
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within a chorus of voices: the unnamed wanderer's, Martha 
Ray's, Parmer Simpson's, Steven Hill's, and finally, the 
community's, each, in turn, interpreting the scanty rumors of 
Martha Ray's history, determining the significance of the 
place to which she repairs, and seeking to establish the 
grounds of her guilt or innocence. Significantly, the 
collective voice of the community— "they say" or "some say"—  
competes with the sea-captain's for predominance. But only 
he, we are told, has seen Martha Ray up close, and only he, 
it appears, declines to denounce her. Thus the conflict 
between the community's almost univocal condemnation of the 
woman and the sea captain's faltering resistance to their 
rumoring constitutes the dramatic tension of this poem.
While I shall demonstrate these arguments momentarily, it 
is first important to outline the relationship between 
language and Wordsworth's representation of sympathy, upon 
which the entire reading turns. Burke had claimed that 
sympathy is central to art: it is "chiefly" by the principle 
of sympathy, he writes, "that poetry, painting, and other 
affecting arts, transfuse their passions from one breast to 
another, and are often capable of grafting a delight on 
wretchedness, misery, and death itself" (44). Like Burke, 
Wordsworth believed that sympathy is best mediated by 
l a n g u a g e . T h u s  in his Note to "The Thorn" he claims that 
one purpose of this poem is to elicit sympathy for the rustic 
narrator via his language, to "take care that words," he 
writes, "which in [such superstitious] minds are impregnated 
with passion, should likewise convey passion to readers who
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are not accustomed to sympathize with men feeling in that 
manner or using such language" {LB 288). The ostensible 
purpose of this poem, then, is to expand the bounds of 
sympathy beyond its narrow parameters to include a different 
class of men. Vet precisely because, according to these 
writers, the possibility of sympathy and thus important 
social bonds are so closely allied to language, Wordsworth 
sometimes represents language as an active and almost 
independent force within the social realm. In the "Essay Upon 
Epitaphs," for example, Wordsworth makes the claim that 
language, in its connection with the possibility of sympathy, 
is the most influential force for good and evil within 
society itself, in perhaps the most often-quoted passage from 
this work, Wordsworth argues that "words are too awful an 
instrument for good and evil to be trifled with":
they hold above all other external powers a 
dominion over thoughts. If words be not an 
incarnation of the thought, but only a 
clothing for it, then surely they will prove 
an ill gift; such as one of those poisoned 
vestments, read of in the stories of 
superstitious times, which had the power to 
consume and to alienate from his right mind 
the victim who put them on. Language, if it 
do not uphold, feed, and leave in quiet, is a 
counterspirit, unremittingly and noiselessly 
at work to derange, to subvert, to lay waste, 
to vitiate, and to dissolve. (Prose II: 84-5)
Ill
In this essay, Wordsworth treats language as an "external 
power," as "spirit" or "counterspirit." It is no longer (or 
not simply) a mediating term in the sympathetic relationship 
between men of different classes, but a force in its own 
right, somehow apart from the men who practice it. Thus 
detached from its explicitly communicative function, language 
(like any other "terrible power") may itself serve as a 
source of the sublime.
Wordsworth's comments in the "Essay Upon Epitaphs” are 
helpful in interpreting "The Thorn," a poem, which, much like 
the essay above, may be read as an allegory of how language 
functions for good or evil. Here language is represented as a 
destructive force. While the community's language works as 
"counterspirit" to "lay waste" the life of Martha Ray, the 
"superstitious" sea captain consistently resists that 
negative force, as is apparent in his descriptions of the 
unfortunate woman, and of the thorn tree with which, in his 
imagination, she is allied. Personifying the tree, he 
describes it as "a wretched thing forlorn" whose history,
12significantly, is also the subject of communal speculation. 
According to the sea captain, the tree "looks so old,/ In 
truth you'd find it hard to say,/ How it could ever have been 
young,/ It looks so old and gray" (1-4). And like Martha Ray, 
it is subject to forces over which it has no control. Though 
it "stands erect" creeping mosses "clasp it round,"
So close, you'd say that they were bent 
With plain and manifest intent,
To drag it to the ground;
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And all had joined in one endeavor
To bury this poor thorn forever. (18-22)
As Albert Gerard notes, the thorn tree is an "emblem of a 
being overcome by the suffering inflicted by outside forces" 
(72) which simply suggests that Martha Ray, in being 
identified with the tree, is somehow a victim. But the sea- 
captain's description of the thorn tree is more explicit than 
Gerard's: it suggests, first, that these forces are almost 
intentional, which is to ascribe a human, as distinct from 
natural, agent to her suffering; second, it refers to a 
communal project ("and all had joined in one endeavor").
These negative and hostile forces are thus identifiable, if a 
bit obscure.
The destructive forces of communal language— or, more 
specifically, of the community's gossip and rumoring— are 
throughout the poem distinguished from the comparatively 
positive voice of the captain, who, as Wordsworth claims in 
the Note to "The Thorn" "was not a native" (LB 288). By 
virtue of his status as an outsider, the captain is 
automatically endowed with a separate voice which, within the 
poem proper, is meant to function in opposition to the 
damaging forces of communal language. Admittedly, this 
"opposition" is not immediately apparent. It is manifest, 
first, in the captain's reluctance to give into rumoring, and 
secondly, in his own comparatively compassionate account of 
Martha Ray's life. Unlike the others, he insists upon the 
limits of own understanding, even to the point of directing 
the wanderer away from hearsay back to the tree. When the
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wanderer, for example, echoes the question that all seek to 
answer— "And wherefore does she cry? (86)— the sea captain 
insists that "the true reason no one knows" and points the 
wanderer to the thorn. The question is repeated, and the 
narrator, once again, disavows any real knowledge:
Nay rack your brain 'tis all in vain,
I'll tell you all I know;
But to the thorn, and to the pond 
Which is a little way beyond,
I wish that you would go:
Perhaps when you are at that place
You something of her tale may trace. (104-10)
Yet he does eventually tell what he has heard, complete with 
commentary on the source of her suffering. It is significant,
I believe, that he attributes her initial suffering to a 
perversion of language, or, more specifically, to a broken 
oath. She planned to be married to Stephen Hill,
And they had fixed the wedding day,
The morning that must wed them both;
But Stephen to another maid 
Had sworn another oath;
And with this other maid to church 
Unthinking Stephen went. . . . (122-27)
After this betrayal, the sea captain indicates that Martha
Ray is ostracized and blamed for her initial credulity. A
"cruel, cruel, fire, they say,/ Into her bones was sent" 
(129-30). She is rumored to be with child ("'Tis said, a 
child was in her womb") and, within months, she is rumored to
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be insane, as well. The narrator stops here to respond with 
compassion to the force of the story he narrates— "Oh me I" he 
cries, "ten thousand times I'd rather/ That he had died, that 
cruel father I" (143*-44). But as the rest of his narration 
reveals, the community, in contrast, is increasingly subject 
to the effects of its own insidious rumors.
Where language works as counterspirit, hearsay quickly
evolves into lurid accusation. Thus the stories surrounding
Martha Ray are changed into "facts," and those "facts" into
supernatural events. The sea captain reports tales of "living
voices" from the mountaintop, "and others, I've heard many
swear,/ Were voices of the dead" (173-74). Despite the fact
that he is himself a superstitious man, he denies that any
such voices could be connected with her: "I cannot think,
whate'er they say,/ They had to do with Martha Ray" (175-76).
Within the village, however, the woman has been cursed. When
no baby materialized (as of course it would not) the village
13began to accuse her of murder. "Some will say" that she 
hanged her baby; "some say" that she drowned it; but "each 
and all agree," he says, that the baby is buried beneath the 
moss. Having tried and found her guilty, then, upon the basis 
of their own fearful speculation, the community swears 
another oath, reminiscent, in effect, of "unthinking" Stephen 
Hill’s. "And some had sworn an oath that she/ Should be to 
public justice brought" (232-33). Their hysterical plan to 
dig up the "baby's" bones is interrupted by another sign of 
communal hysteria, a story of supernatural intervention— the 
"beauteous hill of moss" is presumed to stir.
This "miracle," Z believe, is meant to appear as another 
example of the way language, unleashed from benevolent 
intentions, "holds dominion over thoughts" only, says 
Wordsworth, "to derange." While Wordsworth describes the sea 
captain as "credulous and talkative," which makes him 
vulnerable to the gossip to which he is exposed, there is, i 
addition, clearly something of the sentimental hero in him, 
which resists the negative effect of the stories he is 
compelled to relate. When describing the spot around the 
thorn, for example, he employs the language of romance, a 
flowery hyperbole that always creeps into his speech when 
Martha Ray, and not the village gossip, is its subject.
All lovely colours there you see,
All colours that were ever seen,
And mossy network too is there,
As if by hand of lady fair 
The work had woven been,
And cups, the darlings of the eye,
So deep is their vermillion dye. (39-44)
This somewhat fanciful description is particularly telling 
when placed against the community's account of the same 
place, which occurs towards the end of the poem. "I've 
heard," he says, repeating, now, the words of another, "That 
the scarlet moss is red/ With drops of that poor infant's 
blood" (221-22). While the narrator's increasingly 
impassioned language belies the force of those stories, he 
does not give into them: "But kill a new-born infant thus/ I 
do not think she could" (223-24). And as to whether or not
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the "baby*1 is indeed buried beneath the moss, he refuses to 
hazard an interpretation: "I cannot tell how this may be"
(243). The poem concludes with his pointing, yet again, to 
the thorn, now explicitly bound to the lonely cries of Martha 
Ray:
But plain it is, the thorn is bound 
With heavy tufts of moss, that strive
To drag it to the ground.
And this I know, full many a time,
When she was on the mountain high;
By day, and in the silent night,
When all the stars shone clear and bright,
That I have heard her cry,
"Oh, misery! oh, misery!
Oh, woe is me, oh misery!" (244-253)
Through his stubborn adherence to the words of Martha Ray, 
and his equally stubborn refusal to accept all the lurid 
accusations in the tales he reports, the sea captain is able
to discern— if not to articulate— the presence of "plain and
manifest intent" in the rumors which circulate around him.
Moreover, in his resistance to this intent, it could be
argued that he, even more Martha Ray, should be associated 
with the thorn tree which "stands erect" against such 
insidious forces.
In any case, once his "superstition" and "impassioned 
language" is set against the hysterical gossip of the 
community itself, one can see how Wordsworth could regard the 
sea captain as a subject worthy of sympathetic response. The
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ostensible purpose of the poem, as I have mentioned, is to 
create a bond between the sea captain and the reader, 
comparable to that between the sea captain and the wanderer. 
That Wordsworth was not entirely successful in thi6 project, 
of course, is apparent in his comments in a letter to John 
Wilson, some two years after the poem was published, where he 
claims that the poem— among a certain class of people at 
least— was widely misunderstood. Here, he complains that some 
readers
are disgusted with the naked language of some 
of the most interesting passions of men, 
either because it is indelicate, or gross, or 
[vu]lgar, as many fine ladies could not bear 
certain expressions in The [Had] Mother and 
the Thorn, and, as in the instance of Adam 
Smith, who we [are] told, could not endure 
the Ballad of Chym of the Clough, because the 
[au]thor had not written like a gentleman.
(Early Years 354-55)
For Wordsworth, sympathy is bound to language, and one's 
language, in turn, i6 dependent upon one's identification 
with a particular social class. In seeking to "expand" the 
bounds of sympathetic response from one class of men to 
another, Wordsworth is at his most social, an impulse for 
which he often praised.
Yet, one might ask, what are the limits of this presumably
progressive social vision? My reading of the poem so far,
15although it clarifies the status of the narrator,
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nevertheless leaves unresolved a problematical issue. If "The 
Thorn," as I have argued, is about the effects of language, 
and if the "impassioned" language of the captain, as 
Wordsworth insists, is meant to provoke "correspondence of 
feeling" in the reader, what, within this ethico-aesthetic 
economy, is the function of Martha Ray? One answer, of 
course, is that she is but another of the many females in 
distress with which the pages of sentimental writers are 
strewn, the source, in other words, of tragic pleasure with 
whom the sea captain (or the reader surrogate) is supposed to 
identify. Yet this reading of Martha Ray as a highly mediated 
kind of sentimental heroine is unsatisfactory because it does 
not take into account the place of the sublime in the poem 
proper, an aesthetic structure which actively discourages one 
from identification with pain. As we have seen in Burke, the 
"spectator" must identify with the source of power, and not 
with the one who suffers under it, so as to "claim" to 
himself "some portion of the dignity and importance of the 
thing it contemplates" (50). On this Wordsworth is in 
complete agreement with Burke, and even makes similar 
distinctions. As Wordsworth writes in his essay "On the 
Sublime and Beautiful," the sublime may be divided into two 
types, both of which require identification with power.
"Power awakens the sublime either when it rouses us to a 
sympathetic energy & calls upon the mind to grasp at 
something . . . which it is incapable of attaining" or, when 
it produces "a humiliation or prostration of the mind before 
some external agency" so great that one "presumes not to
119
participate, but is absorbed in the might in the external 
power" (Prose II: 354). In order to supplement traditional 
readings of the poem, then, one must ask a simple question: 
what, in these poem, is the agent of suffering with which one 
is supposed to identify?
Clearly, neither Martha Ray nor the captain, according to 
these definitions, can serve as the source of the sublime.
Yet the negative forces of language confronted by each— the 
invidious gossip of the community— can serve as that source, 
in so far as that language represents an agent of suffering 
beyond any individual's control. It is this morally negative 
power, I have suggested, which serves as the major topos of 
the poem, and is symbolized by the thorn tree which, 
according to the sea captain, struggles against it. The 
thorn, then, cannot finally be identified with any single 
character. It stands, instead, much like the poem, as a kind 
of monument to the seemingly inevitable suffering which 
"good" men such as the captain, the wanderer, or the reader, 
must resist even as they attempt to understand. Martha Ray, 
however, unlike the sea captain, can neither struggle against 
these forces nor gain the distance necessary to understanding 
them. In the poem proper, she is represented simply as a 
passive and relatively inarticulate testament to the power of 
language— to the very language, I would add, out of which 
Wordsworth's poem and the bonds it attempts to promote are 
constructed, in this sense, Martha Ray is represented as the 
"natural" source of a moral community from which she is 
displaced. To put it semiotically, within the ethico-
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aesthetic economy of the sympathetic sublime, her function is 
to serve as the tangible embodiment of pain and suffering 
upon which the clearly androcentric pleasures of the sublime 
are founded.
In this analysis of the "The Thorn," the sublime emerges 
as a (largely) masculinist moral construct. Before going on, 
however, I want to be very careful about what I believe that 
means. It is "masculinist," I would argue, not because the 
sublime is egocentric, or that it is symptomatic of some 
imperious and intrinsically masculine attempt to "transcend" 
nature, females, or group activity in general. This is to 
speculate about its cause, when I am more interested in its 
purpose, contours, and possible effect. From this point of 
view, the sympathetic sublime as outlined here is masculinist 
simply because through its structures, exclusively masculine 
groups are simultaneously being formed. The sublime promotes 
a masculinist moral economy itself dependent upon the 
connection between the feminine and the "natural" embodiment 
of suffering and pain.*® While such distinctions as I have 
tried to draw here may appear to be a too-subtle splitting of 
hairs, this shift from a genetic to a positivist 
interpretation has important implications, I believe, not 
only for criticism of the sublime, but also for criticism of 
women's writing, particularly as that is related to 
"feminine” models of models of morality. These implications 
will be introduced in the following section.
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Dorothy and Other Women
As I have already mentioned, one question that feminist
critics have had to ask is why fewer texts by women writers
show evidence of the sublime than texts by men. The most
recent and in some ways most convincing response to this
question is that women, have a different "social-structurally
induced psychological mechanism" than men, that predisposes
women to an "alternative" moral construct, characterized by a
concern with relationships, the willingness and ability to
care (Chodorow 207). This desire to locate a "separate
sphere" of moral development in writing by women is
especially apparent in the criticism on Dorothy Wordsworth,
in which critics, drawing upon Chodorow's psycho-sexual
account of moral development, look for proof of Dorothy's
non-hierarchical relationships. Susan Wolfson, for example,
*
writes of Dorothy's "poetics of community" (162) and Susan 
Levin, of her "dependence on and joy in a domestic life in 
nature" (1987, 73). Thus Dorothy's representations of women 
and nature are thought to be symptomatic of a feminine 
imagination, a feminine consciousness, and finally, a more 
"compassionate" feminine morality. Largely on this basis, 
Dorothy Wordsworth has recently been re-claimed as a proto­
type of feminine moral virtue, as a women whose caring, 
nurturing qualities serve as a convenient foil for the
17masculinist self-aggrandizement of her brother William.
There are several problems, however, with such an 
approach, three of which I would like to address here. First, 
as Nicholson and Fraser have already pointed out, Chodorow's
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claim that women are distinguished from men in their "greater 
concerns with relational interaction" may "rest on an 
equivocation on the term relationship" (97). As I have 
attempted to show, the function of the sublime is not, or not 
simply, to "transcend" relationships, but, instead, to create 
them. In alliance with the discourse of sympathy, it 
functions to promote social bonds between already similar 
men. If there is a difference between "masculine" and 
"feminine" morality, then, that is manifest in one's 
representation of community, what needs to be addressed is 
not the fact of relationship, or its absence, but the 
contours of the relationships which are being promoted. To 
ignore or suppress the fact that the sublime works to create 
relationships— however public, self-aggrandizing, and 
androcentric those may be— may be to presuppose a "late 
twentieth-century concept" of that word, where the idea of 
"relationship" is limited mostly, if not exclusively, to 
"private" phenomena such as "intimacy, friendship, and love" 
(97). In mid-eighteenth century writing, as we have seen, the 
public/private dichotomy assumed in Chodorow's analysis was 
in the process of being formed, in part through the discourse 
of sympathy.
The suggestion that this discourse is always male-biased 
brings up a second problem with models of "masculine" and 
"feminine" moral development: the way that, in positing a 
single activity such as "mothering" to explain the 
differences between men and women, they obscure the formative 
or constitutive nature of ethico-aesthetic discourse itself.
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Correspondingly, because critics following Chodorow are
looking for positive evidence of a "feminine" moral
disposition, they may obscure or simply overlook the subtle
resistances that women such as Dorothy Wordsworth have
mounted against male-biased ethico-aesthetic writing, and
thus way women were forced to challenge these codes at the
level of representation itself. One extended example of this
resistance, I hope, will suffice. As "The Thorn" illustrates,
18vagrant women can serve as a vehicle for the sublime. In
that poem, Martha Ray is the victim of overwhelming forces
with which, Wordsworth hopes, men as different as the sea
captain and the "reader" will be able to identify. While
Dorothy, in turn, is perfectly willing to represent women as
victims of outside forces over which they have no control,
she does not cast that representation into the sublime, where
it serves to create such clearly masculinist bonds. Instead,
she consistently employs the picturesque, where an absent
visual center, thoroughly aware of its own descriptive
powers, describes and organizes objects as those present
19themselves to memory (Davis). The following journal entry 
is typical. Leaving Leadhills, Scotland, she and her brother 
come upon a woman "sitting right in the middle of the field, 
alone, wrapped up in a grey cloak or plaid": "She sat 
motionless all the time we looked at her, which might be 
nearly half an hour. We could not conceive why she sat there, 
for there were neither sheep nor cattle in the field; her 
appearance was very melancholy" (Journals I: 213). As they 
cross over the hill, the landscape, as she describes it,
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begins to assume the same qualities as the woman. They spot 
"blasted" trees, she says, near a dilapidated cottage. "No 
doubt," she continues,
that woman had been an inhabitant of the 
cottage; however this might be, there was so 
much obscurity and uncertainty about her, and 
her figure agreed so well with the desolation 
of the place, that we were indebted to the 
chance of her being there for some of the 
most interesting feelings that we had ever 
had from natural objects connected with man 
in dreary solitariness. (Journals I: 213)
These "interesting feelings" are the sign, of course, of a 
highly refined aesthetic sensibility. Obscurity, desolation, 
and solitude, moreover, are all markers of the sublime. Yet 
rather than casting these emotions into a structure of power, 
Dorothy represents a single and highly controlled vision of 
nature, in which the woman and her surroundings provoke 
little but melancholy and an "interesting" mood.
The import of this aesthetic stance emerges in a journal 
entry written some twenty years later. Following a stream to 
the "gray torrent of the Lutschine," Dorothy and a party of 
travelers arrive at the basin of a cataract "where two 
women," she writes, "appeared before me singing a shrill and 
savage air:— "
. . . their tones were startling, and in 
connection with their wild yet quiet figures 
strangely combined with the sounds of dashing
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water and the silent aspect of the huge crag 
that seemed to reach the sky! (Journals II:
218)
While this scene is material for the sublime, Dorothy refuses 
to pursue this structure. Instead, in a lengthy footnote to 
this brief passage, she appends her brother's sonnet written 
in memory of this occasion, and a similar entry from Robert 
Southey's journal. In Wordsworth's poem, the poor and 
homeless women are mythologized, made into sirens who, in 
conjunction with nature, become objects of pleasure for men:
...no caverned Witch
Chaunting a love-spell ever intertwined 
Notes shrill and wild with art more musical!
Alas! that from the lips of abject Want 
And Idleness in tatters mendicant 
They should proceed— enjoyment to enthrall 
And with regret and useless pity haunt 
This bold, this pure, this skyborn Waterfall!
(Journals II: 218n)
While it might be argued that Dorothy appends this sonnet in 
order to confirm the power of this sighting, its major 
purpose, I believe, is to demystify these women, to intervene 
in the process by which they are mis-represented. Thus while 
noting that both Southey and her brother characterize the 
women's tones as being "sweet" and "thrilling," Dorothy 
remarks, quite decisively, that was close to the women 
when they began to sing, and hence, probably it was that I 
perceived nothing of sweetness in their tones" (Journals 2:
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218n). And while noting that both Southey and her brother 
report seeing three women, Dorothy insists that there were 
but two. "Observe," she writes at the end of her note, "_I 
heard only two singers; but the powerfulness of their tones 
was perfectly astonishing— and as Hr. Southey says, 'it was 
not a song of articulate sounds'" (Journals II: 218n).
"Astonishment," according to Dorothy's own definition, is
"an overwhelming sense of the powers of nature for the
destruction of all things, of the helplessness of man”
(Journals II: 128). According to Burke's, it is "that state
of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended with some
degree of horror" (57). In both cases, astonishment is a
signpost of the sublime; it marks the presence of an
overpowering or overwhelming force, or the effect of that
force upon the spectator. The difference, however, between
these two definitions is that Dorothy's simply notes the
"sense" of destructive forces in nature, while the Burkean
sublime prescribes that one "identify" or sympathize with
those powers so as to turn the suffering of others to one's
own personal gain. Instead of participating in the male-
bonding here, Dorothy devotes her energies to undermining the
self-serving and highly "literary" accounts perpetuated by
the men around her, each of whom had represented these two
real women as three charming muses whose "inarticulate"
20suffering prompts "enjoyment to enthrall." While it is 
perhaps not wise to make too much of Dorothy Wordsworth's 
footnote, the absence of the sublime is significant, I 
believe, not simply because it denotes a lack of poetic
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imagination, or simply because it denotes a positive and
"feminine" moral sensibility, but because, given the context
outlined here, it may signify a localized refusal to enter
into the masculinist economy of pleasure, pain, and power
21upon which the sympathetic sublime is based.
The suggestion that women are capable of resisting a 
largely hegemonic cultural discourse, in turn, raises a third 
problem with using psychoanalytic theory to analyze ethical 
language. Ethical language always operates through binaries. 
This means that early feminists and female moralists, forced 
to confront the binary structure of the language of sympathy, 
and the hierarchy of values within it, had a limited number 
of choices. Yet these were pursued in often complicated and 
even contradictory ways. I believe it to be significant, for 
example, that conservative eighteenth-century writers such as 
Hannah More told women that there were three modes of writing 
to which they should not aspire. "The lofty epic, the pointed 
satire, and the more daring and successful flights of the 
tragic muse," she writes, "should be "reserved for the bold 
adventures of the other sex" (Works II: 334). Clearly, More's 
comment is prescriptive; she hopes to promote a gender- 
specific morality, where the behaviors and values of men are 
carefully and purposefully distinguished from those of women.
As she continues, "the sublime, the nervous, and the 
masculine, characterize their compositions, as the beautiful, 
the soft, and the delicate, mark those of the others" (Works 
II: 335). At the same time, however, Hannah More's 
prescriptions must not be taken as representative of women,
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or even of an age. Other and generally more radical female 
writers who desired to include women in the "family of man" 
were actively drawing upon the language of the sublime to 
suit their own ends. Mary Wollstonecraft clearly does so in 
the following description from her Norwegian letters: "The 
contemplation of noble ruins produces a melancholy that 
exalts the mind."—
We take a retrospect of the exertions of man, 
the fate of empires and their rulers; and 
marking the grand destruction of ages, it 
seems the necessary change of time leading to 
improvement.— Our very soul expands, and we 
forget our littleness; how painfully brought 
to our recollection by such vain attempts to 
snatch from decay what is destined so soon to 
perish. (71)
These lines could easily have been written by a Thompson, a 
Burke, or Wordsworth, all of whom were also actively involved 
in advocating programs for social reform. Because the sublime 
encourages identification with a principle of power, one can 
see why this mode of writing would appeal to Wollstonecraft, 
while being anathema to conservative Christians such as 
Hannah More. The suggestion is that one should be very 
careful about attributing some "masculine" or "feminine" 
moral disposition to a body of literature in which such 
associations, far from having been formed, were actively 
being organized and/or contested upon explicitly political 
grounds.
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This discussion of sympathy, gender, and the sublime thus 
opens up to a much larger issue, what happens to 
psychoanalytic readings of "masculine" and "feminine" moral 
sensibilities when those are revealed to be actively promoted 
by a male-biased moral discourse, dependent upon a gender- 
specific morality? What happens to ideas regarding woman's 
"different voice" when that is regarded as a necessary part 
of competing masculinist ethico-aesthetic structures, by 
which, I would argue, women were already inscribed? These 
questions, of course, are loaded: insofar as they posit a 
pervasive and male-biased ethical discourse, however 
complicated that may be, they are antithetical to critics who 
desire, for their own reasons, to locate and valorize a 
peculiarly "feminine" moral realm. There are, of course, good 
reasons to do that, not the least of which, as Janet Todd has 
pointed out, is that the "extreme value placed on Romantic 
poetry" by F.R. Leavis and others is "allied to a downgrading 
of women's prosaic activity" during the same period (1988,
112). But precisely because psychoanalytic criticism does not 
presume to analyze the history of value-formation, it is more 
likely than any other methodology to duplicate, unknowingly, 
the male-biased structures of value which, I would argue, 
characterize Western philosophical, aesthetic, and moral 
writing itself.
We can see this troublesome continuity in the examples 
above. Although few feminists would agree with Hume and Smith 
that the association between compassion and women is a 
"natural" one— that it is a fact of female biology— it is
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possible to argue that their near-biological essentialism has
been replaced with accounts of "gender identity" which
implicitly rely upon a similar "quasi metanarrative" of
22feminine moral development (Fraser and Nicholson 95). Given
their reliance upon some "masculine" or "feminine" model of
development to explain the sublime— or to explain its
absence— Weiskel, Homan, Wolfson, and Levin are all involved
in promoting (and obscuring) a kind of "cultural"
essentialism not, in the end, so different from More's.
Wolfson and Levin, for example, unknowingly duplicate not
only More's perception of the sublime, but also her
prescriptive intent— to "legitimize" some presumably
"feminine" morality in opposition to some presumably
2 3"egocentric" and thus masculine moral construct. This, 
unfortunately, is simply to invert the hierarchy of values by 
which women were defined, without, at the same time, either 
examining or challenging their construction.
The assumption that gender-specific moralities are 
historically-situated and constructed phenomena does not, 
however, mean that their construction is either simple, 
monocausal, or predictable. As we have seen, the ethics and 
aesthetics of sympathy associate the "feminine" with a 
principle of suffering without at the same time endowing 
women with any real historical specificity. Paradoxically, 
this lack of specificity may have helped create an opening 
for women moralists who, shaping the language of sympathy to 
their own ends, sought to organize "feminine" moralities in 
ways that— directly or indirectly— could subvert, revise, or
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simply transcend the hierarchy of values apparent in the 
writing of men. Because such compensatory strategies, as one 
might expect, were neither self-identical nor self- 
consistent, it makes little sense to speak of a "feminine" 
morality apart from the conditions of its production, and 
apart from the writers who were responsible for particular 
representations. In Part Two, I shall demonstrate this point 
through analyzing the writing of Mary Wollstonecraft and 
Hannah More.
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Notes to Chapter Two
1. "Literary" is placed in quotation marks here because, as 
Raymond Williams (1977) points out, the modern concept of 
"literature" as a highly-valued body of writing that is 
somehow different from more "actual" or "practical" works did 
not emerge until the late-eighteenth century and was not 
fully developed until the nineteenth century. This is an 
important issue for anyone concerned with the interpretation 
of values and value-formation. Consequently, as a matter of 
critical practice, 1 prefer the more historical term 
"letters" over "literature."
2.With the exception of Bate (1945) and Honk, relatively few 
eighteenth-century critics have analyzed the relationship 
between sympathy, pleasure, pain, and the sublime. While this 
may be attributed to the popular notion that the sublime is a 
"romantic" phenomenon, it is important to remember that Burke 
published his treatise on the sublime and the beautiful in 
1757, two years prior to The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
Before the turn of the century, moreover, James Beattie, Hugh 
Blair, Alexander Gerard, Richard Payne Knight, Archibald 
Alison, and scores of others had followed suit (see Monk).
3. Other important accounts of the sublime based upon 
psychoanalytic models include Weiskel and Morris, both of 
whom— in perhaps quite different ways— rely upon Freud. This 
chapter, in contrast, draws upon a second tradition of 
writing on the sublime as an intrinsically social or even 
political mode of writing, a notion which is most 
systematically set forth by Schiller. In addition, see 
Wilkinson and Willoughby, who provide the best introduction 
to Schiller's aesthetics— or, more precisely, to his idea of 
the "Aesthetic State" (xi-cxcv). On the politics of the 
sublime, see also Shapiro.
4. Following Gilbert and Gubar, Margaret Homan sought to 
articulate a separate tradition of women's writing set 
against the "phallogocentric" literature of the sublime, 
where, she argues, women such as Dorothy Wordsworth were 
required to assume a "secondary and peripheral role" and to 
"omit a central or prominent self" in their writing (Homan 73).
5. For a useful discussion of the relationship between 
literary criticism, romanticism, and the representation of 
gender, see Todd 1988, 110-117.
6. On the relationship between sympathy and tragic response 
in sentimental literature, see Wasserman and Crane. On 
sympathy and tragic response in anti-sensibility literature, 
or in what has been called the "anti-theatrical tradition," 
see Marshall 1986, 167-192; Marshall 1988; Cohen. On tragedy 
and the sublime, see Albrecht 1-24. As these categories 
exemplify, and as these critics have illustrated at length, 
the relationship between sympathy, tragedy, and the sublime
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was throughout the eighteenth century a source of great 
controversy and debate. Rather than entering that debate, 1 
shall focus upon one aspect of the larger problem: the way 
these three terms are united by a principle of pleasure that 
characterizes aesthetics as a whole.
7. Here Addison alludes to the idea that distance, either 
physical or psychological, is necessary for the aesthetic 
experience to occur. On the problem of aesthetic 
distantiation, see Stolnitz 1961b; Ogden; Bullough; and 
Fabricant.
B. Burke's admission that people take pleasure in the actual 
Buffering of others is undoubtedly related to that fact that 
in the mid-eighteenth century crowds of people flocked to 
hangings and other scenes of public punishment. As he 
continues, "Chuse a day on which to represent the most 
sublime and affecting tragedy we have; appoint the most 
famous actors; spare no cost upon the scenes and the 
decoration; unite the greatest efforts of poetry, painting, 
and music; and when you have collected your audience, just at 
the moment when their minds are erect with expectation, let 
it be reported that a state criminal of high rank is on the 
point of being executed in the adjoining square; in a moment 
the emptiness of the theatre would demonstrate the 
comparative weakness of the imitative arts, and proclaim the 
triumph of the real sympathy" (47). On the relationship 
between sympathy and punishment, see McGowan.
9. As Morris correctly points out, "there is no essence of 
the sublime" (300). In this sense, it is very much like the 
figure of sympathy. What follows, then, is an analysis of the 
points in the writing of Wordsworth and Burke at which the 
logic of sympathy as I have outlined it and the structure of 
the sublime intersect with one another. I do not claim that 
this analysis can be extended beyond the writers here.
10. See Swartz on the relationship between ambition and the 
sublime, although he does not address the importance of 
sympathy in this context.
11. In his analysis of poetic language, Burke had argued 
against Locke and others that, since words have no 
resemblance to the "ideas for which they stand," poetry and 
rhetoric operate "chiefly by substitution; by the means of 
sounds, which by custom have the effect of realities" {173). 
The "business" of poetry and rhetoric, he claims, "is to 
affect rather by sympathy...; to display rather the effect of 
things on the mind of the speaker, or of others, than to 
present a clear idea of the things themselves (172). In this 
sense sympathy is central not only to an expressivist theory 
of art, but to the hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and others 
in Germany. See Gadamer 153-87.
12. All references to "The Thorn" are taken from Lyrical 
Ballads, eds. Brett and Jones.
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13. 1 realize, of course, that in calling the existence of 
this "baby" into question, I am denying a long tradition of 
criticism that assumes, in Byron's words, that the subject of 
"The Thorn" is "the remorse of an unnatural mother for the 
destruction of a natural child." It should be pointed out, 
however, that Byron's reference to the subject of the poem is 
within a longer complaint about Wordsworth's "prosaic raving" 
in the preface. Byron's full remark, which may, in fact, be a 
deliberate misrepresentation, is "In a note or preface (I 
forget which) by Mr. W. Wordsworth to a poem, the Subject of 
which, as far it is intelligible, is the remorse of an 
unnatural mother for the destruction of a natural child" etc. 
(see the preface to Don Juan). Neither here nor in the poem 
proper is there any reason to believe that the child existed 
anywhere outside the community's imagination.
14. As Wordsworth writes elsewhere, "[It] is not enough for 
me as a poet, to delineate merely such feelings as all men do 
sympathize with but, it is also highly desireable to add to 
these others, such as all men may sympathize with, and such
as there is reason to believe they would be better and more
moral beings if they did sympathize with" (Early Letters 
358). On the relationship between WordswortlTi sympathy^ and 
the poor, see Sampson and Simpson 160-184.
15. It should be said, in passing, that it also clarifies a 
problem in Wordsworth scholarship. It is well known that 
Wordsworth saw an actual thorn tree while walking with his 
ward, Basil Montagu, and determined to write a poem about it. 
It is also well known that Martha Ray was the mother of Basil 
Montagu, who in 1779 was murdered by a jealous lover. As 
Averill has noted, this trial received an inordinate amount 
of publicity. Yet more than one critic, believing the poem to 
be about a sea captain, a vagrant, or a thorn tree, has 
commented that "it is completely inexplicable why Wordsworth 
should have chosen the name of his friend's unfortunate 
mother to be the heroine of the poem" (LB 291). When the poem 
is regarded, as it has been here, as an allegory about the 
destructive powers of public rumor, scandal, and gossip—  
which, in turn, an individual may somehow resist— "The Thorn" 
emerges in a different light: as a would-be vindication, 
however partial, of the infamous Martha Ray.
16. This idea is closely related to Irigaray's concept of a 
"hom(m)o-social economy" where a woman "enters into" social, 
cultural, and economic exchanges "only as the object of a 
transaction, unless she agrees to renounce the specificity of 
her sex, whose ’identity' is imposed on her according to 
models that remain foreign to her. Women's social inferiority 
is reinforced and complicated by the fact that woman does not 
have access to language, except through recourse to 
’masculine' systems of representation which disappropriate 
her from her relation to herself and to other women" (85).
See also Sedgewick.
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17. Central to many of these arguments for a superior 
"feminine" morality set against the "masculine" sublime is 
the assumption that in romantic writing, a disregard for 
nature and an appropriation of the "feminine" are equated. 
Mellor, for example, claims that the sublime and the poets 
who promote it "endorsed a concept of the self as a power 
that gains control over and gives significance to nature, a 
nature troped in their writings as female. They thus 
legitimized the continued repression of women and at the same 
time gave credence to the historically emerging capitalist 
belief in the primacy of the individual over the group" (8). 
Richardson expands upon this argument, asserting, in 
addition, that in order to claim "emotional intensity and 
intuition as male prerogatives" Romantic poets appropriate, 
assimilate, or incorporate feminine qualities (15). in both 
cases, the equation between certain "feminine" qualities and 
"nature"— itself a complicated romantic construct— is simply 
appropriated for anti-masculinist arguments. This seems to be 
a widespread trend in romantic criticism. Half of the 
articles in Romanticism and Feminism, significantly, quote 
Chodorow or Gilligan approvingly. See n. 21 and 22.
18. Examples include "The Vagrant Woman" in LB, itself taken 
from Adventures on Salisbury Plain (1793); "TEe Mad Mother" 
from LB; and "The Ruined Cottage."
19. See also Nabholtz for a more traditional account of 
Dorothy and the aesthetics of the picturesque.
20. I do not mean to suggest that Dorothy's response to the 
discourse of sympathy is purely resistant. Like many 
eighteenth-century writers, she bought into the conservative 
idea that women should define themselves in terms of public 
service, which is simply to form different kinds of 
relationships than those encouraged for men. As Susan Wolfson 
has noted, Dorothy Wordsworth was active in any number of 
community projects. In fact, she defines herself in terms of 
her compassionate qualities: "my only merits," she writes, 
"are my devotedness to those I love and I hope a charity 
towards all mankind” (Middle Letters I: 525).
21. There are several explanations for this, none of which 
can be reduced to the notion of some pre-existent feminine 
moral sensibility, though each is undoubtedly implicated in 
the historical formation of that idea. It is important to 
remember, for example, that Dorothy, unlike William, was 
constantly aware of her own precarious position as a 
dependent sister. In this sense, she was little more than a 
brother's whim away from being one of the many homeless and 
vagrant women who populate her journals and poems. While this 
awareness rarely emerges in what we could identify as 
"compassion," it does seem to be manifest in structures of 
sympathy which differ from her brother's, in structures which 
allow both distance and control, without at the same time 
turning what must have been the very real pain of other women 
into material for the sympathetic sublime.
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22. Most prominent among these theorists is Chodorow, who, in 
an effort to understand why women willingly take part in 
social practices which serve to maintain their status as the 
social inferiors of men, examines the causes and effects of 
"mothering" from a psychological perspective. (See n. 17). 
Chodorow argues that the fact that women are the primary 
caretakers of children gives rise to a different sense of 
self in boys and girls. Whereas girls are thought to define 
themselves in terms of their ability to relate to others, 
boys are not. From a post-structuralist feminist perspective, 
the problems with this approach are manifold. As Linda 
Nicholson and others have pointed out, in its positing of a 
single activity to "explain" the differences between the 
behaviors of men and women, not only does Chodorow's theory 
have "clear metanarrative overtones" (95), but in so far as 
it relies upon the "idea of a cross-cultural, deep sense of 
self, specified differently for men and women" (96) it 
ignores or at least suppresses the culturally-specific and 
historically-determined differences between individual men 
and women themselves. And this, concludes Nicholson, "is to 
risk projecting the socially dominant conjunctions" of one's 
own society onto others, "thereby distorting important 
features of both" (98). 1 shall return to Chodorow's 
significance in the conclusion of this study.
23. Chodorow claims that her description of the moral 
development of females is not meant to be prescriptive (215). 
In practice, however, it certainly is, as is apparent by the 
way Gilligan and her followers have valorized what they call 
"non-repressive" relationships between self and others, which 
are presumed to be characterized by women. This tendency to 
politicize psycho-sexual models of development is 
particularly apparent in French feminism, which, some have 
argued, exemplifies a "feminine" sublime. For an interesting 
exchange about this problem within a contemporary context, 
see Yaeger, who claims that "French feminists" and others 
have created a "horizontal sublime" that "refuses an oedipal, 
phallic fight to the death with the father, but expands 
towards others" (191); and Edelman, who, after considering 
the "theoretically regressive" aspects of a contemporary 
feminine sublime, concedes that in its "gestures of 
empowerment" this mode of writing constitutes an 
"historically and politically imperative" moment in feminist 
theory and politics" (222).
Part Two: Early Feminism and Sympathetic Response
The world cannot be seen by an unmoved 
spectator, we must mix in the throng, and 
feel as men feel before we can judge of 
their feelings. Wollstonecraft, A
Vindication of the Rights of Woman
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Chapter Three: The Female Body Politic
In the first half of this study, I demonstrated how the 
discourse of sympathy functions to create bonds between 
presumably virtuous men, bonds from which women were 
excluded. This analysis, for reasons I have already 
addressed, was intentionally removed from any extended 
discussion of specific social practices. In order to 
highlight the political nature of moral discourse— the way in 
which "masculine" and "feminine" moral dispositions are 
always matters of conflicting but purposeful representation—  
I shall employ the same strategy here. In the two or three 
decades before the turn of the century, sympathy emerged as a 
key term in debates about the French Revolution, about 
British radicalism, and, I shall illustrate, about the 
"natural" position of women in social and political life. In 
these highly-charged and volatile arguments, the gender- 
specific subtext of sympathy underlying Wordsworth and Smith 
is made explicit, particularly in the writing of Rousseau, 
Wollstonecraft, Hays, and More. At the same time, however, 
there was a new or at least different emphasis upon the 
nature and value of the female body as a potential source of 
moral disorder, or, in the writing of Wollstonecraft and 
More, as a source of moral reform. My goal in Part Two of 
this study is to locate those structures as they make their 
way into feminist theory and practice where, arguably, they
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remain today. In order to do this, I shall focus in this 
chapter upon one issue— the relationship between compassion, 
politics, and popular representations of the female body. My 
specific purpose is to establish the relationship between 
compassion, the female body, and the "moral value" of women 
as an explicitly political issue, not only to male moralists, 
but to early feminists, as well.
This particular configuration radiates in many directions.
As I have already mentioned, throughout the eighteenth
century medical writers were mapping out the central nervous
system, or the "sympathetic system," in different ways for
men than for women.* A  burgeoning psychology, for example,
had identified the female nervous system as being "innately"
more susceptible to emotional disorders and thus
constitutionally less capable of withstanding outside forces.
As Todd points out, "Women were thought to express emotions
with their bodies more sincerely and spontaneously than men;
hence their propensity to crying, blushing and fainting. At
the same time, such a susceptible organism could easily
2become erratic and deranged" (Todd 1986, 19). For obvious 
reasons, this strange wedding between medicine and morality 
cannot be regarded as an objective and value-free feat of 
medical science. Similarly, it is possible to see an equally 
male-biased inscription of women in eighteenth-century moral 
theory. Hume, Smith, and (as I shall demonstrate) Rousseau 
all represent compassion as a physical, involuntary, or 
automatic form of sympathetic response, in so doing, they are 
following a popular signification. Johnson's Dictionary, as I
have mentioned, defines "compassion" as a special case of 
sympathetic response, as "painful sympathy" over which, 
presumably, one has little control.^ The fact that "having 
bowels" is a popular synonym for compassion illustrates this 
point rather graphically (see Dictionary). On the other hand, 
each of these moralists explicitly attributes this form of 
sympathetic response to women, which is to shape a 
(presumably) value-neutral association to their own ends. As 
Kathryn Pauley Morgan has demonstrated, one of the many ways 
moral philosophers have denied women full moral agency is by 
representing them as "negative moral epiphenomenalists," or 
as creatures whose bodies act upon the mind so as to occlude 
appropriate moral feeling (150). Only through this 
complicated sleight of hand are the British moralists able 
both to insist upon the value of compassion, and to ensure 
that their own carefully cultivated moral qualities be 
regarded as "naturally" superior.^
This doctrine of separate virtues, the hierarchy of value 
into which that was cast, and the fact that both of those 
were being "naturalized" by eighteenth-century ethics, 
aesthetics, and medicine together thus serve as the starting 
point for mid-eighteenth century female writers, most of whom 
were determined to solidify, clarify, and elevate woman's 
moral value. Within that context, generally speaking, any 
female moralist is faced with one of two choices. First, she 
can insist (with Smith) upon woman's "natural" compassion, 
and promote "private" virtues at the expense of "public" 
ones. This is to invert the hierarchy of values intrinsic to
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Smith's text, while maintaining the difference by which men 
and women are defined. As I will discuss in the following 
chapter, this is the option adopted by the conservative 
Christian Hannah More, who sought to promote what she 
believed to be were the best interests of women by keeping 
the "society of the sexes" intact. The problems with this 
approach are myriad, but the most immediate one is that while 
women, by virtue of their compassionate qualities, are 
endowed with moral value, they are not— outside of particular 
forms of Christianity— at the same time endowed with moral 
judgment.
The equation between compassion and women thus has real 
political implications. Within the more secularized systems 
of Hume and Smith, as we saw in Chapter II, indiscriminate 
compassion for others precludes one from identifying with the 
impartial spectator, and thus from internalizing moral 
authority. In relegating compassion to women, then, Hume,
Smith, and others were simultaneously reinforcing her social 
and moral status as what Wollstonecraft will later call a 
"lovely trembler," as a creature both too threatened and too 
threatening to be granted civil existence (Rights of Woman 
61). Given this, it is not surprising that radical feminists 
such as Hary Wollstonecraft and Mary Hays should question the 
association between compassion and feminine virtue. The other 
option, which they exemplify, is to de-naturalize the 
association between "compassion" and womanhood so as to 
undermine the basis for women's so-called ethical inferiority 
and their subsequent political exclusion.
In order to demonstrate the intimate relation between the 
writing of sympathy and early feminist politics, i shall 
begin at an unlikely place, with Rousseau's Julie, or, The 
New Heloise. This so-called "sensibility" novel, like much of 
the writing we have already seen, draws upon the discourse of 
sympathy to promote and justify the ethical and political 
power of the middle-class male. Yet Rousseau casts the logic 
of sympathy into a myth of social origin, also apparent in 
the novel, where Julie, the female protagonist, is 
represented as a necessary but dangerous source of compassion 
which must be suppressed for the greater good of the state.
In the section which follows, I shall demonstrate how 
Wollstonecraft's early works— Hary, A Fiction (1788) and 
Thoughts on the Education of Daughters (1787)— are attempts 
to de-naturalize the association between women and unthinking 
compassion, in part by attributing women's "inferior" 
morality to her inadequate moral and religious education. The 
remainder of this chapter is devoted to analyzing A 
Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), where I shall 
focus upon three interrelated issues: Wollstonecraft's 
reliance upon a rational religion to qualify the inherited 
association between women and "exquisite humanity"; her 
attempt to broaden the notions of "fellow-feeling" to include 
women, as well; and her desire to ground the moral value of 
women by appealing to the notion of "rational motherhood," 
which, she will argue, promotes more fundamental social bonds 
than those celebrated by middle-class men.
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Pity and Radical Politics: Rousseau
Rousseau is important to any discussion of Wollstonecraft 
because like her, as Cora Kaplan points out, "Rousseau wished 
to harness his gender ideologies to radical social and 
political theories" (39).^ It is possible to see this desire 
in the plot of The New Heloise.^ This novel tells the story 
of an ill-fated relationship between Julie, the daughter of 
an aristocrat, and her middle-class tutor, St. Preux.
Throughout the novel, the essentially noble man will learn to 
control his passion for Julie, to join the company of "good" 
men such as Wolmar and Lord Bomston, and to take his rightful 
place as a responsible and respected citizen in the public: 
world who knows the "value of a beneficent heart" (195).
Julie, too, has a lesson to learn. Under the rule of her 
rational husband Wolmar, she learns the value of "private" 
virtues— chastity and maternal affection. As Rousseau has the 
reformed Julie ask of St. Preux:
Do you remember that, while reading your 
Plato's Republic, we once disputed the point 
of the moral difference between the sexes? I 
persist in the opinion which I had then and 
cannot imagine one common model of perfection 
for two different beings. . . . Besides, the 
purposes of nature not being the same in each 
sex, its inclinations, perceptions, and 
sentiments must be directed according to its 
own views; opposite tastes and constitutions 
are required for tilling the soil and for
nursing children. . . . The souls of a
perfect woman and a perfect man must not
resemble each other more than their 
appearance. Our vain imitations of your sex 
are the height of folly; they make wise men 
laugh at us and they discourage love. (108)
Each, then, learns his or her moral duty, how to serve best
within his or her alloted "sphere." At the same time, these
gender-specific and seemingly natural virtues are represented 
as being central to the future of a better world than the one 
symbolized by Julie's corrupt father.
Zn both this novel and Emile, Rousseau outlines separate 
duties for men and women which should, he claims, be 
inculcated by different "moral" educations. While his 
portrayal of these undoubtedly constitutes a significant 
moment in anti-feminist literature, instead of focusing upon 
this clearly didactic aspect of the novel, as so many
7feminist critics have already done, I want to outline, 
briefly, how he uses the discourse of sympathy to underwrite 
that explicitly political agenda. In order to do that, it is 
helpful to place the novel within the context of Rousseau's 
more overtly political writing.
In his Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau lays out a myth 
of social origins in which pity, or compassion, is a central
O
terra. Against Hobbes, but with Hume and Smith, Rousseau 
claims that "pity" is a disposition "so natural that even 
beasts sometimes give perceptible signs of it":
Without speaking of the tenderness of mothers
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for their young and of the perils they brave 
to guard them, one observes daily the 
repugnance of horses to trample a living body 
underfoot. (130)
Yet as Derrida has noted, it is largely by virtue of the 
mother-child metaphor that this presumably universal and 
primitive form of relationship is connected with women, and 
women, in turn, are connected with nature (Derrida 173). As 
Rousseau continues, "in the state of nature," pity "takes the 
place of laws, morals, and virtue, with the advantage that no 
one is tempted to disobey its gentle voice" (133). While 
Rousseau's may appear to be a positive account of pity, and 
thus a positive account of the women who were thought to 
embody it, it is important to remember that his compassionate 
Mother/nature serves both a positive and negative role: while 
it protects men from one another in their infancy, it 
simultaneously threatens a "higher" law of nature, which is 
that women must obey men (Derrida 175-76). Thus Rousseau's 
larger purpose in the Discourse on Inequality is to argue 
that "institutional law," or what is represented as masculine 
moral authority, should replace this presumably natural and 
definitely feminized trait (Derrida 173).
Rousseau's myth of social origins is allegorized, Z 
believe, in The New Heloise. Through carefully employing the 
language of sympathy, Rousseau reveals that St. Preux and 
Julie see their relationship in ways that not only reflect 
some "natural" moral difference, but which provide the terms 
by which St. Preux's struggle is to be read. In the height of
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his passion, for example, St. Preux draws upon the discourse 
in writing to his aristocratic female charge: "Sometimes I 
dare to flatter myself," he asserts, "that heaven has brought 
about a secret sympathy in our affections, as well as in our 
tastes and our ages. . . . Before having acquired the 
standard prejudices of the world, we have some similar ways 
of feeling and seeing" (26). In this context, sympathy 
functions to signify some "natural" equality between members 
of two different classes. In so far as it calls into question 
"the standard prejudices of the world," it is a progressive 
trope which serves to subvert the legitimacy of Julie's 
powerful but morally corrupt father. Julie's vision of 
"mutual sympathy," however, involves more than "some similar 
ways of thinking and seeing." indeed, in contrast to her 
lover's, it represents an almost physical sense of 
connection:
Our souls touch, so to speak, at all points 
and we feel an entire coherence. (Correct me, 
my friend, if I am poorly applying your 
lessons in physics.) Fate may indeed separate 
us, but not disunite us. We shall henceforth 
have only mutual pleasures and mutual pains; 
and like those magnets of which you were 
telling me that have, it is said, the same 
movements in different places, we should have 
the same sensations though we were at two 
poles of the earth. (47)
It is this desire for interconnection that throughout the
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novel St. Preux will struggle to overcome.
In so far as Julie represents some original and physical 
desire for interconnection, she cannot be regarded as a 
character in her own right, instead she serves as the 
attractive but dangerous sensibility which threatens to 
subvert St. Preux's rightful duties to society and to the 
state. It is significant, for example, that Julie gives 
herself to St. Preux not out of love— and certainly not out 
of active passion— but out of openness to his pain: "He would 
rush toward me in the impetuousness of a blind passion," she 
writes.
But he would stop himself suddenly; an 
insurmountable barrier seemed to have 
surrounded me, never to be overcome by his 
impetuous but chaste love. I dared watch this 
dangerous spectacle too much. I myself was 
troubled by his fits of passion. His sights 
oppressed my heart. I shared his torments 
when I thought I was only pitying them. I saw 
him trembling with emotion, ready to lose 
consciousness at my feet. Perhaps love alone 
would have saved me; oh my cousin, it is pity 
that destroyed me. (78)
Despite the fact that Julie's presumable natural pity is 
temporarily channeled into more appropriate behaviors, 
eventually her unthinking response to the emotions of others 
does indeed serve to "destroy" her, as she sacrifices her 
life to save the life of her child (395). Even in the end,
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moreover, her fantasies of connection are not controlled, but 
simply displaced from the social world. "The virtue which 
separated us on earth," she writes to St. preux, "will unite 
us in the eternal dwelling" (407). St. Preux, on the other 
hand, has learned to distinguish benevolism from pity, which 
is clearly represented as a "weakness"; in the words of Lord 
Bomston, it is a form of mere self-interest, or "a concern 
for justice and order which desires everyone to be disposed 
of in the manner most advantageous to himself and society" 
(163). Once this negative social force is effectively 
overcome, St. Preux can look forward to inheriting Julie's 
children, marrying her friend, and becoming a father in his 
own right.
Like so many of the works we have seen, then, this novel 
turns upon the idea that pity and compassion are seductive 
but dangerous qualities which must be "perfected" by the 
greater society, or directed toward some appropriate end. All 
three writers take as their starting point the universality 
of pity or compassion. "The greatest ruffian," writes Smith, 
"the most hardened violator of the laws of society is not 
altogether without it" (TMS 9). This apparently positive 
virtue, however, is eventually associated with women, where 
it actually serves to "prove" their moral inferiority, a 
"natural" response to others that men, they argue, must learn 
to overcome. Thus claiming that compassion is an unmanly 
quality, Hume and Smith, as we have seen, react against an 
unthinking ethic— against one which encourages the ability to 
identify with another's weakness or suffering. Rousseau, in
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turn, reinforces the association between women and compassion 
by representing it as a "primitive" and inevitably "feminine" 
need for connection that, paradoxically, both protects and 
threatens a higher law, the civil duty of men. In each case, 
compassion is represented as a volatile, even dangerous 
quality which must be controlled— "repressed" writes Julie—  
so that, like Hume and Smith, Rousseau builds his society 
upon qualities attributed to women who are now, consequently, 
excluded.
Yet there is a difference between Rousseau and the British 
moralists. The seemingly more "radical" Rousseau, rather than 
simply delineating the superiority of individual "self- 
command," represents masculine virtue as the end product of a 
long and difficult struggle against threatening and pre­
existent forces in the state. This struggle, in turn, is 
always cast as a battle between men and women. As he writes 
in the Letter to D'Alembert, "an inverted domestic order is 
the paradigm of violence and political anomaly," where women, 
he claims, "no longer willing to tolerate separation," 
unable to make themselves into men . . . make 
us into women. This disadvantageous result 
which degrades man is very important 
everywhere; but it is especially so in a 
state like ours, whose interest is to prevent 
it. Whether a monarch governs men or women 
ought to be rather indifferent to him, 
provided that he be obeyed; but in a 
republic, men are needed. (177)
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"In a republic, man are needed"— the suggestion, of course, 
is that women are not, except in so far as they represent a 
protective and threatening force which men, to prove their 
moral worth, must struggle to control.
Given the ongoing alliance between the discourse of
sympathy and sexual and party politics, it should be apparent
that at issue in this mid-century work is not so much the
status of the novel as "sensibility" or "anti-sensibility"
literature, but how, through the representation of masculine
and feminine "sensibilities," social relationships are being 
gre-formed. To put it another way, at stake in The New 
Heloise is not simply some romantic liaison, but the promises 
of individualism, which are embodied in the tumultuous but 
eventually successful career of St. Preux. Julie, in turn, is 
little more than the too-responsive text from which the 
erstwhile tutor draws his hard-learned lesson. In casting her 
this way, Rousseau both reinforces the idea that women 
possess a secondary and inferior moral power, and softens 
that inferiority by appealing to a favorite eighteenth- 
century theme: that women, while themselves slaves of 
compassion, may serve as moral agents by effecting another's 
moral elevation. Thus Julie's status as moral heroine, unlike 
St. Preux's, is inherently problematical, and subject to 
debate throughout that century and into our own.
That debate, as I have indicated, usually turns upon 
whether or not "compassion" or "suffering” is regarded as a 
valuable feminine trait, even while the systems through which 
those values were written were and still are constantly in
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flux. Certainly there is little question in the case of 
Clarissa, who serves as Julie's prototype. As John Mullan has 
commented a propos of Clarissa, she "values her capacity for 
'suffering'," which signifies both her susceptibility to 
others and the moral resolution which controls it: "the 
school of affliction," she writes, is "an excellent school .
. . in which we are taught to know ourselves, to be able to 
compassionate and bear with one another, and look up to a 
better hope" (64). In the newly-secularized political visions 
of mid-eighteenth-century philosophers, however, compassion 
is represented as a hopelessly inadequate response to a 
changing world.
From this point of view, it is easy to see why compassion 
was such an important term for early feminist writers, many 
of whom, writing in direct response to Rousseau, sought to 
undermine the dangerous association between women and 
unthinking pity. The Memoirs of Emma Courtney (1796), for 
example, may be regarded as a virtual re-writing of The New 
Heloise from a moderate feminist's point of view. Like The 
New Heloise, Hays' novel describes the danger of "pity [that] 
melted the soul to love" for Emma and for Harley, the 
secretly-married man who, unfortunately, she comes to adore 
(79). Yet unlike Julie, Hays' heroine is represented as a 
free moral agent, as a thinking person who realizes on her 
own that her errors are "the offspring of sensibility"
(xviii)— the product of indiscriminate feeling.
Significantly, Hays suggests that this indiscriminate feeling 
had been promoted by Emma's reading of Rousseau. This
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"dangerous, enchanting" novel, says Emma, prompted a 
"pleasure" that "approaches the limits of pain" (25), and 
produced "a long chain of consequences" operating throughout 
her life” (25). Ironically, then, in Hays' novel, Rousseau is 
held to be responsible for inculcating a dangerous openness 
to suffering that, in The New Heloise, he ostensibly sought 
to reform.10
The association between compassion and women is de­
naturalized in a second way, as well. Hays attributes the 
hyper-sensibility of women to a society that offers little 
choice for women but to depend upon a series of foolish, 
amoral, or immoral men. Although Emma endeavors to acquire a 
"rational independence" (27), for example, her profligate 
father had squandered her inheritance, leaving her at the 
mercy of unfeeling friends and relatives. Unlike St. Preux, 
then, who had been put into useful service, she has no 
existence outside a stifling private life. "Cruel 
prejudices!" she writes, " . . .  Why was I not educated for 
commerce, for a profession, for labour?" (30). Increasingly 
her sphere of interests and her social circle narrow, and 
with them, the objects offered to her imagination. When she 
meets Augustus Harley— the "St. Preux, the Emeilus of [her] 
sleeping and waking reveries" (59)— "reason" is made 
"auxiliary to her passion" (61), not because she is naturally 
compassionate, but because of her increasingly marginalized 
position in society. "I was compelled to acknowledge, to 
myself," she writes, "that solitude" and "the absence of 
other impressions" awakened dangerous sensibilities, until
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she believed that she loved an "ideal object" (61). The novel 
ends with the hope that Emma's own "moral martyrdom" will 
inspire others to "emancipate the human mind from 
superstition" and "teach it, that its true dignity and 
virtue, consist in being free" (199).
Hays' overtly political rhetoric should indicate how 
intimately the language of ethics, feeling, and politics were 
allied for eighteenth-century writers, even for those women 
whose work is sometimes read as though it did little more 
than display the writer's individual "sensibility," her 
personal feelings and private desires. As moralists who 
desired to appropriate moral discourse for their own 
political ends, both Hays and her mentor, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, were necessarily interested in examining the 
nature and value of qualities that were thought to peculiarly 
"masculine" or "feminine," and in turning those to women's 
best advantage. Yet it has by now become a commonplace of 
feminist criticism that women and other muted groups must 
speak through the dominant discourse if they are to speak at 
a l l , ^  so one should also remember that Hays and 
Wollstonecraft had a limited number of choices regarding the 
words, figures, and discourses that each would employ. Their 
feminism, consequently, is perhaps best characterized by a 
series of strategies; it is made up of an artillery of 
essentially conservative discourses which together allowed 
women to intervene in the deployment of other and even more 
threatening male-biased systems. With that rather imposing 




Religion, for example, was an important aspect of Mary
12Wollstonecraft's feminist arguments. Throughout her work 
Wollstonecraft would consistently call upon both men and 
women to practice a rational religion associated with Richard 
Price and the Dissenters. The advantage of this religious 
position for mid-eighteenth-century women is two-fold. First, 
the lines between masculine and feminine virtues are obscured 
under a single notion of moral excellence. In Thoughts on the 
Education of Daughters, for example, Wollstonecraft argues 
that men and women alike have a duty to perform acts of 
benevolence: "The wisdom of the Almighty has so ordered 
things," she writes, "that one cause produces many effects. . 
. . Active virtue fits us for the society of more exalted 
beings. Our philanthropy is a proof, we are told, that we are 
capable of loving our Creator" (67). This single duty is 
thought to signify one's relationship to a single divine body 
and soul. "Indeed," she continues, "this divine love, or 
charity, appears to me the principal trait that remains of 
the illustrious character of the Deity, which was originally 
stampt on the souls, and which is to be renewed" (67). The 
real issue in such passages, then— what distinguishes them 
from mainstream benevolist writings— is not a valorization of 
suffering, but Wollstonecraft's determination to prove that 
women, like men, are "stampt" with the "illustrious 
character" of God, that they too are capable of "active
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virtue."
Even in this early work, however, she imposes limitations 
upon compassion. Much of Thoughts on the Education of 
Daughters, for example, is devoted to exposing the situation 
of women who work as governesses for fashionable families. 
Drawing upon her own experience, Wollstonecraft warns 
governesses that they will be subject to the "tyrannical 
domineering tempers" of their employers, and that, moreover, 
this situation cannot be met with Christian suffering:
The tender, who are so by nature, or those 
whom religion has molded with so heavenly a 
disposition, give way for the sake of peace—  
yet still this giving way undermines their 
domestic comfort, and stops the current of 
affection; they labor for patience, and labor 
is ever painful. (61).
Elsewhere in that text, she encourages women to study 
medicine so as to become "judicious nurse[s]" (104). "Many a 
person," she warns, "who has had a sensible physician to 
attend them, have been lost for the want of the other; for 
tenderness, without judgment, sometimes does more harm than 
good (104).
In de-valuing automatic and unthinking compassion, 
Wollstonecraft may appear to be in alliance with mid- 
eighteenth-century moralists who sought to establish the 
moral superiority of men. This near alliance, however, 
signifies neither her admiration for them, nor her contempt 
for women. Given her own position as woman and a moralist, it
is simply an effect of the already-politicized discourse in 
which she is forced to intervene. But because Wollstonecraft 
writes from outside the comparably comfortable positions 
enjoyed by Hume, Smith, and Rousseau, she is also able to 
present a kind of "double vision" where the ethics of 
compassion are necessarily abandoned, while the victims of 
society are not. Unlike Smith, for whom women merely serve as 
a "sex" which embodies a certain configuration of moral 
qualities, Wollstonecraft represents women as a class, who, 
given their status as wives or barely employable persons 
within a market economy, are always already dependent upon 
the arbitrary power of others, upon their charity, 
institutions, values, and norms. As she will later write in 
Rights of Woman, in the "discharge of the simplest duty, we 
are often obliged to act contrary to the present impulse of 
tenderness or compassion" (68). For such "present impulse[s]" 
she would substitute the rights and duties promoted and 
enjoyed by middle-class men which, presumably, would make 
compassion unnecessary. Thus immediately after this comment, 
Wollstonecraft makes the argument that "asylums and 
Magdalenes" are not proper remedies for prostitutes, many of 
whom are victims of their sex and class. "It is justice," she 
claims, and "not charity, that is wanting in the worldl"
(71).
The second advantage of Wollstonecraft's religious 
position is that it allows her to re-value the female body, 
to remove it from the economies already set up by eighteenth- 
century men. As I have suggested, it was a commonplace of
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eighteenth-century medical texts that the mind bore an 
intrinsic relationship to the body by virtue of the 
"sympathetic system." Hume, Smith, and Rousseau had used this 
connection between the mind and the body in a circular 
argument that women, who have the weaker bodies, also have 
the weaker and therefore more-easily corrupted minds. 
Wollstonecraft accepts the mind/body association without 
question, but, drawing upon an essentially religious concept 
of "purity," revises it to suit her own feminist ends. As she 
writes in her first published prose piece, Thoughts on the 
Education of Daughters, "from the body's purity the mind 
receives a sympathetic aid" (35). From this point of view, 
Wollstonecraft is able to remove the female body from an 
anti-feminist standard of moral strength and return it to the 
individual female's control, where the purity of one's body 
can become a measure of one's moral and mental well-being.
We can see how Wollstonecraft recoups the female body from 
its morally secondary position through a brief analysis of 
Mary, A Fiction (1788). While this work is often regarded as 
a novel of sensibility based upon Wollstonecraft's tumultuous 
private life (Ferguson and Todd, 106-107), it is clear that 
Wollstonecraft followed Rousseau, Hays, and others in shaping 
her experiences so as to enter into an ongoing dialogue about 
the moral and political value(s) of women and m e n , ^  Within 
that context, Mary, A Fiction offers a shrewd analysis of how 
unthinking compassion, and the institutions which promote it, 
affect eighteenth-century women. In this novel the heroine is 
doubly doomed: first by a society which treats women as
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commodities— Mary is given to her husband "with an estate"
(28)— and second by a culture that identifies the moral value 
of women with their ability to respond to pain. Throughout 
the novel, Mary is described as a "slave of compassion" (7), 
a woman "in love with misery" (34). This almost masochistic 
propensity, significantly, is learned from Mary's mother, a 
sick and indolent woman who favors her indifferent son over 
Mary: "the apparent partiality she shewed to her brother gave 
her exquisite pain— produced a kind of habitual melancholy, 
led her into a fondness for reading tales of woe, and made 
her almost realize the fictitious distress" (6). While this 
susceptibility to the suffering of others makes Mary 
"desirous of pleasing every human creature" (22)— and 
therefore adored by "the servants and the poor" (12)— instead 
of feeling as though she plays a part in the greater society, 
Mary lives alone, and miserable in her solitude.
As is apparent from the partial synopsis above, this novel 
introduces Wollstonecraft's ongoing concern with how faulty 
institutions and corrupt ethics conspire to keep women in a 
position of economic and moral secondariness, dependent, 
always, upon the graces and judgment of men. What 
Wollstonecraft calls Mary's "negative good-nature" (1) is 
slowly revealed to be a self-destructive response to 
imperfect people in a radically imperfect world. When her own 
fortune is depleted, and she can no longer relieve the 
suffering of others, she is thrust back on her own moral 
resources, which are found to be inadequate: "Too well have I 
loved my fellow creaturest" she writes, "I have not the
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medicine of life, the dear chimera I have so often chased, a 
friend" (52). Eventually, she meets the dying Henry, who 
temporarily serves as her "friend" and "protector," shielding 
her from "the assaults of an unfeeling world" (61). After his 
death, Mary "visited the sick, supported the old, and 
educated the young" (67) but even "benevolence and religion" 
could not fill the "void" (68) left by his passing.
Lest we assume that Mary's compassion is a quality to be 
celebrated, it is important to note that Mary's automatic and 
almost self-indulgent desire to participate in and perhaps 
relieve the pain of suffering others is represented in the 
preface of the novel as a moral flaw, as a product of her 
education and culture. She is described as being typical of 
her sex and class: "educated with the expectation of a large 
fortune" she attends "carefully to the shews of things"; her 
"prejudices were such as the generality approve of" (1).
Missing from this equation, as Wollstonecraft's polemical 
writings make clear, is that Mary was not taught to be a 
self-sufficient and autonomous being, whose moral worth is 
guaranteed by God rather than by some presumably natural 
propensity to suffer. Following this logic, Mary's mistake 
was not to have cultivated compassion or pity; it is, 
instead, to have done it thoughtlessly, to have fetishized 
human suffering, to have blindly and perhaps even selfishly 
performed benevolent acts. In focusing her moral energies 
upon a series of earthly objects, moreover, Mary mistakes 
human pity for divine love, so is not able to turn to God 
when her would-be benevolism fails or is thwarted. Destitute
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and alone, Mary thus becomes an object of pity herself: "The 
healing balm of sympathy is denied; I weep, a solitary 
wretch, and the hot tears scald my cheeks" (52).
In representing the compassionate qualities of Mary as a
learned (and inadequate) response to a flawed world,
Wollstonecraft accomplishes two things: she undermines any
necessary association between unthinking compassion and women
perpetuated by eighteenth-century science, and she intervenes
in the attempt of eighteenth-century moralists to promote and
institutionalize that association within their own moral
systems. Within that context, the novel functions exemplum
malum to portray the damaging .effects of unthinking
compassion upon the moral and therefore physical being of
women, in it what Robert Markley calls "the commodification
of 'good nature'" (211) is revealed, at best, to be a foolish
and self-congratulatory mode of behavior; at worst, as
exemplified by Mary's life, it is shown to be physically
14self-destructive, as well. It is no accident, for example, 
that Mary is peopled with (too-sensitive) characters, all of 
whom are diseased or dying: Mary's parents, Ann, Henry, and 
even Mary herself, since her "delicate state of health," 
Wollstonecraft concludes, "did not promise long life" (68).
The bodies in this novel may be read as signifying the 
relative health of the mind, and vice-versa. Indeed, from 
this point of view, Mary, A Fiction reads like an eighteenth- 
century Magic Mountain, where diseased minds and bodies are 
meant to suggest that disease is rampant in the contemporary 
and spiritually misguided world. Correspondingly, as
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Wollstonecraft's rational religion enables her to believe, 
through those same minds and bodies, that world is capable of 
being reformed.
The female body, then, is as important to 
Wollstonecraft's moral and political vision as it was to 
Rousseau, but with a difference that perhaps reflects the 
already secondary moral and political position of the female 
writer. In The New Heloise, Rousseau's political allegory 
turns upon a sexual relationship between Julie and St. Preux, 
enabled by Julie's compassion. Alternatively, unlike Julie's 
relationships, Mary's are ostensibly non-sexual: Mary marries 
George out of parental coercion; she loves Ann in order to be 
useful; and with Henry she "was in love with misery" (34).
There are several explanations for this lack of sexuality in 
the novel, but the most relevant one, at the moment, is that 
Wollstonecraft seems to want to underscore the fact that the 
immediate reference of her novel is to modes of feeling and 
behavior, and not to sexuality as such, which, for Clarissa 
and Julie, had signified their seducer's moral decadence, and 
had enabled his eventual elevation.^ This strategy is 
important, since through suppressing the sexual,
Wollstonecraft is able to re-appropriate the female body, to 
empower it outside of some already libidinized economy.
Having done that, she is able to represent the heroine's body 
as an index of her own moral nature, which is clearly thought 
to be capable of progressive re-form. Following this logic, 
Mary, A Fiction may be regarded as an allegory of moral 
decay, where the physical and emotional relationship between
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men and women is finally less important than the relationship 
between any man or woman and God, who, significantly, is 
absent from the tale.1®
In Wollstonecraft's later writing, the relatively 
progressive religious position implicit in Mary, A  Fiction 
will play an even more important role as she uses it to 
attack the implicit misogyny in the comparatively secular 
systems of Hume, Smith, Rousseau, and others. This may not be 
immediately apparent. The major premise of A Vindication of 
the Rights of Woman, for example, is that "equality" is the 
basis of the "social affections" which are realized in 
rational marriage (157) and which should be extended 
throughout society as a whole; its minor premise is that 
moral writers are complicitous in promoting inequality, 
insofar as they advocate the doctrine of separate virtues 
which denies the moral equality of women under God.
"Ignorance," she writes, "is a frail base for virtue!"
Yet, that is the condition for which woman 
was organized, has been insisted upon by the 
writers who have most vehemently argued in 
favor of the superiority of man; a 
superiority not in degree, but essence; 
though, to soften the argument, they have 
labored to prove, with chivalrous generosity, 
that the sexes ought not to be compared; man 
was made to reason, women to feel: and that 
together, flesh and spirit, they make to most 
perfect whole, by blending happily reason and
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sensibility into one character. (63)
In contrast to Hume, Smith, and Rousseau, Wollstonecraft 
argues that all men and women should be educated after the 
"same model, or intercourse of the sexes will never deserve 
the name of fellowship, nor will women fulfill the duties of 
their sex until they are independent of men as one man is 
independent of another" (165).
This explicitly political rhetoric, however, is supported 
by Wollstonecraft's argument scattered throughout this text 
that any doctrine of separate virtues is not only unfair to 
women, but finally un-Christian. Any system, she argues, 
which posits two different moralities— one based on feeling, 
and the other upon thought— is almost pagan in its 
implications. Women are taught to value a morality that 
suggests "no other idea than of the most exquisitely polished 
instinct" where there is "no trace of the image of God in 
either sensation or matter" (63). Although Wollstonecraft's 
comments in this section of the Rights of Woman are most 
clearly directed toward Rousseau, insofar as woman's moral 
sensibility is associated with unthinking compassion in the 
writings of Hume and Smith, they, too are complicitous with 
Rousseau in representing women, however politely, in terms of 
matter alone. As Wollstonecraft writes disdainfully in a 
later section of the Rights of Woman in which Smith is named 
outright, "Women are supposed to possess more sensibility, 
and even humanity, than men, and their strong attachments and 
instantaneous emotions of compassion are given as proofs; but 
the clinging affection of ignorance seldom has anything noble
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in it, and may mostly be resolved into selfishness, as well
as the affection of children and brutes" (168).
This critique of moral difference is necessary to ensure
the success of wollstonecraft's larger project, which is to
intervene in the ideology that supported the rights and value
of middle-class men— to expand what she will later call
woman's "sphere of action." As we have seen, there is in
eighteenth-century moral thought a necessary link between
public virtues, mutual sympathy, and citizenship, from which
women were excluded. In response, throughout the Rights of
Woman Wollstonecraft will attempt to extend the language (and
possibility) of judgement and aspiration, heretofore confined
to men, to women as well, largely through re-defining the
structures of sympathy so that women are included. While the
specific structures of Wollstonecraft's domestic reform will
be discussed at length in the following chapter, it is
important to understand the conceptual basis of
Wollstonecraft's moral and political system, to which 1 now 
17turn.
The Partial Spectator
With Smith— whom she variously describes as an "acute
observer" (58), a "grave philosophical reasoner" (90) and a
"cool reasoner" (133)— Wollstonecraft represents sympathy as
18the basis of all social bonds. "The charm of life," she 
writes, quoting Smith, is "sympathy; nothing pleases us more 
than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling with all the 
emotions of our own breast" (90). Yet women are excluded from
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this mutual sympathy by virtue of their private existence and
their limited station which, ironically to Wollstonecraft,
are often represented as a "privilege" granted to the sex as
a whole. While men "from the middle rank of life” have "at
least an opportunity of exerting themselves with dignity,"
she claims, women are born into a paradoxical state with
"certain sexual privileges" which thwart the desire for
respect and esteem (57). "When do we hear of women," she
asks, "who, starting out of obscurity, boldly claim respect
on account of their great abilities or daring virtues? Where
are they to be found?" (57). instead of practicing the
virtues of middle-class men, women are privileged slaves of
those upon whom their power and influence depends. They thus
share the precarious position of the aristocracy, a rarified
and protected species whom Smith had criticized in The Theory
of Moral Sentiments for their superficial graces and
19frivolous accomplishments (58-60).
Throughout the Rights of Woman Wollstonecraft posits 
several apparently contradictory remedies to this situation. 
First, reversing the negative portrayal of women in Mary, A 
Fiction, Wollstonecraft argues that women have an obligation 
to themselves as rational creatures to educate themselves, to 
exercise, like men, their bodies and minds. As she writes in 
the opening of the Rights of Woman;
I wish . . .  to persuade women to endeavor to 
acquire strength, both of mind and body, and 
to convince them that the soft phrases, 
susceptibility of heart, delicacy of
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sentiment, and refinement of taste, are 
almost synonymous with epithets of weakness, 
and that those beings who are only the 
objects of pity and that kind of love, which 
has been termed its sister, will soon become 
objects of contempt. (9)
Second, she calls for a reorganization of society so that 
women, although they are most often confined to private 
existence, might be endowed with public value and "duties" 
even within this married state. Some women, she argues, 
should be allowed to enter the public realm and practice a 
limited number of professions, including "the art of healing" 
(151-52), a practice that was only recently being taken over 
by men. Most, however, should incorporate the public values 
of men in practicing "rational motherhood," a vocation which 
she regards as "indispensible" to widescale social reform 
(142).
The idea of rational motherhood is, arguably, the
cornerstone of Wollstonecraft's political system, and the
20point at which sympathy plays the greatest role. In order 
to understand how this works, it is necessary to keep in mind 
that part of the goal of the Rights of Woman is to politicize 
the domestic duties of women, to make them equal to the 
public functions of men. Since these duties are for the most 
part private ones, Wollstonecraft must make private virtues 
central to the good of the state— more central, in fact, than 
the public virtues of men. Thus, as Myers has pointed out, 
she appropriates the martial metaphors of Smith and Rousseau
to characterize the duties of a mother who is represented as 
being more central than a soldier in fulfilling the duties 
"of a citizen" (145). She argues that the only "justifiable 
war" in the present state of society is a "defensive war" 
against moral corruption, and that women have a central role 
to play within it. Were women encouraged to "keep their 
thoughts in motion" (145) by practicing active virtue, "the 
true heroism of antiquity," she writes, "might again animate 
female bosoms" (146).
This comparison between the "character of a modern 
soldier" and a "civilized woman," should not, however, be 
taken at face value (146). Although Myers has described this 
impulse to "create a pattern of female domestic heroism" as 
common move on the part of eighteenth-century female writers 
in Wollstonecraft's case, at least, this metaphor functions 
as a rhetorical strategy intended largely to criticize the 
misplaced priorities of middle-class men. " I  am not going to 
advise [women]," she writes, "to turn their distaff into a 
musket, though I sincerely wish to see the bayonet converted 
into a pruning-hook" (146). She claims that an inadvertent 
attention to power and wealth has "muddied the pure rills of 
natural affection" (146) that is dependent not upon 
imperialism, as Smith indirectly suggests, but upon a stable 
domestic economy (146) where every person may serve the 
country as an equal and equally-valued citizen. That this 
vision of women waging a "defensive war" is simply a 
rhetorical ploy she self-consciously admits. "I only 
recreated an imagination," she writes, "by supposing that
society will some time or another be so constituted, that men 
must necessarily fulfill the duties of a citizen, or be 
despised, and that while he was employed in any of the 
departments of civil life, his wife, also an active citizen, 
should be equally intent to manage her family, educate her 
children, and assist her neighbors" (146). Despite the 
martial metaphors, then, Wollstonecraft does not advocate a 
wholesale transformation in the roles of men and women— with 
few exceptions, she is content to support an emergent 
public/private dichotomy— but a transformation in the values 
with which those roles are endowed. She simply wants people 
to appreciate the important place of motherhood to the 
present and future of the state. It is imperative that we 
understand Wollstonecraft's argument for rational motherhood 
as an essentially compensatory move, which should not be 
mistaken for a completely thought out social, moral, or 
political agenda. It is imperative, that is, that we do not 
impose our own political agendas too quickly upon the text, 1 
as it is all too easy to do. Some critics, for example, have 
interpreted this newly-empowered domestic role as being 
"potentially revolutionary"; Hyers argues that as a 
"proponent of the humanizing values associated with home," 
Wollstonecraft interprets "domestic culture as proffering 
active roles, constructive channels through which women can 
aid in revitalizing the world to conform to the values of 
home, not the materialistic marketplace" (334). On the other 
hand, essentially socialist feminists such as Zillah 
Eisenstein note that Wollstonecraft "never addresses the
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issue that, as mothers, married women are economically 
dependent on their husbands because there is no direct 
payment for this work. This would have been a challenge to 
the patriarchy that she was unable to make" (100). While both 
of these insights are important to Wollstonecraft criticism 
and feminism as a whole, I cannot help but believe that in 
their desire to locate and evaluate Wollstonecraft's feminism 
in familiar terms, they overlook a major aspect of this 
eighteenth-century feminist text.
At issue in The Rights of Woman are gender-specific 
virtues which are already loaded with political implications. 
The difference between the gender-specific virtues is not 
only a concrete economic division of labor which (for us or 
for Wollstonecraft) might be righted through economic or 
moral reform; it is also an axiological one, though which 
women's personal and social value— or lack of value— was 
located, marked, distributed, and assigned. Wollstonecraft 
realizes that in order to be the moral equals of men, women 
must re-define their domestic duties so as to make them 
central and not antithetical to the future of the state. The 
significant point, then, is not the success or failure of her 
project, but how this redefinition and revaluation of woman's 
role is promoted and guaranteed.
Within this context, it is telling that Wollstonecraft 
appropriates the discourse of sympathy to endow women with 
social and moral authority, in two distinct but interrelated 
ways. First, with Smith, she argues that "natural affection” 
among people is "a very faint tie" (152). The social
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affections must "grow out of the habitual exercise of a
21mutual sympathy" among family members (152). Unlike Smith, 
however, who had argued that the most respectable and even 
"natural" attachment takes place between two virtuous men 
(TMS 224-25), Wollstonecraft makes the domestic affections 
more fundamental than any later social relationship:
Few, I believe, have had much affection for 
mankind, who did not first love their 
parents, their brothers, sisters, and even 
the domestic brutes, whom they first played 
with. The exercise of youthful sympathies 
forms the moral temperature; and it is the 
recollection these first affections that 
gives life to those that are afterwards more 
under the direction of reason. (162)
In Wollstonecraft's vision of the good society, women and men 
constitute a "greater family" bound together not only by 
mutual admiration and esteem, but, prior to that, by a "cord 
of love" that is analogous to the relationship between a 
rational mother and her child. Thus against Smith, who had 
argued that "what is called natural affection [is] more the 
effect of the moral than of the supposed physical 
relationship between the parent and the child" (TMS 223), 
Wollstonecraft insists that the most primary tie of 
sympathetic connection is that original bond. Maternal 
feelings, she claims, are actually a "natural substitute for 
love" when the lover (as he necessarily must) becomes only a 
friend. A child then appears, who "gently twists the relaxing
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cord, and a mutual care produces a new mutual sympathy"
(152). In this version of the good society, women are 
represented as the founders and keepers of important social 
bonds. Their moral value is guaranteed, moreover, by the fact 
that the relationship between a mother and her child is 
neither simply physical (as in love) nor simply moral (as in 
the relationship between two virtuous men); it is instead, a 
physical and moral relationship that is represented as being 
prior to the social itself. This explains why Wollstonecraft 
devotes so much energy to celebrating breast-feeding as an 
active and necessary duty, even to the point of claiming that 
it is woman's primary civic role. "Her parental affection," 
she writes, "scarcely deserves the name, when it does not 
lead her to suckle her children, because the discharge of 
this duty is equally calculated to inspire maternal and 
filial affection: and it is the indispensable duty of men and 
women to fulfill the duties which give birth to affections 
that are the surest preventatives against vice" (152). In a 
sense, then, in order to guarantee women the moral and social 
significance denied to her by writers like Hume, Smith, and 
Rousseau— in order to make her central to the good of the 
state— Wollstonecraft is compelled to simultaneously 
naturalize and re-value a mode of feminization that each of 
them sought to marginalize or displace.
Before going on, it is perhaps helpful to summarize the 
argument thus far. in this chapter I have claimed, first, 
that Wollstonecraft's desire to control and regulate 
compassion— a desire most apparent in her early works— is
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intrinsically related to eighteenth-century political theory, 
where thoughtful self-representation is necessary to fellow- 
feeling, and thus to citizenship in the public realm. It is 
easy to see how Wollstonecraft's call for women's enlarged 
"sphere of action" in the Rights of Woman intersects with 
this problematic, insofar as it represents another and more 
positive attempt to extend to women the public value of 
middle-class men, to politicize the realm to which women, for 
the most part, were confined. The discourse of sympathy, I 
suggested, is central to this process, in that Wollstonecraft 
appropriates and revises Smith's structures of domestic 
reform to serve her own end, which is to describe the natural 
difference of women as a positive good, as the origin of 
active virtues that should, she claims, be invested with 
civil significance.
Any moralist worth his salt— or any feminist worth hers—  
knows, however, that to claim that an act should be endowed 
with moral or political value is not necessarily to make it 
so. Values— like emotions, habits, and even languages— are 
part of a complex code that reflects and reinforces the 
concrete structures of power in any given society. Thus 
Wollstonecraft is not content to simply politicize the 
domestic, to increase women's "sphere of action" (100). As 
she well realized, social norms— particularly those regarding 
women's virtue— are built on "mutable prejudices" (102). What 
is necessary, then, is a more stable or less partial basis of 
moral judgment than that proposed by Hume and Smith. "To have 
in this uncertain world some stay," she writes, "which cannot
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be undermined, is of the utmost consequence; and this stay it 
is, which gives that dignity to the manners, which shews that 
a person does not depend on mere human applause for comfort 
and satisfaction" (34). Correspondingly, throughout the 
Rights of Woman, although she retains the specular structure 
of moral judgment, she removes it from the relationship 
between an individual and the world, to a relationship 
between an individual and God.
Smith, we recall, had argued that the virtues of "esteem" 
or self-command, require the ability to "suppose the idea of 
some other being, who is the natural judge of the person who 
feels them" (193). They require the ability, through the 
process of "disinterested" negotiation, to internalize the 
impartial spectator. As Smith continues, "it is only by 
sympathy with the decisions of this arbiter of his conduct, 
that he can conceive, either the triumph of self-applause, or 
the shame of self-condemnation" (TMS 193). Speaking now from 
her own sensitivity to woman's secondary position, 
Wollstonecraft claims that women cannot bow to the moral 
authority of men: "If we really deserve our own good opinion 
we shall commonly be respected in the world; but if we pant 
after higher attainments, it is not sufficient to view 
ourselves as we suppose we are viewed by others, though this 
has been ingeniously argued, as the foundation of our moral 
sentiments" (135). Consequently, rather than regulating their 
behavior so as to conform to clear double standards, women, 
she writes, should "improve themselves until they rise above 
the fumes of vanity; and then . . . let public opinion come
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around” (98).
In the meantime, she claims, only God is qualified to 
judge such a person's actions, so that this relationship 
should matter more than an often frivolous and inevitably 
anti-female body of public opinion: "We should endeavor to 
view ourselves as we suppose that being views us who seeth 
each thought ripen into action, and whose judgment never 
swerves from the eternal rule of right" (135). In 
Wollstonecraft's moral system, compassion is not de-valued.
It is instead displaced onto an arguably now-feminized God:
"The Almighty," she writes, "is then the kind parent, who 
chastens and educates, and indulges us not when it would tend 
to hurt. He is compassion itself, and never wounds but to 
heal, when the ends of correction are answered11 (73). 
Ironically, then, in theory and perhaps in practice, 
Wollstonecraft seems to reinforce Smith's contention that the 
"extreme humanity" he and the other moralists so eagerly 
attributed to women is "unfit for this world" ( 4 0 ) . ^
The precise nature of Wollstonecraft's writing of value—  
her reliance upon rhetoric borrowed from the Dissenters, her 
arguments with Rousseau, and her partial revisions of Smith—  
thus constitutes a series of interventionist strategies 
through which the minds and bodies of women were recast into 
a more "esteemed" position. In substituting God, reason, or a 
single standard of excellence for public "applause"— the 
measure applied to the writing of men— Wollstonecraft 
simultaneously creates an opening for women (like herself) 
who quite literally cannot afford to exhibit the "soft
virtues," the only virtues for women that Hume, Smith, and 
Rousseau would allow. It is important to realize, however, 
that her moral program was not the only sign of eighteenth- 
century feminism. Wollstonecraft's writing, I have insisted 
is part of a larger ethico-political context. This context 
includes not only male moralists, but "conservative" women 
such as Hannah More who may also claim to have contributed 
modern feminist theory and practice. In the following 
chapter, by focusing upon the similarities and differences 
between More and Wollstonecraft, I shall seek to make that 
connection clear.
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Notes to Chapter Three
1. See, for example, Mullan 57-113; Johnson; Todd 1986, 19-
21. In his analysis of Clarissa, Mullan draws connections 
between eighteenth-century medicine, the writing of 
"sensibility," and the moral secondariness of women which are 
central to this chapter.
2. Indeed, as Foucault has argued in Madness and Civilization 
(1965), this mapping of what then being called the 
"sympathetic system" eventually led to the widespread 
acceptance of the female as an hysteric, outside the bounds 
of language and incapable of self-control (153-54).
3. Smith describes the involuntary nature of compassion, and 
its relationship to the body, at length in his opening 
chapter: "Persons of delicate fibres and a weak constitution 
of body complain, that in looking on the sores and ulcers 
which are exposed by beggars in the streets, they are apt to 
feel an itching or uneasy sensation in the correspondent part 
of their bodies. The horror which they conceive at the misery 
of those wretches affects that particular part in themselves 
more than any other; because that horror arises from 
conceiving what they themselves would suffer, if they really 
were the wretches whom they are looking upon...The very force 
of this conception is sufficient, in their feeble frames, to 
produce that itching or uneasy sensation complained of" (TMS 
10).
4. It is interesting to note, in passing, that from the 
point of view of the ethics of self-command, pity implies a 
lack of sympathy from and with others which, in the ethics of 
Smith and Hume, is always associated with "shame". This is 
undoubtedly related to the fact that in popular psychology, 
as we saw above, "pity" is closely tied with the body, and 
thus with matter and material pain that is not easily 
sympathized with. Smith makes this point by comparing the 
feelings aroused in spectators by a person on a scaffold, on 
the one hand, and a pillory, on the other. While the first 
provokes "sympathy" from the crowd, the latter mode of 
punishment, because connected with bodily pain, can provoke 
nothing but "that consciousness that his misery is felt by 
himself only, which is of all sentiments the most
unsupportable....There is no sympathy...but with his 
consciousness of the want of sympathy with which this pain is 
attended. It is with his shame, not with his sorrow. Those 
who pity him, blush and hang down their heads for him"
(TMS 60).
5. On the relationship between Wollstonecraft and Rousseau, 
see Ferguson and Todd; Eisenstein 55-112.
6. Political readings of The New Heloise abound. For a 
recent discussion of this novel within an historicist and 
post-structuralist frame, see Kamuf 97-122. "Like the Heloise
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of . . . twelfth-century letters, Julie is positioned at the 
juncture of one social order which can no longer sustain its 
claim to legitimate power and another which must succeed to 
that claim without violence, that is, legitimately. In The 
New Eloise, this articulation is worked out through Julie 's 
passage from her father's archaic law of aristocratic 
privilege to the renewed order of an enlightened Wolmar, a 
passage that marks the intermediate term of her passion for 
St. Preux as disorder" (103). See also Waller, whose 
interpretation intersects with mine in interesting ways.
7. Feminist critics have long commented upon Rousseau's 
sexual politics, particularly upon how his concept of female 
modesty (or "moral love") is thought to be necessary to the 
preservation of the patriarchal state. As Cora Kaplan has 
argued a propos of Rousseau, "In civil society women's amoral 
weakness must not be given its natural scope unless it lead, 
as it inevitably must, to adultery and criminal consequence, 
the foisting of illegitimate heirs on bourgeois husbands" 
(39).
8. Although I follow the Masters translation here, in Of 
Grammatology Spivak translates pity (pitie) as "compassion."
9. The relatively recent idea that "sensibility" literature 
must be read in terms of its representation of gender can be 
found in Mullan; Markley; Bystrom; and Johnson, who noting a 
"curious asymmetry" in portrayals of female characters, 
states correctly that "sensibility is the affective arena of 
an ideology oppressive to women" (15). Johnson's account of 
sensibility stands in sharp contrast to those of Rogers and 
others, who desire to represent Richardson (for example) as a 
kind of proto-feminist.
10. Such stray attempts to displace a male-biased system of 
values through gender inversion are typical of the early 
feminist polemic; both Hays and Wollstonecraft accuse their 
male contemporaries of sharing the "effeminate" qualities of 
that Rousseau, Smith, Hume, and Burke sought so diligently to 
attribute to women. In the Rights of Woman, for example, 
Wollstonecraft makes a similar gesture toward Rousseau, when 
she claims disdainfully that people "sympathize" with 
Rousseau: he makes them "feel," she argues, "not think" (91). 
These strategies have lead some critics (including Mary 
Poovey) to accuse of Wollstonecraft, Hays, and others of 
adopting the male-biased values against which they react.
This criticism is insensitive not only to the nature of 
value-formation but to the subject-positions of early 
radicals, faced with the impulse to naturalize feminine 
virtues by which women were being excluded from moral 
judgment and participation in the public realm. The important 
point, then, is that gender-inversion is derived from an 
awareness that the "feminine" is always already devalued, and 
is aligned with more specific socio-political critiques of a 
society that does not offer women more appropriate objects 
for their active imaginations than the company of (weak,
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profligate, romantic, or tyrannical) men upon whom women are 
forced to depend.
11. The theory of muted groups, usually associated with 
Shirley and Edwin Ardener and Clifford Geertz, was introduced 
to mainstream feminist criticism by Showalter. "All language 
is the language of the dominant order, and women, if they 
speak at all, must speak through it" (262).
12. Although I will focus upon the heuristic aspects of 
Wollstonecraft's relationship to religion in the argument 
which follows, her actual association with the Dissenters is 
closely related to that. The loosely-organized British 
Dissenters, as Marilyn Butler points out, symbolized left- 
wing politics in Britain. They included radicals Priestley, 
Price, Blake, Godwin, Hays, and Wollstonecraft, all of whom, 
despite their similar politics, took great pains to 
disassociate themselves from French atheists such as Volney 
(79). Wollstonecraft probably first became associated with 
the group when she, her sister Eliza, and Fanny Blood "set up 
a small school in the Dissenting community of Newington 
Green" in 1783, where she met Richard Price (Tyson 67). As a 
group, the Dissenters were fierce individualists who believed 
that all people were equal under God, which made them 
amenable to feminist arguments, and often actively supportive 
of them. It is significant, for example, that all of 
Wollstonecraft's writing was published by Joseph Johnson, 
himself a Dissenter, and thus one of the few publishers 
devoted to distributing leftist writing. See Tyson.
13. Most critics treat Wollstonecraft within one of two 
overlapping contexts: as a political writer, who inherits the 
problematical structures of liberalism; or as a moral writer 
working within and against "sensibility" literature. In 
essence, feminist critics often follow their male 
counterparts in separating the language of politics and 
ethics, so that what emerges is a strange and unjustified 
distinction between the language of "individualism" and the 
language of the individual, whose feelings and emotions may 
be discerned and interpreted within some psychoanalytic 
frame. The latter approach, of course, has dominated in 
literary criticism, where it has resulted in many fine 
psycho-biographical readings of Wollstonecraft's work. In 
this analysis, however, my goal is to co-ordinate these 
apparently disparate approaches to Wollstonecraft's work by 
reading the politics of ethical language, including the 
language of sensibility. My working assumption is that the 
language of individual "feeling" is intimately related to the 
rise of "individualism" in eighteenth-century moral and 
political theory. To put it another way, the discourse of 
feeling— what we usually call "sensibility"— is actually a 
dense field of linguistic and political struggle, where the 
most consistent tactic is to represent "feeling" as the 
product of individual desire. Through appeals to one's own 
feeling as the source of truth or value, the ideology of 
"individualism"— including the contours of individual
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"sexuality"— was organized and promoted. Given this, to read 
the language of feeling as signifying sexual desire, (whether 
that is manifest or repressed) is necessarily to elide the 
discourse of sympathy, where, I would argue, representations 
of sexuality, individual feeling, and political empowerment 
are most clearly allied.
14. See, for example, Robert Markley's analysis of 
Shaftesbury, Sterne, Steele, and others: "For many middle- 
class authors, sentimentality— the generosity of feeling—  
becomes their claim to a cultural power-sharing based upon a 
liberal interpretation of 'breeding' that equates hereditary 
power and moral sensitivity" (218). Such broad class analyses 
of "sensibility"— even those as insightful as this one— fail 
to consider the contradictions within sensibility literature 
itself, including the fact that women, who were largely 
responsible for its rapid promotion, were upon that basis 
held responsible for their own ethical, political, and 
professional secondariness.
15. I do not mean to suggest that sexuality (or the language 
of sexuality) was not important to women's writing; simply 
that it should not be conflated with the language of feeling 
which, more often than not, has a direct reference to ethical 
and political discourse where "lust," "chastity," and 
"rational desire" were key terms in arguments over the moral 
value of men and women. For an interesting analysis of this 
problem, see Kaplan; for an opposing view, see Lingbauer.
16. For an alternate reading of Mary as a novel of 
sensibility whose theme is "the growth of a philanthropist" 
that actually reflects Wollstonecraft's "longing for love” 
see Ferguson and Todd 33-38.
17. Godwin felt that Wollstonecraft's morality cannot be 
systematized, and to a certain extent, he is right, 
particularly insofar as so much her writing necessarily takes 
the form of critique. This reactive position does not, 
however, obscure her reliance upon and revision of moralists 
such as Smith.
18. In insisting that the discourse of sympathy is important 
to eighteenth-century feminism, this argument will run 
against the grain of some traditional accounts which, 
following Lloyd and others, make the desire to be regarded as 
"rational" beings the driving impulse behind the work of 
writers such as Wollstonecraft. According to Carolyn 
Korsmeyer, for example, the eighteenth-century debates 
regarding the foundation of morals— the writings of Hume, 
Smith, and others— "had little or no effect upon the question 
of the rationality of women and the political ramifications 
of this question" (286). Mitzi Myers' position is closer to 
my own. Myers has demonstrated how early feminism is 
characterized by women as diverse as Mary Wollstonecraft and 
Hannah More calling for a "reconstituted domestic ideal" in 
which women were thought to serve as "a focal point for moral
leo
regeneration" (329). As Myers illustrates, each cast the 
prevalent bourgeois ethic in women's terms by promoting a 
"pattern of female domestic heroism, an image of activity, 
strength, fortitude, and ethical maturity, of self-denial, 
purity, and truth" (335). While this "reconstituted domestic 
ideal" and the "pattern of female domestic heroism" through 
which it was thought to be effected are clearly related to 
the discourse of sympathy and its ethic of self-command,
Myers does not examine those within the context of sympathy.
19. Both Guralnick and Kay 19B6 comment upon Wollstonecraft's 
response to Smith's characterization of the aristocracy.
20. The idea that women should be educated so as to be better 
mothers goes back at least as far as Locke. They were simply 
educated with a difference that reflected their non-public 
position. "The aim of a girl's education," writes one critic, 
"was to improve her moral character, [to] make her able to 
take part in a general conversation with men without making a 
fool of herself, and equip her to educate her own children" 
(Browne 42).
21. See Smith (TMS 220-224) on domestic education and family 
affection. "What is called affection," he writes, "is in 
reality nothing by habitual sympathy" (220).
22. "We only regret that it is unfit for this world, because 
the world is unworthy of it, and because it must expose the 
person who is endowed with it as a prey to the perfidy and 
ingratitude of insinuating falsehood, and to a thousand pains 
and uneasinesses, which, of all men, he least deserves to 
feel, and which generally too he is, of all men, the least 
capable of supporting" (TMS 40).
Chapter Four: Wollstonecraft, wore,
and the Limits of Sympathy
A fundamental assumption of many poststructuralist feminisms 
is that every discourse emerges from struggle and
icontradiction. While I have so far focused upon struggle 
within a relatively purified discourse of sympathy— within 
the realms of ethics, aesthetics, and politics— one must also 
be prepared to apply this same criterion to the study of the 
discourse of feminism. In fact, to do otherwise is to 
represent feminism as sentiments, impulses, behaviors, 
practices, or strategies existing apart from the language of 
their construction, and thus apart from the male-biased 
systems which that language has historically implied. In this 
chapter, I shall examine the way eighteenth-century feminism 
established itself through a series of sometimes 
contradictory programs for political reform, in which the 
language of sympathy is central. More specifically, I shall 
supplement the previous analyses by examining how sympathy 
served as a problematical and even divisive term within 
eighteenth-century feminism itself. This analysis, like those 
which preceded it, will be paradigmatic, and necessarily 
confined to the works of two writers, Mary Wollstonecraft and 
Hannah More.
To place Hannah More within the context of feminism is, 
perhaps, surprising. This moderately successful playwright,
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extremely successful essayist, and devoted friend of Johnson, 
Garrick, and Edmund Burke is often represented as an arch­
conservative. In fact, according to most accounts, More 
refused even to read Wollstonecraft's work. "Rights of 
Women!," she is said to have commented, "We will be hearing 
of the Rights of Children next!" (Hopkins 135). From a 
contemporary perspective, then, she appears to be anti­
feminist, a eighteenth-century Phyllis Schafley set against
2Wollstonecraft's Gloria Steinham. Admittedly, if one's 
feminism can be measured by arguments for or against the 
legal status of women, or by the nature of one's political 
alliances, this polarization is undeniable: the pious and 
rather traditional More associated with religious and 
intellectual circles strongly opposed to the Revolution in 
France, and Wollstonecraft with circles defined by Joseph 
Johnson, William Godwin, and other British radicals. Yet 
throughout this dissertation, I have insisted that 
eighteenth-century feminism is most often composed of 
interventionist or compensatory strategies which, I would now 
add, are reducible neither to a particular doctrine nor to a 
particular party alliance. As Mitzi Myers points out, 
Wollstonecraft and More were in some ways more alike than 
different, since both were forced "to shape their world views 
through the dominant models" which were themselves dependent 
upon a "male idiom" (Myers 332). In practice, moreover, both 
writers were active members of middle-class movements for 
social reform that sought to extend the language of general 
reform— promoted by conservatives and radicals alike— to
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encompass women. In order to examine their feminist politics, 
then, it is necessary to examine not only how each writer is 
allied with a particular party, but how, given her particular 
alliance, each attempted to use the language of sympathy to 
improve the social position and moral value of her sex within 
that particular context.
It is precisely because women enjoy an "intermediate" 
moral status in the discourse of sympathy that eighteenth- 
century women's responses to the discourse are complicated 
and, as I have suggested, diverse. Generally speaking, 
Wollstonecraft and More's appropriation of the discourse of 
sympathy turns upon the question of what each perceived to be 
"woman's true happiness," that is, her most empowering social 
role. Wollstonecraft, I have argued, sought to re-value women 
by insisting upon their moral autonomy and the importance of 
"rational motherhood" in creating and preserving the social 
bonds by which the social is defined. She thus revises the 
logic of sympathy as promoted by Smith in several different 
ways. On the one hand, after denying that unthinking 
compassion is a valuable feminine trait, she attempts to 
extend the "masculine" virtues— including moral judgment— to 
middle-class women. At the same time, she insists that the 
(rational) mother-child relationship is more fundamental than 
the "mutual sympathy" presumably enjoyed by middle-class men.
In effect, she erases difference at the level of culture, 
only to reinstate it at the level of nature, where, she 
seemed to believe, it could displace the primacy of male-male 
relationships as the ne plus ultra of appropriate sympathetic
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response.
Given Wollstonecraftrs implicit goal— to argue that women 
should be granted both moral and political value, and should 
therefore enjoy the rights granted to men— her complex, 
perhaps equivocal, and often slippery argument makes sense, 
in response to Hume, Smith, and Rousseau's visions of the 
social, she is compelled to assert that women are potentially 
rational and morally responsible creatures whose "natural" 
roles as mothers make them equally (if not more) necessary 
than men to the creation and maintenance of sympathetic 
bonds, and thus to the future of the state. However innocuous 
and even conservative as Wollstonecraft's argument may seem 
to us, it is important to remember how and why parts of it 
provoked controversy among Wollstonecraft's contemporaries.
The radical feminist element of Wollstonecraft's argument was 
not that women should be educated, which was least a century 
old. In fact, as R. N. Jaynes has illustrated in her article 
on the reception of the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft's 
claim that "the mind is of no sex" was at first received 
favorably by most readers (307). Nor, arguably, was it that 
women should be granted the same rights as men, a rather 
utopian notion that was already a major part of Revolutionary 
rhetoric. It was, instead, her attempt to alter what was 
considered "natural” in moral discourse— to insist against 
most ethical, aesthetic, and political writers that the moral 
virtues of women and men should not differ in quality. "I see 
not the shadow of a reason to conclude," she writes, "that 
the virtues [of men and women) should differ in respect to
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their nature. In fact, how can they, if virtue has only one 
eternal standard?" (26).
Wollstonecraft's single standard of virtue, then, is self­
consciously set against a doctrine of moral difference that, 
as we have seen, was purposefully and assiduously being 
promoted by middle-class men. Perhaps because their efforts 
had not yet fully solidified, her argument— in potential, at 
least— could threaten the logic supporting the precarious 
moral structure of bourgeois society as a whole.
Consequently, according to Jaynes, such statements provoked a 
rash of satires (including Polwhele's The Unsex'd Females), 
and condemnations from several quarters— not only from 
obviously conservative anti-jacobin writers, but also, writes 
Jaynes, from men who despite fairly progressive views on 
female education and intellectual ability "were not pleased 
to acknowledge that the manners ought to be of no sex" (307).
In order to understand why, one need simply return to the 
logic of sympathy itself. Unlike the sexless mind— a matter 
of individual consciousness which may, after all, remain 
private— manners are a public phenomenon.^ They are related 
not only to how one represents oneself, but, through that, to 
an engendered moral system which required the exclusion of 
women in order for the positive self-characterization of men 
to be maintained. For Wollstonecraft, a woman, to insist upon 
being included was at some level to threaten the carefully- 
erected social, moral, and economic system as a whole.
Within this context, it is particularly significant that 
females condemned Wollstonecraft, as well. Hannah More, for
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example, may be referring to Wollstonecraft when she 
complains in Strictures on the Modern System of Female 
Education that the relatively harmless "contest" for 
intellectual equality between men and women which had raged 
in the previous century has been "revived with added fury" in 
her own (Works VI: 144). Whereas the previous struggle had
i
been merely a kind of "imaginary prerogative, . . .a mere 
titular right, a shadowy claim to a few unreal acres of 
Parnassian territory," the present struggle, she claims, has 
real political implications. It "has taken a more serious 
turn," she writes,
and brings forward political as well as 
intellectual pretensions; and among the 
innovations of this innovating period, the 
imposing term of rights has been produced to 
sanctify the claim of our female pretenders, 
with a view not only to rekindle in the minds 
of women a presumptuous vanity dishonorable 
to their sex, but produced with a view to 
excite in their hearts an impious discontent 
with the post which God has assigned then in 
this world." (144)
Given all the charges listed here, it is difficult to 
determine what most disturbs More about feminist aspirations: 
their long-term strategy, to gain equal rights, or their 
immediate goal: to "excite" in other women "an impious 
discontent" with what More regards as women's god-given 
"post". But because More is forced to appeal to the language
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of religious authority in defending the "assigned" roles of 
women, and because so many of her works are devoted to 
maintaining the doctrine of separate spheres, I am inclined 
to believe that it is the latter, if so, the question before 
us now is simple: what, in upholding the doctrine of separate 
virtues, could Hannah More and others like her possibility 
hope to gain? Or, to put it another way, what could they be 
afraid to lose?
Evangelicalism and the Value of Compassion
"Each sex," More argues in her Strictures, "has its proper 
excellencies, which would be lost were they melted down into 
the common character by the fusion of the new philosophy"
(Works VI: 144). Clearly, she is opposed to any social 
movement that would seek to have moral and social 
distinctions erased or minimalized. One way to understand 
this opposition is to look at it within the confines of her
4Evangelical Christianity. A major tenet of Evangelical 
Christianity is that virtue is a private phenomenon, measured 
largely by the intensity of one's relationship with God. More 
accepts this assumption, and turns it to her advantage. First 
she claims that because Christianity dissolves gender 
difference, women must be regarded as the moral equals of 
men. "Christianity has exalted women to true and disputed 
dignity; in Christ Jesus, as there is neither 'rich nor 
poor,' 'bond nor free,' so there is neither 'male nor 
female'" (148). Second, arguing that commerce, politics, and 
most professions are unimportant to one's "true" spiritual
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value, she readily grants men power over the public sphere. 
Third— and this is the force of More's argument— More 
attempts to convince women that by virtue of their largely 
cloistered existence, they in fact have the "superior 
advantage" over men (149).
This moral advantage is only apparent, of course, within 
Christianity, as More's list of women's "superior" qualities 
makes clear. Women's "naturally soft and flexible hearts," 
she argues, are "favorable to the cultivation of a devotional 
spirit" (149). Similarly, what she calls the "native 
constitution" of women, their comparative physical weakness, 
is seen as encouraging a spirit of "attachment and 
dependence" which is "peculiarly favorable to religion"
(149). Even women's inferior education, More argues, 
ultimately works in their favor: because women commonly have 
less knowledge than men, they "have not to shake off the 
pride of system" that undermines religious faith; and because 
they are "naturally more affectionate than fastidious" women 
are better readers of Christian texts, which, she concludes, 
"are meant to be read in a devotional" rather than a 
"critical" spirit" (150).
Given More's "defense" of women, one is tempted to cast 
her in the same category as Rousseau (who also celebrated his 
"lovely ignorant fair") and thus to dismiss her as a self- 
hating misogynist. Yet however similar their descriptions of 
women's moral qualities, More casts those into a different 
hierarchy of value, so that they take on a different color or 
tone. It is important to understand that More's basically
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conservative argument for moral difference functions 
primarily as a compensatory move at the level of value- 
formation itself, wherein women, denied the same social 
opportunities as men, attempt to compensate for this fact 
through what Michele Barrett calls "corresponding ideologies 
of moral worth" (81). Thus while controlling the behavior of 
women is equally important to both writers, Rousseau 
represents women as moral threats, while More represents them 
as the bastions of moral culture. Because women are 
"naturally" better Christians than men, they are responsible, 
she insists, for instituting the kind of social reform that 
begins with Christian virtues. To the "women of rank" 
addressed in her Strictures, More explains that the "general 
state of civilized society depends. . .on the prevailing 
sentiments and habits of women, and on the nature and degree 
of the estimation in which they are held" (Works VI: 11).
More's insistence upon the doctrine of sexual virtues 
serves a more immediate function, as well. Rather than 
confining women to the home, it enables More to claim a 
public sphere for eighteenth-century women, separate from but 
perhaps superior to the one dominated by men. This, of 
course, is the realm of public charity, social work, and 
ministering to the poor. In Marinna, More describes Christian 
charity as a vocation particularly suited to women of rank.
"I have often heard it regretted that ladies have no stated 
employment, no profession," she writes.
It is a mistake; charity is the calling of a 
lady; the care of the poor is her profession.
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Hen have little time or taste for details.
Women of fortune have abundant leisure, which 
can no way be so properly or so pleasantly 
filled up as in making themselves intimately 
acquainted with the worth and the wants of 
all within their reach (409).
In this sense, More's argument for the doctrine of sexual 
virtues is an early chapter in the problematical relationship 
between women's movements and "public service," which, as 
Mary Poovey has pointed out, gave women "a constructive 
vehicle for their talents and, in return, a heightened sense 
of their ability and self-worth" (9). In this commodification 
of feminine virtue, ideology plays a central role: women's 
"real value," More believes, is underwritten by Christianity 
and nurtured by her social position, which allows middle- 
class and upper-class women so much leisure time.
Given her emphasis upon Christian charity, one might 
assume that More would celebrate women's "natural" 
compassion. But perhaps because she was aware of the negative 
connotations with that term, she sought, instead, to reform 
it, to cultivate compassion so that it might serve a socially 
useful role. A major part of the Strictures, for example, is 
devoted to defending compassion against charges made by 
Wollstonecraft and others that it is a self-indulgent or 
"negative" virtue, proof of feminine weakness. "It is cruel 
to chill the precious sensibility of an ingenuous soul,” she 
writes, "by treating with supercilious coldness and unfeeling 
ridicule every indication of a warm, tender, disinterested,
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and enthusiastic spirit, as if it exhibited symptoms of a 
deficiency in understanding or in prudence" (Works VI: 175- 
76). Yet in these defenses. More is careful to distinguish 
between "natural" compassion, an unthinking responsiveness to 
suffering others, and compassion which might serve a socially 
useful role. The former, she admits, is a highly unstable 
moral impulse, and as such, a potential source of social 
disorder. As she writes in her poem "Sensibility," "'Tis not 
a gift peculiar to the good,/ 'Tis often but the virtue of 
the blood" which one must "divert to its proper course"
(Works V: 381).^ In order to raise compassion from this 
association with the body, More attempts to align it with 
Christian duty.
The Strictures, essentially a primer of women's charitable 
vocation, carefully separates compassion from the senses, and 
thus from the cult of sensibility with which it was easily 
allied. As More writes to her presumed audience of wealthy 
women, one should not proportion one's charity according to 
the "immediate effect which the distressed object produces 
upon her senses" (Works VI: 179). This kind of morality, in 
so far as it dependent upon "local circumstances and present 
events," cannot proceed from a sense of Christian duty (179).
At its worst, in fact, such unthinking compassion is but a 
highly cultivated "species of feeling" which in some women 
"inevitably leads to the utter exclusion of all interest in 
the sufferings of others":
Instead of exercising their sensibility in 
the wholesome duty of relieving distress and
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visiting scenes of sorrow, that sensibility 
is itself pleaded as a reason for their not 
being able to endure sights of woe, and for 
shunning the distress it should be exerted in 
removing. That exquisite sense of feeling 
which God implanted in the heart as a 
stimulus to quicken us in relieving the 
miseries of others, is thus introverted, and 
learns to consider self not as the agent, but 
the object of compassion. (186)
This false delicacy based upon pleasure is characterized,
More claims, by a failure to part with one's money: it 
"reserves its selfish and ready tears for the more elegant 
and less expensive sorrows of the melting novel or the 
pathetic tragedy" (286-87). In contrast to this, true 
compassion involves a sense of sacrifice and even pain, as 
More makes clear in the following comment: "the most coarse 
and disgusting object," she claims, the "more uninviting and 
repulsive cases may be better tests of the principle on which 
we relieve, than those which abound in pathos and interest" 
(179).
While I shall return to the successes and limitations of 
More's moral program momentarily, it is helpful, perhaps, to 
initiate a comparison between her feminist impulses and those 
of Mary Wollstonecraft. Like Wollstonecraft, who built her 
argument for women's moral value on the importance of 
rational motherhood, More endows women with something other 
than an ornamental status. In fact, like the more radical
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writer, she charges them with responsibility for the future 
of the state. To be sure, the power of women in this system 
is indirect— More defends the conservative notion that 
women's greatest "talent" is moral "influence"— but, 
arguably, the influence to be gained through charity work is 
no more or less secondary than the "power" of rational 
motherhood promoted by Wollstonecraft. Both writers, faced 
with a male-biased culture, were dependent upon such fifth- 
column tactics to re-value the roles to which women were 
confined.® Both writers, then, though in different ways, were 
compelled to intervene in cultural politics at the level of 
value-formation itself. That this intention is 
straightforward is apparent in the way More uses the language 
of value in conjunction with her argument for a doctrine of 
sexual virtues. While More believes (again with 
Wollstonecraft) that women should be educated, she argues 
that "to annihilate distinctions from which [a woman derives] 
advantages" is to "attempt innovations which would depreciate 
her real value" [emphasis added] (144).
From one point of view, then, More had a real and a 
positive political effect. By making the relief of suffering 
not only a duty, but a vocation which necessitates thoughtful 
public action, More helped to dispel charges that compassion 
is aligned with aestheticism or passivity, charges that had 
marked compassion as an unreliable emotion on which to base 
social reform. Simultaneously, through valorizing a measured 
compassion attributed largely to women, More helped to rescue 
women from their former moral position, and even to cast them
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as the moral superiors of men. To the extent that her 
celebration of compassionate philanthropy extends to women a 
social valuable role, it is successful in displacing, or at 
least de-centering, male-biased ethical models. Yet More has 
gone down in history books as a raging anti-feminist. This 
characterization clearly has less to do with her attempt to 
re-value women's roles than with what those roles in practice 
imply. Generally speaking, while ministering to the poor 
softens and obscures women's apparently necessary exclusion 
from public life, such work is limited, as is More's 
Strictures, to "women of rank and fortune," to the Lady 
Bountifuls who alone have the necessary resources to relieve 
the suffering of the poor. Because More was not herself an 
aristocrat, she was unable— in direct ways, at least— to 
regulate the flow of money so as to serve some socially- 
useful end. As a writer, educator, and friend of politicians, 
she could, however, regulate the flow of knowledge. Only 
through examining the contours of those efforts, then, is it 
possible to understand the limitations of More's 
compassionate womanhood.
More's Moral Hierarchy
As I have already suggested, a major difference between 
Wollstonecraft and More is that while the former analyzed 
ethical institutions, the latter sought to institutionalize 
ethics, or to promote a hierarchy of values set against 
"levellers" like Wollstonecraft. Under the guidance of 
William Wilberforce, and with the patronage of her wealthy
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£riends, More and her sisters established and regulated a 
series of Sunday Schools, Women's Benefit Societies, and 
Schools of industry for the poor, beginning with one at 
Cheddar and, by the end of the century, extending across 
England (see Jones 151-171). Here, instructors taught pupils 
to read (but not to write), preached the value of Christian 
suffering, and distributed Hannah More's anti-jacobin works—  
her essays, dialogues, poems, and plays. Because of her 
involvement in the Evangelical movement, and despite the fact 
that More was a fairly successful playwright, novelist, and 
poet, she is best known as an educator, or simply as a 
pamphleteer.
The Cheap Repository Tracts, in fact, have sometimes been 
credited with stilling the resentment of increasingly 
restless and literate working class against an increasingly 
nervous aristocracy.^ whether or not this is true, they at 
least have that intention. As she explains in their preface,
"an appetite for reading" had so increased "among the 
inferior ranks" that she felt compelled to provide more 
wholesome reading, so as to "abate their relish for those 
corrupt and inflammatory publications which the consequences 
of the French Revolution have so fatally been pouring in upon 
us" (Works I: advertisement, n.p.). This propaganda— or 
counter-propaganda— is interesting mostly for its coercion of 
the poor, which often resembles More's advice to women. 
Throughout this work, More encourages the poor to be willing 
objects of compassion who need only to trust in their 
superiors and to fashion a Christian heart. The tracts are
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composed of dialogues between laborers or tradesmen, who, 
presumably through their own thinking, discover the flaws of 
the new philosophy.
"The History of Mr. Fantom," for example, is devoted to 
undermining the influence of Thomas Paine, whose Rights of 
Man was being widely distributed. In it, More represents Mr. 
Fantom as a would-be philosopher, enamored by Paine's book, 
and calling for "universal benevolence" through which all 
men, he believes, would be "good and happy” (Works I: 7). He 
is set against the more sensible Mr. Trueman, who eventually 
exposes Mr. Fantom as a vain, hypocritical, and self-centered 
man, as a presumptuous blowhard whose philosophy does not 
translate into socially useful action. Part of Trueman's 
argument against Fantom's "universal benevolence" is the 
doctrine of compensation to which More will repeatedly turn. 
Since "God is Love," asks Trueman, "do you think a being, 
whose very essence is love, would permit any misery among his 
children here, if it was not to be, in some way or another, 
or some where or other, for their good?" (17) In fact, More 
represents poverty as a challenge to two classes: as Mr.
Trueman continues, "I suppose, God permits this misery partly 
to exercise the sufferers, and partly to try the prosperous 
[since] good men have an opportunity of lessening it" (17- 
18) .8
This passage, like many others, exemplifies the close 
alliance between morality and party politics in eighteenth- 
century writing. Central to the politics of compassion is a 
kind of "trickle down" moral and economic theory, in which
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the prosperity and morality of the upper and middle classes 
is represented as being directly beneficial to the laboring 
poor, even while the disparity between the classes is 
effectively maintained. This description of More's politics 
would be neither unfamiliar nor unwelcome to her. An anti­
jacobin, she defended and passionately promoted a 
hierarchical society, in which class difference is intimately 
related to one's education and knowledge. As she writes in 
Essays on Various Subjects, a collection designed for "young 
ladies," "Various are the reasons why the greater part of 
mankind cannot apply themselves to arts or letters":
Particular studies are only suited to the 
capacities of particular persons. Some are 
incapable of applying to them from the 
delicacy of their sex. . . .Many are 
precluded by the narrowness of their 
education, and many by the straightness of 
their fortune. (Works II: 380)
Rather than rectify this situation, however, she celebrates 
it as part of God's plan:
The wisdom of God is wonderfully manifested 
in this happy and well-ordered diversity in 
the powers and properties of his creatures; 
since, by thus admirably suiting the agent to 
his action, the whole scheme of human affairs 
is carried on with the most agreeing and 
consistent economy, and no chasm is left for 
want of an object to fill it, exactly suited
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to its nature. (Works II: 380)
While she believed that this disparity would disappear in 
heaven, at least throughout her earthly life, More was 
devoted to keeping it intact. This was to be accomplished, in 
part, through mobilizing an army of compassionate and 
socially-active women, whose interests were clearly those of 
the male ruling classes.
As Marilyn Butler reminds us, sympathies with the poor and
oppressed are a hallmark of eighteenth-century writing, and
are not necessarily a sign of radicalism, or even of what we
might now call a "liberal" conscience (36). The morality of
Cowper, for example, "made a strong appeal to the
conservative, traditionally Christian strain in the gentry
and prosperous middle class, which responded to the coming
Evangelical movement"; it is telling, however, that members
of these classes "sought a spiritual regeneration within
individuals rather than disturbing the hierarchical order of
things" (36). Given this, it is no accident that Cowper was
More's favorite writer: "I have found what I have been
looking for all my life," More writes to a friend, "a poet
gwhom I can read on Sunday." Wollstonecraft, too, admired 
Cowper, but for very different reasons. In the Rights of 
Woman, while making an argument against following the "blind 
authority" of men, she misquotes a line from The Task: "They 
are free— who will be free— I" (100).
Wollstonecraft and More's very different relationships to 
the existing social order are manifest in their appropriation 
of the discourse of sympathy as well. Because More wants so
199
desperately to preserve the notion of gender and class 
difference, the topos of "mutual sympathy" is a rare 
commodity in her work. As we saw in the writing of Smith and 
Wollstonecraft, mutual sympathy, unlike compassion, is a 
trope of similitude: if it is not exactly derived from 
equality, it at least reveals aspirations toward it. More's 
works, in contrast, are designed to maintain social 
difference, largely by representing such sentiments as 
Wollstonecraft's as a crime against nature and God. In 
Village Politics, for example, More portrays an argument 
between Tom, who, having recently read The Rights of M a n , 
claims that "all men are equal" (Works I: 362), and Jack, a 
man of "good sense" who points out the sacrilege of such 
aspirations: "If that's thy talk, Tom," he responds, "thou 
dost quarrel with Providence, and not with government. For 
the woman is below her husband, and the children are below 
their mother, and the servant is below his master" (363). In 
More's strictly hierarchical world, there seems to be little 
room for a vision of the social order not dependent upon 
class and gender lines.
Any representation of mutual sympathy in More's work is 
thus particularly striking, and usually associated with 
conversation, or with "appropriate" converse between educated 
members of the same social class. Much as in Smith's writing, 
the model for sympathy is the social club, or "little 
societies". In "The Bas Bleu, or Conversation," for example, 
More refers to her own social circle, the Blue Stockings, a 
floating pool of female writers, patronesses, scholars, and
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political wives: Elizabeth Vesey, Fanney Burney, Elizabeth 
Montagu, Anna Letitia Barbauld, Elisabeth Macaulay, Charlotte 
Lennox, and others. Usual guests included Johnson, Burke, 
Garrick, and Reynolds— all of whom are mentioned in the poem.
In More's eyes, this mixed society (which necessarily met at 
private homes) was "composed of persons distinguished, in 
general, for their rank, talents, or respectable character" 
(Works V: 360). In our eyes, it was composed of London's 
wealthy and powerful, its social and intellectual elite.
Yet even in this poem, "mutual sympathy" is simply 
revealed to be a false promise of social coherence to which 
women should not aspire. The poem itself is a mock-heroic, a 
paean to the civilizing powers of Conversation, "Soft 
polisher of rugged man" and "Refiner of the social plan"
(Works V: 368). It is addressed to Elizabeth Vesey, the much- 
hailed London hostess who is rumored to have kept 
conversation flowing by placing her guests in a changing 
series of intimate groups, but, more generally, to the 
learned women who composed the Blue Stockings as such. Given 
the education of the women involved, one might expect More to 
sing the praises of their wit, knowledge, and social skills. 
That she does, but, significantly, throughout the poem, 
women's public display of knowledge— or, more specifically, 
her attraction to the power of wit— is represented as a 
danger which even these wealthy and powerful women should 
avoid.
More's gentle satire turns upon an implicit set of values, 
which asserts, as we have seen, that women are to desire
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"moral influence" but not public power. This division between 
the private and the public, each associated with a different 
sex, can be extended to knowledge as well. As she puts it in 
another context, "That kind of knowledge which is fitted 
rather for home consumption than foreign exportation, is 
peculiarly adapted to women" (Works VI: 137). Whenever 
knowledge becomes, like money, a form of public power, it is, 
according to More, inappropriate for women to display. In 
this poem, the analogy between public power, knowledge, and a 
masculine sphere apparent in the preceding comment is cast 
into a moral allegory whose protagonist is "Conversation." As 
More writes, somewhat self-ironically, "Ah, wherefore wise, 
if none must hear?"
Our intellectual ore must shine,
Not slumber, idly, in the mine.
Let Education's moral mint 
The noblest images imprint;
Let taste her curious touchstone hold 
To try if standard be the gold;
But 'tis thy commerce. Conversation,
Must give it use by circulation;
That noblest commerce of mankind,
Whose precious merchandise is Mindl (Works V: 368) 
Because this form of "Conversation” is closely associated 
with an inappropriate form of public power and personal 
display, suggested through an ongoing analogy between 
conversation and trade, the poem culminates in Conversation's 
humiliating public defeat. Intoxicated by the pleasure of
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"Wit" and the desire for approval, Conversation sacrifices 
its "real" power, "Virtue."
Within this moral allegory, the trope of mutual sympathy 
plays a central role. Associated with wit, it symbolizes the 
false promise of social coherence that is devoted to a 
principle of worldly pleasure, as opposed to Christian 
sacrifice. Like the poem as a whole, More's representation of 
mutual sympathy is in the mock-heroic mode. It is thus 
gradually represented as a false sense of union or triumph, 
derived from an exaggerated sense of one's "worth" and 
"powers:" "Enlightened spirits!," she writes to her female 
counterparts, "you, who know,/ What charms from polished 
converse flow":
Speak, for you can, the pure delight 
When kindling sympathies unite;
When correspondent tastes impart 
Communion sweet from heart to heart;
You ne'er the cold gradations need 
Which vulgar soul to union lead;
No dry discussion to unfold
The meaning ere well 'tis told: (Works V: 369-70)
Here, More represents mutual sympathy as the product of 
similar tastes, as the peculiar and almost-spiritual pleasure 
of an intellectual elite. Sympathy is portrayed as a kind of
"communion" that promises to transcend hierarchy and the
"cold gradations" of language. In the next passage, More 
changes the metaphor and draws upon a common trope in 
eighteenth-century aesthetic theory. Sympathy is compared to
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the even-more mysterious powers of electro-magnetism, where 
its success is dependent not simply upon similar tastes, but 
upon "kindred souls [that] demand alliance” :
Each in the other joys to find 
The image answering to his mind.
But sparks electric only strike 
On souls electrical alike;
The flash of intellect expires,
Unless it meet congenial fires: (Works V: 370)
So far, More has drawn upon virtually every major trope of 
sympathetic response. In the next stanza, however, she 
exposes these as pretensions of an intellectual elect, 
largely by comparing the would-be mysteries and pleasures of 
sympathetic "communion" to those hailed by a less-elevated 
social group, the masons.
The language to th' elect alone
Is, like the mason's mystery, known;
in vain th' unerring sign is made
To him who is not of the trade. (Works V: 370)
The freemasons, of course, were members of an artisan class 
whose pro-revolutionary leanings would be anathema to More 
and her circle.*® Through this deflating comparison between 
that soc'ety of rabble-rousers and the aspirations of 
educated women, More is able both to diminish the attractions 
of mutual sympathy— it is, after all, connected with a 
clearly vulgar form of trade— and to hint at its dangers as a 
potential form of social disorder.**
Since this poem is conducted through the mock-heroic mode,
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it is perhaps an overstatement to say that through "Bas Bleu" 
More condemns mutual sympathy. The trope is never taken 
seriously enough for to do so. Instead, through her ironic 
portrayal, More succeeds in both de-valuing the trope of 
"commerce of feeling," and in representing it as a secular 
and exclusively masculine enterprise to which women should 
never aspire. Given this, it is fair to say that, however 
different its tone and form, More's poem turns on the same 
constellation of concerns apparent in the writings of Smith 
and Wollstonecraft: sympathy as a form of social coherence; 
sympathy as a political trope; the domestication of women; 
and what is considered to be "appropriate" self­
representation.
Yet unlike Wollstonecraft and Smith, More is caught in 
something of a discursive double bind. On the one hand, with 
Smith, she wants to preserve the relationship between women 
and the private virtues; on the other hand, with 
Wollstonecraft, she wants to extend to women the social value 
and presence granted to middle-class men. Her problematical 
solution is to insist upon the importance of women in mixed 
circles, but to thwart any attempt toward self-representation 
that would threaten the precarious value of their admittedly 
secondary role. At the end of the poem, having described, as 
I mentioned, the defeat of women's aspirations toward "equal 
commerce," More calls upon the "lettered and the fair" to 
practice their one true "talent." This mysterious and 
peculiarly feminine power— "This charm, this witchcraft"— is 
silence, or "attention,” through which, she claims, the
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social circle is sustained.
Mute angel, yes; thy looks dispense,
The silence of intelligence;
Thy graceful form I well discern,
In act to listen and to learn. (Works V: 371)
Silence, then, is represented as the most appropriate public 
posture for women, as the best proof of their "intelligence," 
and as their most valued and most valuable public role.
In the lexicon of modern feminist theory, More represents 
women in either of two too-familiar roles: as the passive 
consumer of a masculine world, whose power is real but 
indirect, or as the marginalized hysteric, whose power is the 
power of resistance to a masculine symbolic order. In 
eighteenth-century terms, however, More grants women the 
power of influence, which, as we know, turns upon one's 
ability to serve as the charming but moral companions of 
eighteenth-century men. This secondary position was, perhaps, 
inevitable for a woman in More's social circle, who was 
dependent upon the graces of Johnson, Garrick, and others to 
arrange and promote her writing career. Alternatively, 
assuming that even some members of the Blue Stocking group 
practiced what More preached, it is easy to understand why 
Johnson, Burke, and Garrick found so much pleasure in their 
drawing rooms. Mute angels are a valuable commodity, 
particulary for aging actors and practicing poets. But More's 
advice to women cannot easily be reduced to proof of her own 
self-interest— at least not directly. Like many of More's 
strategies to increase the moral value of women, this
celebration of silence is a compensatory gesture, which can 
be read in several ways. One might interpret it as a 
manifestation of More's Christian consciousness, where, as we 
have seen, women must avoid a comparatively degraded public 
sphere so as to ensure their own moral superiority. Or, more 
suspiciously, one might argue that it is meant to atone for a 
world in which women had so few opportunities to practice 
"commerce of feeling" that "commerce of feeling" is 
subsequently de-valued, and represented as a threat to a 
"better" social order, which is then underwritten by 
Christian values. In either case, it is significant that More 
could only ensure the compassionate qualities of women— could 
only prove their moral superiority— by pointing to women's 
amiable silence, and calling for their retreat from any 
public aspirations. This suggests that were she to admit the 
possibility of mutual sympathy between women and men, her 
moral hierarchy would be shaken at its foundations, and her 
carefully constructed argument for the moral superiority of 
women, which requires the notion of difference, would tremble 
along with it.
The Wrongs of Woman
For More, then, there can be no mutual sympathy between men 
and women, or between members of two different classes. On 
the whole, she is suspicious of the notion, believing it to 
be, at worst, a romantic illusion of equality that may erupt 
in social disorder, or, at best, a sentimental notion 
perpetuated by "romantic" novels. Often, the two objections
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are indistinguishable. In her Essays, for example. More warns
her young audience against looking to "pernicious reading"
for a model of female friendship. Here, she claims, a
"violent intimacy ensues" between two young people, or, she
continues, "to speak the language of sentiment, an intimate
union of souls immediately takes place, which is wrought to
the highest pitch by a secret correspondence" (Works II:
359). With surprising consistency throughout More's work, and
even in reference to the relationship between the female
members of the same class, the idea of "feeling with" is
12trivialized or simply dismissed. There exists at least a 
deep analogy between this rejection of "feeling with" and 
More's attitude toward the laboring poor, who, as we have 
seen, constitute a largely nameless source of potential 
social upheaval that middle-class men and women, she 
believes, must together attempt to regulate and control.
For Wollstonecraft, on the other hand, as for many other 
British radicals, the poor are genuine victims of the 
asymmetrical social order that More would protect. Thus for 
Wollstonecraft, progressive sexual and party politics— one 
focusing upon gender, and the other, upon class— are closely 
interwoven. This relationship between sexual and party 
politics, as we might expect, is often represented in the 
language of sympathy. In her description of life as a 
governess for a wealthy family, for example, Wollstonecraft 
laments the absence of "mutual sympathy" between members of 
different classes. Though a "young mind looks round for love 
and friendship," she writes, "love and friendship fly from
poverty: expect them not if you are very poor" (Rights of 
Woman 74). Smith, of course, had made much the same point in 
his description of how poverty places the poor man "out of 
the sight of mankind" which has "scarce any fellow-feeling 
with the misery and distress he suffers" (TMS 51). Their 
comments, however, are of two different orders. Whereas 
Smith's example of the poor man is meant to illustrate— even 
to naturalize— the idea that the sympathetic imagination more 
easily passes to the empowered, Wollstonecraft's is a 
complaint, and a call for justice. Recognizing that class 
and sex differences constitute an impediment to "mutual 
sympathy" that cannot be rectified without basic economic and 
educational parity, Wollstonecraft consistently argues that 
"power" is a real phenomenon taking place not merely in and 
through the realm of values (and therefore confined to the 
minds of men) but in and through concrete social institutions 
by which women, like other groups, had been created, de­
valued, excluded, and oppressed.
In her last novel, Maria, or, The Wrongs of Woman,
Wollstonecraft's analysis of the social condition of women
begun in Mary is expanded to include the experience of women
13who are also members of the laboring poor. Although as in 
all her work, her goal is to describe "the misery and 
oppression, peculiar to women, that arise out of the partial 
laws and customs of society" (73), The Wrongs of Woman is 
built upon the stories of Maria and Jemima, two women of 
different classes. Their conditions are said to be "equally 
oppressive," although necessarily taking "different forms"
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(74). While much of this novel is straightforwardly 
polemical, and its purpose to expose the inequities of an 
arcane legal system under which both women suffer, the aspect 
of the novel I will focus upon here concerns the relation of 
Maria and Jemima. Given the very different experiences of 
these two women, this relationship is initially fraught with 
tension, but by the end of the novel, Maria and Jemima are 
represented as fast and loyal friends. Sympathy is the 
heroine of this connection, or, to switch metaphors, the 
"bridge” through which these tensions are (presumably) 
resolved.
The Wrongs of Woman opens with its central character,
Maria, having been locked up in an asylum by her husband,
George Venables. As we later find out, the ruthless and 
degenerate Venables first spent all his wife's inheritance 
and through his neglect and abuse, drove her away; because 
their child was heir to a considerable fortune, he 
subsequently hunted down Maria, kidnapped their four-month- 
old daughter, and had his wife committed. Maria finds herself 
placed under the care of the second character, Jemima, a 
former prostitute turned "jailer" who initially believes that 
Maria is mad. Gradually, and largely through Maria's efforts 
to create a bond between the two women, Jemima learns to 
trust Maria, and Maria to respect Jemima. In fact, Jemima 
first serves as a liaison between Maria and a fellow- 
prisoner, Darnford, who will become Maria's lover. Upon his 
release, Jemima helps Maria to escape. While that love affair 
apparently ends in Maria's abandonment and attempted suicide,
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Jemima locates the lost child, for whose sake Maria 
determines to live.
The bond between Maria and Jemima is, as I suggested, a 
gradual process. Given that Jemima had been "sophisticated 
into misanthropy" (80), or had learned to dislike and 
distrust others by the harshness she had met in the world, 
she is at first unresponsive to Maria. Largely through 
exercising "fortitude" (78) and other behaviors connected 
with appropriate self-representation, however, Maria is able 
to convince Jemima that she is not mad. As Wollstonecraft 
writes, "The manner, rather than the expostulations, of 
Maria, made a slight suspicion dart into [Jemima's] mind with 
corresponding sympathy which she could not at that moment 
examine more minutely" (78). This "corresponding sympathy"—  
the faint recognition of a similarly rational creature— is 
(paradoxically perhaps) strengthened by Jemima's ability to 
identify with Maria's grief at the loss of her child. As 
Wollstonecraft puts it, when Jemima hears the story of how 
Maria's child "had been torn from her, even while she was 
discharging the tenderest maternal office, the woman awoke in 
a bosom long estranged from feminine emotions, and Jemima 
determined to alleviate. . .the suffering of a wretched 
mother" (80). Later, Maria's love affair with Darnford 
exposes Jemima to the "domestic affections," an aspect of 
"humanity" that she had never seen. Under the influence of 
their apparent love, where "every sense was harmonized to joy 
and social extacy," Jemima first learns to sympathize with 
pleasure, rather than pain:
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So animated, indeed, were their accents of 
tenderness, in discussing what, in other 
circumstances, would have been commonplace 
subjects, that Jemima felt, with surprise, a 
tear of pleasure trickling down her rugged 
cheeks. She wiped it away, half ashamed; and 
when Maria kindly enquired the cause. . .she 
owned that it was the first tear social 
enjoyment had ever drawn from her. She seemed 
indeed to breathe more freely; the cloud of 
suspicion was cleared away from her brow; she 
felt herself, for once in her life, treated 
like a fellow-creature. (101)
Finally, the effect of this scene was so powerful that 
Jemima, "softened by the air of confidence that breathed 
around her" (101) felt free to break her long silence, to 
relate her own story, and thus through her self­
representation to provoke sympathy in turn.
From a feminist perspective, Jemima's account is in some 
ways the most significant part of this book. As far as I 
know, it is one of the few eighteenth-century accounts of a 
poor woman's life that— if Z may borrow the language of 
sympathy— genuinely intends to command respect, not just 
pity, for its v i c t i m . ^  Through it, Maria learns that Jemima 
shares her desire for independence, or for a society that 
affords more opportunities for women, and does not punish its 
women for the mistakes of its men. Herself an illegitimate 
child, Jemima was raped by her master, then thrown out on the
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streets. Ashamed and forced to have an abortion, Jemima 
begged, prostituted, and, eventually, became a housekeeper 
for an elderly and rather profligate man near Hampstead, 
where she took it upon herself to read, and, already outside 
"proper society," benefit from conversations between men from 
which more respectable women would have been excluded.
Largely through self-education, she acquired what "might be 
termed a moral sense" (111) and desired to return to the 
"respectable part of society" (111). When the master died, 
however, his family refused to give her a recommendation, and 
she was once again thrust upon her own resources. After 
another series of trials and tribulations, she became a 
jailer, where, in solitude, she at least had independence, 
even though she was complicitous in serving the interests of 
the class she had learned to despise.
While it is possible to discern differences between the 
events of Maria's life and those in Jemima's, Wollstonecraft 
wants to make broad thematic connections which exemplify 
their shared status as creatures living under "partial laws." 
For this reason, both are represented as "outlaws" who, 
excluded from rights and privileges, are forced to rely upon 
their own judgment or, in some cases, to take the law into 
their own hands. Thus Maria is, as she says, "hunted like 
criminal" (196) and Jemima quite literally is one: "I became 
a thief from principle," she says (118). Throughout the novel 
the legal system is represented as one-sided and corrupt, as 
we see when Maria pleads her case before an unsympathetic 
judge. The fact that Jemima becomes Maria's benevolent
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"jailer" who is nevertheless able* unlike the men around her, 
to recognize Maria's innocence finally suggests that 
according to Wollstonecraft and despite popular opinion, 
women have a more refined sense of justice than men.
But the most interesting thing about their shared status 
as "outsiders" is that it quite literally creates the 
conditions for the possibility of sympathy; it enables and 
promotes their desire to create "fellow-feeling" by turning 
to one another. For Jemima, as I have suggested, this means 
learning from Maria the lesson of humanity, a social impulse 
which had been "numbed" at birth. In language that 
anticipates Frankenstein, Jemima complains bitterly to Maria 
and Darnford, "Still, what should induce me to be the 
champion for suffering humanity?— Who ever risked any thing 
for me?— Who ever acknowledged me to be a fellow-creature?" 
(119). For Maria, on the other hand, it means learning to 
respect a former thief and prostitute, when, as she admits, 
she was once "mortified at being compelled to consider them 
as my fellow-creatures, as if an ape had claimed kindred with 
me" (168). The asylum where they are both imprisoned is thus 
less a microcosm of the outside world than it the space of 
their marginalization. By virtue of that— and that alone—  
they confront their prejudices, and identify the other as a 
fellow-creature, worthy of their respect.
Given Wollstonecraft's emphasis upon sympathy between 
members of different classes, it would appear that 
Wollstonecraft has been able to accomplish what Smith and 
More would not, that is, to appropriate the discourse of
sympathy in the service of radical politics that transcend or 
resolve class and cultural differences. The novel, however, 
cannot support such a utopian reading. And given 
Wollstonecraft's own assumptions, we should not expect it to 
do so. All of Wollstonecraft's work is directed toward 
establishing moral and economic "autonomy" for women, which, 
in this case, means relative independence from male-biased 
moral and legal systems through which they are as individuals 
oppressed, in The Wrongs of Woman, for example, Jemima's 
narrative exemplifies the "evils of poverty" upon the 
character of a would-be autonomous woman. Recognizing 
Jemima's worth and desire, and, reasoning from her own 
experience of suffering to Jemima's very different one, Maria 
is able to support Jemima's aspirations. Yet individual 
"autonomy" does not translate into equality, even between 
these two women. As Janet Todd points out, Jemima never 
pretends to be the equal of Maria— in fact, once released 
from prison, she insists upon remaining as Maria's servant 
(1986, 112). Thus class hierarchy is modified, its edges 
blurred, but the master/servant relationship seemingly 
dictated by birth remains intact.
It is possible to see this hierarchical structure by 
attending to Wollstonecraft's representation of sympathy, as 
well. As in Smith, the possibility of sympathy is connected 
to one's appropriate self-representation and identification 
with a principle of pleasure and power. This aspect of 
sympathetic response is played out through Jemima; after she 
is introduced to "human converse," the foundation of sympathy
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(119), sympathy works as a principle of upward mobility, with
Maria serving as the point, or as the moral character, to
which Jemima should aspire. Maria's relationship to sympathy
is a bit more complicated. While Maria generally shows
compassion for Jemima and thus treats her as a "fellow-
creature," thereby enabling Jemima's rise to humanity, Maria
has no corresponding desire to emulate the unfortunate woman.
From one point of view, then, their relationship "fails";
because it is largely one-sided, it cannot approximate the
"mutual sympathy" celebrated in Smith, for whom the most
valued form of sympathetic response is a kind of mutual
15admiration society between two virtuous men. On the basis 
of either Smith's model or More's, the hierarchical structure 
of sympathy between Maria and Jemima is neither effectively 
dissipated nor resolved.
Yet perhaps that is not the most important issue in the 
text, which, like all of Wollstonecraft's work, is 
necessarily interventionist. In the Rights of Woman, as we 
have seen, Wollstonecraft sought to displace— or at least to 
dislodge— both Smith's system of sympathetic response, and 
the model of compassionate womanhood promoted by More, since 
in each case, woman's social role is connected and confined 
to compassion. In order to do that, she attempted to extend 
the possibility of moral judgment to women. Similarly, in The 
Wrongs of Woman, she repeats those sentiments in an argument 
that women must be allowed "positive virtue" (153).
Explaining that she had yielded to her husband's sexual 
overtures out of "sheer compassion," she argues that "Men,
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more effectually to enslave us, may Inculcate this partial 
morality, and lose sight of virtue in subdividing it into the 
duties of particular stations" but that "the first duty of 
women is to themselves, to their own passion and imagination" 
(153). This positive virtue, however, is never enough. As we 
have seen in the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft was forced 
to ground the moral value of women in their role as rational 
mothers. The Wrongs of Woman simply dramatizes that moral 
claim.
In order to emphasize the importance of women's maternal 
role, throughout the Wrongs of Woman Wollstonecraft portrays 
a society in which this role is thwarted. For this reason, 
Maria's child— not "liberty" or "equality"— is represented as 
being the most valuable commodity in the novel, and is the 
catalyst upon which all the action turns. George, for 
example, symbolizes not only the bad husband, but the bad 
father. He had Maria confined in order to acquire the child, 
because the latter was endowed with a considerable 
inheritance. Maria, in turn, "tortured by maternal 
apprehension" (75) desires to escape because she fears for 
her daughter, and wants to fulfill the role that only a 
mother could: "who would watch her with a mother's 
tenderness, a mother's self-denial?" (75). Similarly, it is 
through identifying with Maria's loss that the "woman awoke" 
in Jemima, and she first experiences a sense of injustice
(80), and it is largely because she did not have a mother 
that her own trials and tribulations are explained. Looking 
back, she says to Maria and Darnford, "I cannot help
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attributing the greater part of my misery, to the misfortune 
of having been thrown into the world without the grand 
support of life— a mother's affection" (106). It is through 
their mutual concern for the missing child, in fact, that 
Haria and Jemima are at last brought together, and their 
escape effected. After hearing Jemima's story, Maria is 
convinced that "Jemima's humanity had rather been benumbed 
than killed" (120) and she convinces her to take action on 
behalf of her child: "With your heart, and such dreadful 
experience, can you lend your aid to deprive my babe of a 
mother's tenderness, a mother's care?
In the name of God, assist me to snatch her 
from destruction! Let me but give her an 
education— let me but prepare her body and 
mind to encounter the ills which await her 
sex, and I will teach her to consider you as 
her second mother, and herself as the prop of 
your age. (121)
At the end of the novel, moreover, when Maria, apparently 
suffering from Darnford's betrayal, attempts to commit 
suicide, Jemima locates the child, and Maria vows to live.
This theme of the threatened child which can only be 
saved by a mother's love underscores wollstonecraft's earlier 
argument in the Rights of Woman that women, in their maternal 
role, are the most fundamental stabilizing force in society. 
Conversely, the child is represented as a redemptive force 
through which a misanthropic and male-dominated society may 
be softened, if not overthrown. In fact, according to
Wollstonecraft, it is because Maria and Jemima share this 
perception of the mother-child relationship, and not because 
of some intrinsic ability to "compassion-ate," that they are 
able to "sympathize" that is, to share a common bond. Because 
they had lived outside the conventions of society, Maria and 
Jemima are thrown together in a common space; because they 
share the same values, however, Maria and Jemima have a 
common goal, to protect the endangered child which is, in the 
end, a symbol for the endangered status of the social itself. 
At the same time, the mother-child relationship is quite 
literally represented as the purgative through which a male- 
dominated society is dispelled. At the end of the novel,
Maria is lying on her would-be deathbed, poisoned, and 
calling out for a father: "May I find a father where I am 
going!" Yet when Jemima— the "second mother"— appears with 
the child, "Maria started off the bed, and fainted.— Violent 
vomiting ensued" (203). When the child calls out to her,
Maria goes through an "an agonizing struggle," then, we are 
told, exclaimed: "The conflict is over!— I will live for my 
child!'" (203).
Because the mother-child relationship is so central to the 
common bond between Maria and Jemima, and because that is 
portrayed as being central to future of the social itself, 
sympathy is this novel cannot be read in familiar terms. At 
stake here is not simply, I would argue, the power of female 
friendship, or even the power of compassion for the 
sufferings of women of two different classes. It is, instead, 
the power of rational motherhood, which Wollstonecraft had
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posited as woman's sole claim to social existence, 
superseding the relationship between two virtuous men. In 
this novel it is represented as the concern of all women, 
including members of the working class. The effect of this 
universalization is that while Wollstonecraft is not able to 
overthrow the hierarchy intrinsic to the logic of sympathy, 
she is able, temporarily, to displace models such as 
Rousseau's, and to situate women in the center of a culture 
from which they had been displaced.
In this chapter, I have brought together sexual and party 
politics in order to make a single point: in eighteenth- 
century writing by women, sympathy supports at least two 
distinct but interrelated ideologies, both of which (in 
theory at least) have feminist intentions. In her complete 
distrust of "feeling with" as a principle of social 
coherence. More differs from Wollstonecraft, who, in alliance 
with other British radicals, is interested in erasing, or at 
least de-naturalizing, cultural and social differences. This 
is most apparent in their representation of class, since, as 
I have throughout this work insisted, sympathy is part of the 
symbolic system that articulates and supports a largely 
middle-class moral and political theory, marking who or what 
is to remain outside the social as such. At the same time, I 
have argued that precisely because the discourse of sympathy 
was so pervasive, both More and Wollstonecraft were forced to 
rely upon a compensatory strategy to endow women with moral 
worth. In order to counter the exclusionary practices of 
moral and political writers from Smith to Rousseau, both
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writers simply extend the social and political significance 
of the private realm itself, one by emphasizing the 
importance of rational motherhood, and the other by 
celebrating the virtues of public service.
How different, then, are Wollstonecraft and More? Because 
both women write within and against the discourse of sympathy 
to assert women's social value, from one point of view, the 
logic of their respective strategies is uncannily similar.
Both, for example, in alliance with Smith, promote a vision 
of the social based upon models of the nuclear family, which 
necessitates the (inevitably hierarchical) family structure. 
Both associate the value of women with non-paying social 
reform. And both, in different ways, insist that a woman's 
body, as a natural source of compassion or as the original 
site of sympathetic bonds, can serve as source of all future 
social good, in compensation for a culture in which the 
activities of men were valued more than those of women, each, 
in alliance with a particular and essentially religious 
ideology, sought to establish a connection between women and 
a particular social role, where philanthropy and rational 
motherhood were simultaneously endowed with equal or even 
superior moral value than the public roles of men. However 
radical those arguments were in their own time, I would like 
to offer the possibility that both writers were instrumental 
in creating and even naturalizing associations which remain 
foundational to some types of feminist theory and practice 
today.
221
Notes to Chapter Four
1. There are several and often conflicting traditions of 
poststructuralist feminism (see Owen), most of which 
nevertheless share a single goal: as Spivak puts it, to re­
write "great male texts" so that "there is new material for 
the grasping of the production and determination of 
literature within the general production and determination of 
consciousness and society. After all, the people who produce 
literature, male and female, are also moved by general ideas 
of world and consciousness to which they cannot give a name"
(81). I am working within that tradition roost indebted to 
Foucault. For accounts of the relationship between feminism 
and Foucault, see Armstrong; Weedon; and the introduction to 
Feminism and Foucault by Diamond and Quinby.
2. This view is summarized in Todd's preface to her annotated 
bibliography of Wollstonecraft (xxiv): "Hannah More, the most 
famous of the Bluestockings, wanted partial reform in the 
position of women, consonant with their divinely appointed 
subordination. . . .Wollstonecraft, however, wanted a radical 
change in agreement with her religious opinion, that women, 
like men had immortal souls to create."
3. Pocock draws attention to the importance of "manners" in 
Burke's response to the French Revolution. Burke felt that 
"the ancien regime is a microcosm of the history of Europe; 
feudal conquest, clerical and political organization, 
commercial and cultural growth; all is organized around a 
historical edifice of manners, and it is the structure of 
European civility which the Revolution is in the process of 
destroying" (199). I would extend his thesis to explain anti­
feminist responses to Wollstonecraft's work, in fact, one can 
see this same phenomenon in Stone, who comments that Mary 
Wollstonecraft's "passionate claim to sexual equality, 
together with her sympathy for the French Revolution and her 
irregular personal life, merely alienated the support of all 
but the most tolerant of men" (227).
4. Marilyn Butler has described Evangelicalism as a social 
movement which "sought a spiritual regeneration within 
individuals rather than by disturbing the present 
hierarchical order of things" (36). More is certainly within 
that tradition, and that is all I am concerned with here, but 
More's relationship to Evangelicalism is considerably more 
complex. See Jones 97-102 and Schnorrenberg 199 for the 
Evangelicals' attitude toward women.
5. When referring to Hannah More's poems, I will provide only 
the volume and page numbers, since line numbers are not given 
in the Harper edition.
6. It is amusing that, in arguing for women's moral 
influence, More appeals to the example of Cicero who, with 
Fulvia's influence, had defeated Catiline's conspiracy
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against him, only to fall himself by her vengeance against 
him years later. "We read of the greatest orator of 
antiquity, that the wisest plans which it had cost him years 
to frame, a woman could overturn in a single day" (Works VI: 
11). As the editor points out, moreover, when Cicero*s head 
was brought to her, "she pierced with a bodkin that tongue 
which had so often delighted listening senators” (lln). One 
wonders if More could have found some more appropriate 
example of woman's god-given talent.
7. On the distribution and influence of Hannah More's 
political writing, see Collins 78-81; Altick 68-75; Thompson 
1963, 56-9; Pederson; Smith 91-96; and Gaull 47-9. Concerning 
the huge number of More's Religious Tracts that were put into 
circulation, Altick writes that "There had never been 
anything like it in the history of books" (75).
8. in the context of the 1790s and the English government's 
stern reaction against potential revolution at home, More's 
attitude toward the laboring poor she strove to educate is 
consonant with Burke's feeling that "where a man is incapable 
of receiving Benefit through his reason, he must be made to 
receive it thro' his fears. Here the Magistrate must stand in 
the place of the Professor. They who cannot or will not be 
taught, must be coerced" (qtd. in Olivia Smith 74).
9. See Jones 90 on More's relationship to Cowper. Although 
she did not know him, they had mutual friends and admired 
each other's work.
10. It was generally known that the masons were one of the 
many social clubs throughout Europe where radical ideas first 
took root and were promoted, although there is some 
disagreement about their influence in England. My point here 
is simply that More is drawing upon a popular symbol of 
social disorder, and not that the masons in England were a 
genuine revolutionary force. See Britton 5; Thompson 1963, 
168; and Hunt 113, who suggests that much of the revolution's 
imagery was drawn from masonic sources.
11. More's representation of trade in this poem has less, I 
think, to do with what McVeagh has identified as the anti­
mercantilist movement in late-eighteenth century writing than 
it does with her desire to cast "Conversation" as a form of 
public power, much like trade, which women should avoid.
12. To be fair, later in this same essay (364) she claims 
"that women are as capable of as faithful and as durable 
friendship as any of the other sex," and even goes so far as 
to claim that people do not think so because "the recorders" 
of famous male friendships were men, but she never uses the 
language of sympathy in that context Works II: 364. See also 
Works VI: 174, where the language of sympathy is involved in 
her description of "good-nature" where "genuine sympathy" is 
represented as a mode of behavior, much like charity, which 
gives rise to self-sacrifice and Christian good works.
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13. Yet in the middle of this story, Wollstonecraft includes 
a short discussion between the three characters upon the 
evils of poverty, and upon the faulty solutions proffered by 
modern authors, including ones such as Burke and More. These, 
"insisting that it is the lot of the majority to be oppressed 
in this life, kindly turn them over to another, to rectify 
the false weights and measures of this, as the only way to 
justify the dispensations of Providence" (115). All agree 
that it is more important to open one's heart, than one's 
purse (119), to establish conditions for moral growth which 
the novel itself exemplifies.
14. This, if course, is a generalization which is not easily 
supported. One apparent exception is the work of Defoe, whose 
Moll Flanders and Roxana have been praised for their 
real'istic portrayals of women oppressed by social 
circumstances beyond their control. Yet Defoe's portrayal of 
women must be qualified. As Watt argues of Moll Flanders, 
"some of [her] actions may be very similar to the picaro, but 
the feeling evoked by them is of a much more complete 
sympathy and identification: author and reader alike cannot 
but take her and her problems much more seriously" (94).
There is no question of satire or humor in Wollstonecraft's 
portrayal of Jemima. See also Starr on the story of Roxana, 
where he argues that the purpose of the novel is to "'move 
the Pity, even of those that abhor the Crime'" (76).
15. Significantly, Wollstonecraft does use the language of 
mutual sympathy to portray Maria's relationship with 
Darnford, another hero modeled after St. Preux, where "mutual 
sympathy" is eventually proved to be an illusion. Although 
the novel is unfinished, there are clear indications of his 
moral failure. See, for example 192, where this is 
foreshadowed: "With Darnford she did not taste uninterrupted 
felicity; there was a volatility in his manner which often 
distressed her; but love gladdened the scene; besides, he was 
the most tender, sympathizing creature in the world. A 
fondness for the sex often gives an appearance of humanity to 
the behavior of men, who have small pretensions to the 
reality; and they seem to love others, when they are only 
pursuing their own gratification."
Conclusion
Sympathy, Gender, and the Writing of Value
"How I would like to believe
in tenderness...." Sylvia Plath, 
"The Moon and the Yew Tree"
In the late-eighteenth century, as we have seen, the
discourse of sympathy played a key role in arguments for and
against the importance of women in largely middle-class
movements for social reform. In this chapter, I want to focus
upon the problematical relationship between sympathy, gender
and the writing of value within a contemporary context.
Consequently, I have almost completely ignored some one
hundred and fifty years of history, during which, it could
have been illustrated, both motherhood and philanthropy were
solidified into arguments for woman's moral superiority. At
the same time, sympathy and compassion, much like the women
who were thought to embody them, became confined to the
"household of the emotions," now unequivocally set against
the presumably "corrupt" world of commerce and trade. Yet,
as in the eighteenth-century, the idea that the domestic
should be valued more than the public world, as Judith Newton
has pointed out, is largely a compensatory gesture,
constructed in the early Victorian era (the 1830s and 40s)
2"by middle-class women for each other" (127). It is 
possible to argue, then, that throughout the nineteenth
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century, the discourse of sympathy was very much alive, and 
that women continued to challenge the hierarchy of values 
implicit in it.
From another point of view, however, this challenge did 
little more than to legitimize women's secondary moral 
status. Even while women such as Sarah Ellis were insisting 
upon the value of women's "disinterested kindness," they were 
also solidifying the association between women and compassion 
which was soon to be cast into theories of biological 
development. By the third quarter of the nineteenth-century, 
for example, Charles Darwin was able to maintain that the 
moral differences between men and women are the result of 
"natural selection." in the Descent of Han (1871) he writes 
that "Woman seems to differ from man in mental disposition, 
chiefly in her greater tenderness and less selfishness" (qtd. 
in Agonitio 260). Notably, the "evidence" for this claim is 
drawn from representations of women in popular travel books: 
"and this holds good," he continues, "even with savages, as 
shewn by a well-known passage in Mungo Park's Travels, and by 
statements made by many other travellers" (260). In this way, 
anthropology and ideology were increasingly allied; it is 
thus not surprising to see Darwin attribute these "womanly" 
moral qualities to "maternal instincts": "Woman, owing to her 
maternal instincts, displays these qualities towards her 
infants in an eminent degree; therefore it is likely that she 
would extend them towards her fellow-creatures" (260). These 
caring "instincts," in turn, are represented as being morally 
"superior" to the equally "natural" qualities of men. "Man is
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the rival of other men," writes Darwin, "he delights in 
competition, and this leads to ambition which passes too 
easily into selfishness. These latter qualities seem to be 
his natural and unfortunate birthright" (260). Yet Darwin's 
flattering portrayal of women's morality should not be taken 
at face value. As he continues, "it is generally admitted 
that with women the powers of intuition, of rapid perception, 
and perhaps of imitation, are more strongly marked than in 
man; but some, at least, of these faculties are 
characteristic of the lower races, and therefore of a past an 
lower state of civilization" (260). In Darwin's account of 
moral difference, then, the hierarchy of values implicit in 
the discourse of sympathy has simply been re-cast as a fact 
of "natural" evolution itself.
This too-holy marriage between morality and biology— a 
marriage, as we have seen, which goes back to eighteenth- 
century medical texts— has, not surprising created a problem 
for modern-day feminists. Many twentieth-century feminists, 
for example, have attempted to explain moral differences 
between men and women on the basis of sociological, 
psychological, or historical factors. Prominent among these 
is a theorist I have already mentioned, Nancy Chodorow, who 
argues that, because women have traditionally served as the 
primary caretakers of children, and because boys and girls 
identify with the mother in different ways, girls are more 
likely than boys to define themselves in terms of 
relationships, to see themselves in terms of their ability to 
"care." While this explanation is undoubtedly an improvement
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over Darwin's— or Freud's— account of moral difference,
because it relies upon a gender-specific theory of moral
development, it nevertheless can be charged with a kind of
cultural essentialism which obscures the differences between
and women,^ and correspondingly, the importance of structures
4outside the nuclear family in moral development itself.
This issue is all the more troubling when one considers 
the effect of Chodorow's argument upon some feminist 
theorists. Although Chodorow warns that her descriptions of 
male and female moral development are "structural and 
statistical truths" that should not be confused with 
"prescription," that has not always been the case. This is in 
part due to the tremendous influence of Carol Gilligan's 
psychoanalytically-based study of women's moral development, 
which argues that women possses a different moral structure,
"a different voice" which should serve as the basis of 
ethical reform. Within literary criticism, as we 6aw in 
Chapter II, both men and women have appropriated the 
association between women and compassion in attempts to re­
value the writing of women, which for the most part had been 
dismissed or ignored. Within philosophy, the Chodorow- 
Gilligan thesis is perhaps even more important. A partial 
list of the men and women who seek to posit an "alternative" 
to the "totalizing" and clearly masculinist moral systems of 
Kant, Hegel, and others by drawing upon Gilligan would 
include Hary Katzenstein, David Laitin, Annette C. Baier, 
Barbara Houston, Katherine Morgan, and Sarah Ruddick 1988—  
who argues that "maternal thinking," or what she calls
"attentive love," should be extended in "the public realm":
"we must work...to make the preservation and growth of all
children a work of public conscience and legislation" ( 349- 
550). While I would certainly not want to deny that children 
are an important part of a society, or that women, who have 
traditionally functioned as their primary caretakers, are as 
a group more familiar with them than are men, or even that 
Chodorow and Gilligan have provided a compelling basis for 
feminist reform, I do want take issue with the idea that 
women, or their morality, either can or should be described 
outside the culturally-specific discourses which provide the 
language and structures of value itself, in making this 
argument, I shall not enter the ongoing debate about whether 
or not there is an empirical basis for the idea that women 
possess a separate morality— a debate still raging in 
philosophical circles— or whether or not this idea can serve 
as a viable platform for feminist theory and politics. 
Instead, I shall address the ways in which the discourse of 
sympathy in twentieth-century texts still reveals an 
assymetrical structure of power analogous to that of 
eighteenth-century ethical treatises.
That the asymmetrical structures of power intrinsic to 
contemporary versions of the discourse of sympathy are not 
immediately apparent lends truth to Foucault's comment that 
power is "tolerable only on condition that it mask a 
substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to 
its ability to hide its own mechanisms" (1981, 86). The 
purpose of this chapter, accordingly, is first to "de-
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essentialize" the association between women and compassion by 
reading it as part of a masculinist system of representation 
through which both men and women are inscribed. In order to 
do this, I shall examine Max Scheler's The Nature of 
Sympathy, a foundational text in which, as I shall 
illustrate, the male-biased hierarchy of values implicit in 
the ethics of sympathy all along remains intact. Here 
sympathy is represented as a "universal" construct, but this 
argument is predicated on the existence of some "natural" 
sympathy thought to exist between any mother and her child, a 
bond which simultaneously excludes her from culture. While 
Scheler's text has been embraced by radical humanist 
philosophers (many of whom are writing within an explicitly 
Christian tradition) and ignored by feminist psychoanalytic 
critics (who nevertheless come to many of the same 
conclusions) attests, I believe, to the way in which the 
psychology, humanism, and the discourse of sympathy are 
mutually implicated. Arguments about women's moral value have 
shifted from moral to psychological ground; at the same time, 
the history of ethical writing that helped articulate the 
terms of these arguments is increasingly obscured. The second 
purpose of this chapter, then, is to explore briefly the 
parallels between Scheler's arguments for moral reform and 
those of an extremely influential feminist writer, Carol 
Gilligan. I shall conclude with some comments about the 
import of this phenomena.
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Max Scheler's Maternal Body
By the twentieth century, the gender-specific roles promoted 
by writers from Shaftesbury to Darwin were naturalized by a 
more concrete division of labor, and equally important, 
perhaps, by the rise of the social sciences. Correspondingly, 
with the work of Max Scheler, this asymmetrical structure of 
sympathy is rewritten into an ontological framework borrowed 
from the neo-Kantians. In the one hundred and fifty years 
between Smith and Scheler, however, the most important shift 
in the ethics of sympathy is in the way these now-traditional 
roles were beginning to be revalued. Like his contemporary 
Heidegger, Scheler had become disillusioned with the 
civilization that Hume and Smith had struggled so diligently 
to promote. In a familiar formulation, Scheler complains that 
modern civilization has led to what he calls "hypertrophy of 
the intellect." Appealing to a myth of origins which, as we 
have seen, goes back to Rousseau, Scheler asserts that a 
once-natural and universal ability to identify with the 
emotions of others has been lost. This, of course, is a 
disease peculiar to men which a more comprehensive ethics of 
sympathy is thought to redeem. Like Smith, Hume, Wordsworth, 
and Rousseau, Scheler locates "natural" sympathetic response 
in the female body. But perhaps because his culture is more 
domesticated, or perhaps because of the influence of Darwin, 
or perhaps because, as Deleuze suggests, the twentieth 
century is so thoroughly Oedipalized,6 Scheler grounds his 
theory of sympathy in the maternal body alone, in a now- 
valorized relationship between any mother and her child.
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Before addressing the significance of this founding trope for 
contemporary ethics, it is helpful, I believe, to examine the 
metaphysical gestures by which its relationship to earlier 
theories of sympathy are obscured.
Many eighteenth- and nineteenth-century theories of 
sympathy— unlike those of Smith and Hume— will attempt to 
draw an analogy between the moral and the physical worlds. A 
popular version of sympathy to which I alluded but did not 
discuss emanates from eighteenth-century studies in electro­
magnetics, and from works such as Gerard's Essay on Taste.
As the magnet selects from a quantity of 
matter the ferruginous particles, which 
happen to be scattered through it, without 
making an impression on other substances; so 
imagination, by a similar sympathy, equally 
inexplicable, draws out from the whole 
compass of nature such ideas as we have 
occasion for, without attending to any 
others. (173-74)
Similarly, for Scheler, the world is an indissoluble 
corporeal unity, and there exists a "natural” and "universal" 
relationship between the moral and the physical world.
The heart possesses, within its own realm, a 
strict analogon of logic, which it does not, 
however, borrow from the realm of the 
intellect. As the ancient doctrine of the 
nomos agraphos can already teach, there are 
laws written into it which correspond to the
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plan according to which the world, as a world 
of values, is built up. It can love and hate 
blindly, or with evidence, just as we can 
judge blindly or with evidence, (xii)
Reasoning from this unity, and relying on an analogy drawn 
from physics, Scheler claims that every "moral motion", such 
as the love of A for B, awakens a "corresponding" love in B 
to A, hence of the love of C and D, and so forth: "and thus 
the wave travels on in the moral universe from C to D and E 
and F into infinity. And the same applies to hate, 
injustice, and every kind of sin" (xxx).^
Whereas Smith and Hume had explicitly addressed the 
problem of language and culture in guaranteeing sympathetic 
response, metaphysical theories of sympathy simply remove the 
problem of signification from speech and writing to physics 
and biology, to more "stable" modes of discourse. One 
advantage of this strategy is that it simultaneously protects 
the sympathetic imagination from historical change. 
Consequently, such analogies between the moral and physical 
worlds may be read as figures with a concrete purpose. In 
Gerard's account, the sympathetic imagination, a mode of 
cognition, functions like magnetism to regulate the 
impressions one receives from "nature"; in Scheler's 
description, the sympathetic imagination, which i_s a sound­
wave in the world of morality, ensures that feeling emanating 
from a single point will reverberate through the universe.
While one writer relies upon simile and the other relies upon 
metaphor, both analogies serve to represent the sympathetic
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imagination as logical, coherent, and universal— even though 
its mechanisms are, in the words of Gerard, "inexplicable", 
and, as Scheler suggests, apparent in "God's eyes" only.
However, as I shall illustrate, in Scheler's The Nature of 
Sympathy this extended comparison between the natural and 
moral world is simply a metalepsis, in which the central, or 
grounding figure is omitted. This privileged trope— the 
figure guaranteeing's Scheler system— is the mother-child 
relationship. First, Scheler argues that unlike men, women 
have been protected from the insidious forces of 
civilization. Second, in an account which Chodorow will 
denaturalize in her theory of development, Scheler argues 
that a special "connection" is derived from the original 
unity between the mother and child, where the loved one was a 
"spatial and corporeal ’part' of the one who loves" (25).
Thus any mother, he claims, bears a biological code of 
signals enabling her "to know" the child in an intimate way.
In a familiar formulation, Scheler offers as an example of 
this "intuitive psycho-somatic unity" the ability of the 
mother to diagnose her child's illness, even though a team of 
medical professionals will have tried and failed. "It may be 
added," he writes,
that woman, as such, still possesses powers 
of intuition which, being based on the 
maternal instinct with its specialized 
aptitudes for identification, are found only 
rudimentarily in man— nor has he anything to 
replace them. This capacity first develops.
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no doubt, in a woman's own experience of 
maternity, but it is not confined to her own 
child, or to children generally, for it 
extends, when fully developed, to all the 
world. <32)
Generally speaking, representing a particular mode of 
engenderment as "natural" allows Scheler to erect his system 
on the body of the mother, which, in turn, functions as a 
universalizing metaphor through which the body of the world 
may be constituted. The mother-child connection, an 
intuitive field of signification, is represented as the 
source of moral and physical unity, through which nature 
might be restored. In passing, Scheler reinforces twentieth- 
century domestic roles: all females are represented as real
or potential mothers, endowed with the qualities that this 
role ideally implied: the mother should be loving, nurturing, 
and, most of all, knowing. Her sympathy, he writes,
"extends, when fully developed, to all the world."
While this description of the redeeming power of a 
mother's love may strike some people as being experientially 
valid, that is not my issue here. I believe it to be 
significant that, within the text proper, the maternal body 
is a largely undifferentiated field of affective forces that 
simply serves as proof of sympathy, or of sympathetic 
connection. The maternal body, in short, serves to 
"naturalize” and "humanize" the body of the world on which 
Scheler's metaphysical theories are dependent. The final 
irony of Scheler's text, moreover, is that while the maternal
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body is valorized, these morally generative qualities remove 
the mother from the culture she is thought to redeem. He 
argues that in order to produce and "read" the forces of 
sympathy naturally (as does the mother) it is necessary to 
exist outside the bounds of "civilization" as such. In a list 
whose members have in common being "other" to educated men, 
Scheler claims that this residual sympathy may also be found 
in "primitives, children, dreamers, neurotics of a certain 
type, and in hypnotic subjects" (31). Despite that the fact 
that female sympathy is a cherished commodity in Scheler's 
text, for him as for Smith, it resides in the pre- and the 
meta-linguistic, which is to say, in the marginalized and 
unempowered, outside of history and "civilization" as such. 
Women, or more precisely, their reproductive powers, are 
simply rewritten as the moral center of an intellectual 
community from which women simultaneously have been 
displaced.
Scheler's reliance upon the maternal body as the source 
and proof of sympathetic connection attests to the way the 
founding tropes of sympathy are social constructions, subject 
to historical change. In the eighteenth-century, for 
example, the mother-child relationship is represented as 
inimical to the progress of true sympathetic understanding. 
Compare Scheler's idealization of the maternal body with 
Smith's representation of a mother, who, upon hearing her 
child cry, can formulate no idea of its troubles:
What are the pangs of a mother, when she 
hears the moanings of her infant that during
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the agony of disease cannot express what it 
feels? In her idea of what it suffers, she 
joins, to its real helplessness, her own 
consciousness of its helplessness, and her 
own terrors for the unknown consequences of 
its disorder; and out of all these, forms, 
for her own sorrow, the most complete image 
of misery and distress. (TMS 12)
Here, the mother-child relationship forms the negative, as it 
were, of "true" sympathetic identification. The child, unable 
to articulate its complaints, enjoins no sympathy, but merely 
provokes helplessness and terror in the would-be sympathizer, 
whose animated imagination formulates the worst possible 
scenario. A product of culture, sympathy is inextricably 
bound to the possibility of self-narration, to a fiction 
through which one attempts to bridge the gap between self and 
other. In Scheler's account, "self-representation" is simply 
naturalized, or represented as a universal quality of the 
body itself, which mothers know how to "read."
On the other hand, Scheler's overt systematizing is 
analogous to eighteenth-century theories, in that they share 
common strategies or intentions: in their universalizing 
impulses, theories of sympathy are metalepses which will 
always reveal their founding trope. This trope— here, the 
mother-child relation— stands in for, and thus obscures, the 
problem of signification, or how to guarantee a relationship 
between self and other. While the founding trope could be 
interpreted either as regressive/analeptic or
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utopic/proleptic, depending upon one's methodological 
concerns, its intentionality remains the same. This trope 
establishes the feminine as the necessary figure through 
which sympathy is guaranteed, although this requires her 
displacement, or exclusion, from the culture she is thought 
to generate or restore. Clearly, her "natural” ability to 
sympathize is in direct and necessary relation to her absence 
of "intellect", or to the thoughtful judgment necessary for 
citizenship in a public world. And even more clearly, 
sympathy is implicated in the dominant values of a 
patriarchal culture, from which women are, on the basis of 
gender role alone, it seems, excluded.
Scheler's The Nature of Sympathy is a fascinating, almost 
uncanny, study in itself; it protects and valorizes many 
cultural assumptions many feminists have attempted to debunk, 
if only because we have come to distrust, without much 
hesitation, the totalizing projects of high modernism. Yet 
the connection between the maternal body and "womanly 
sympathy" retains an elliptical relation to twentieth-century 
valorizations of "feminine" sympathy in modern utopias which 
also work within a binary. Or, more precisely, within a 
hierarchy of values that is intimately bound to the rise of 
capitalism itself, in every case, the female is identified 
with a structure of care and responsiveness set apart from 
the world of work. Precisely because women are excluded, it 
is assumed, they can serve as a viable source of social 
change. This raises an important issue. Is the status of 
"feminine" as outsider an accident of the discourse of
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sympathy, or is it, instead, a necessary exclusion, a central 
part of the logic by which the discourse of sympathy works? I 
shall address this question— and its import— in the section 
that follows.
The Psychologizing of Ethics: A  Different Voice 
Recently, the discourse of sympathy has been appropriated by 
"mainstream" writers who articulate what has been called a 
"minimal utopia" of social life, characterized, writes one 
critic, by "nurturant, caring, expressive and nonrepressive 
relations between self and other, self and nature" (Benhabib 
and Cornell 4). Central to this, effort is Carol Gilligan's A 
Different Voice, in which Gilligan argues for the presence of 
a gender-specific ethical sensibility. This work is largely 
revisionary. Whereas Lawrence Kohlberg's traditional studies 
of morality privileged notions such as rights and duties, the 
hereditary province of men, Gilligan argues that women have 
their own morality which she terms "the ethics of care."
Against Kohlberg, Gilligan explains this phenomenon largely 
through a competing theory of development. Following Piaget, 
Kohlberg had forwarded a notiori of moral maturity that is 
inextricably bound to individuation, and in which women were 
found to be deficient (Gilligan 18-19). As Gilligan points 
out, this study is biased in its evaluation of female 
morality because "the very traits that traditionally have 
defined the 'goodness' of women, their care for and 
sensitivity to the needs of others, are those that mark them 
as deficient in moral development" (Gilligan 18). A Different
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Voice, in contrast, is theoretically informed by the 
psychoanalytic theories of Nancy Chodorow. Revising Freud's 
negative account of female development, Chodorow had argued 
that girls, parented by a person of the same gender, "emerge 
with a stronger basis [than do boys] for experiencing 
another's needs or feelings as one's own" (Gilligan 8). 
Gilligan's interviews with some two-hundred women and men on 
moral situations support Chodorow's conclusion that unlike 
men, "women not only define themselves within a context of 
human relationships but also judge themselves in term of 
their ability to care" (Gilligan 17). Whereas men construct 
the moral problem in terms of rights, women, she claims, 
construct it in terms of interaction, relationship, and 
responsibility.
While few people would deny that by locating feminine 
morality in a neo-Freudian theory of female psychological 
development, Gilligan has made an important contribution to 
psychoanalytic theory and to mainstream feminist ethics 
alike, A  Different Voice is a controversial work for 
feminists. Whereas Barbara Houston defends the idea of a 
"feminine" morality as a viable basis for moral reform, 
others have expressed concern that Gilligan is simply 
reinforcing sexist notions of femininity. Judy Auerbach, for 
example, has raised the objection that precisely because 
Gilligan is interested in individual development, she does 
not attend to the larger cultural factors influencing and 
surrounding her subjects' moral constructs. Instead, she 
begins her book with the following disclaimer:
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No claims are made about the origins of the 
differences described or their distribution 
in a wider population, across cultures, or 
through time. Clearly, these differences 
arise in a social context where factors of 
social status and power combine with 
reproductive biology to shape the experiences 
of males and females and the relations 
between the sexes. (Gilligan 2)
In so doing, Gilligan not only ignores the social 
construction of feminine morality, but ignores the way in 
which this ethics of care is presently implicated in the 
reinforcement and promotion of masculine power (Auerbach, et 
al. 153).
A second and related objection to A Different Voice 
emanates from feminists are troubled by the way such sweeping 
accounts of psycho-sexual development ignore social and 
historical differences between women. Thus Fraser and 
Nicholson have taken issue with the fact that Gilligan posits 
an alternative "feminine" model of moral development; this, 
they point out, invites the "same charges of false 
generalization she herself had raised against Kohlberg"
(Fraser and Nicholson 99). As these critics continue, 
to the extent that she described women's 
moral development in terms of a different 
voice; to the extent that she did not specify 
which women, under which specific historical 
circumstances, have spoken with the voice in
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question; and to extent that she grounded her 
analysis in the cross-cultural framework of 
Nancy Chodorow, her model remained 
essentialist. It perpetuated in a newer, more 
localized fashion traces of previous, more 
grandiose quasi metanarratives. (99)
From this avowedly post-modernist and decidedly feminist 
perspective, Gilligan perpetuates a modernist notion of 
gender-identity which a more "pragmatic and fallibilistic" 
feminist theory would avoid, instead of a "different voice," 
they argue, feminists should focus upon the ways in which 
"different voices" have worked in alliance, but not without 
conflict, toward more or less common goals (102).
In retrospect, it is possible to see how such critiques 
have influenced my accounts of Dorothy Wordsworth, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, and Hannah More. Yet the objection to 
Gilligan's study I want to raise here is considerably more 
limited, and probably quite predictable. To define women this 
way is not only to deny differences between individual women, 
which is a political problem with immediate effects; it is 
also, as I have insisted, to embrace a mode of engenderment 
actively promoted by a history of male-biased texts. And 
that, I would argue, is a theoretical one, involving the 
nature of value-formation itself.
As George Sher has pointed out, "Women's moral judgments 
may be expressed in a different voice, but that voice echoes 
through some quite familiar rooms" (179). These "rooms," of 
course, are located in eighteenth-century arguments for
middle-class moral reform— in the ethical writing of Hume, 
Smith, Burke, and others, which we have already explored. Yet 
it is perhaps helpful to rehearse again those arguments here. 
In the mid-eighteenth century, as I have illustrated, 
“sympathy" became a code-term for social homogeneity among 
upwardly mobile middle-class men, a way of "knowing," or a 
principle of communication, or a desire to create 
relationships between equally-aspiring middle-class men. The 
structure and ideological power of this discourse, however, 
are dependent upon a "feminized" version of sympathy, or upon 
what Adam Smith calls the "exquisite fellow-feeling" of 
females. For Smith, women are largely passive receptacles for 
the emotions of others, characterized by the ability to 
"grieve for their sufferings, to resent their injuries, and 
to rejoice at their good fortune" (TMS 200). Recognition of 
the "intermediate" existence which women had been granted 
lead writers as diverse as Mary Wollstonecraft and Hannah 
More to re-value the feminine by qualifying those virtues and 
casting them as source of a largely middle-class program for 
moral reform. In this sense, the early history of feminism is 
in many ways the history of re-valuation, in which de-valued 
traits and roles are endowed with equal or greater merit than 
the practices and qualities thought to characterize men.
Gilligan, having inherited this male-biased hierarchy of 
value, appropriates a by-now familiar feminist strategy, and 
calls for yet another round of middle-class moral reform 
spearheaded by women. Like Mary Wollstonecraft * s , moreover, 
her moral program is thought to begin within the structures
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of the middle-class family. Presumably, Gilligan shares 
Chodorow's call for a wholesale attempt at co-parenting. Were 
both men and women to assume responsibility for children, it 
is assumed, the moral dispositions of their children would 
not be so clearly "masculine" or "feminine"; or, if they 
were, feminine sensibility would not as a result of being 
"feminine" be abhorred. However plausible this program is in 
theory, in making women's compassion the source of moral 
reform, Gilligan further legitimizes an association between 
women and feeling for others that, as I have argued, is both 
derived from and appeals to a masculinist system of ethics. 
Consequently, from an historical point of view, Gilligan's 
"solution" to the problem of women's traditionally inferior 
moral value bears a troubling resemblance to its cause.
What her argument elides is that fact that the ethics of 
sympathy turn upon a definition of the "feminine" as that 
which exists outside public life, upon a notion of that yet- 
uncorrupted "other" which can still serve as the site or 
model for future social reform. The religious overtones of 
this argument— the notion that man can somehow be "redeemed"- 
-are not quite so disturbing as the suggestion that, in this 
system, the moral value of woman is dependent upon her 
ability to serve at that role, to serve, in short, as the 
embodiment of "suffering humanity" upon which man's pleasure, 
power, and moral superiority are based. To put it another 
way, it is the status of woman as outsider to a largely 
homosocial system that enables her to have any moral value in 
the first place, even while, through that system, the
secondary status of women is virtually guaranteed. As 
Gilligan admits, it is precisely because men are pushed 
toward separation and individuation that they devalue others 
around them, even though they suffer from that separation.
And as Scheler announces, culture is promoted and sustained 
by hypertrophy of the intellect, through which men are 
divorced from their historical ability to identify with the 
emotions of others. In each case, "feminine" morality is 
defined by the way it embodies different values that those 
thought to be necessary not only to the "public" world, but 
to the moral community as such.
This exclusion of women from "full moral agency," as 
Kathryn Pauley Morgan has illustrated, is not an omission 
which is easily corrected through internal reform. It is, 
instead, intrinsic to the history of ethical writing itself, 
where it has assumed any number of forms. One of these is the 
promotion of a doctrine of separate spheres. "We are first 
told," she writes, "that there is a moral domain in which we 
achieve excellence":
Then we are told that we can only achieve 
excellence in that domain. Then we are told 
that this domain is not a domain in which 
morality operates in its most exemplary way 
if at all. And finally we are blamed for 
living our moral lives in that domain while 
being told that we can do no other. (153)
The result of this process, Morgan continues, is "moral 
confusion" on the part of women, "if not outright madness"
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(153). While the suggestion that male-biased moral systems 
have been responsible for women's "madness" is provocative—  
one thinks, for example, of Charlotte Perkins Gilman,
Virginia Woolf, and Sylvia Plath, all of whom were interested 
in the relation between sympathy and the oppression of women- 
-it also raises the more immediate issue of feminist 
complicity. Given the intrinsically male-biased nature of 
this moral system, it is possible to argue that in treating 
any structure of care as an identifiable feminine emotional 
construct— or, for that matter, in treating "ambition" as a 
masculine one— Gilligan simply reinforces a major form of 
ethical inscription practiced by patriarchal culture. A 
Different Voice is from this perspective unwillingly 
implicated in the asymmetrical value-formation of the culture
git seeks to reform.
The Writing of Value(s)
Throughout this study I have approached sympathy as an 
historical problem which, moreover, is dependent upon a 
system of representation. My treatment has undoubtedly 
appeared, at times, to be overly abstract— too cumbersome or 
too heavy-handed for the fragile and ephemeral history of the 
"emotions" which were being examined. At this point, however, 
it is perhaps possible to see why this discursive approach 
was necessary: only by explaining how power works on the 
behalf of specific interests can one analyze the 
opportunities for resistance to it. By treating sympathy as a 
mode of representation l have attempted to establish those
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opportunities. I have not, however, provided a solution.
While it is possible to argue that there is nothing 
intrinsically valuable (or value-less) about the traditional 
roles of women— about their roles as wife, helpmate, or 
mother— which can be corrected or altered through their 
denial, or, alternatively, through a revision of the values 
by which they have been defined, such an idea undoubtedly 
conflicts with some of women's (and men's) deepest and most 
cherished beliefs. One can explain and negotiate those 
beliefs, as does Carol Gilligan; one can promote them, as 
does Max Scheler; or, at least for the sake of analysis, one 
can deny them, if only long enough to understand the way in 
which the logic of sympathy works.
In order to do this, it has been necessary, from time to 
time, to take issue with some forms of psychoanalytic 
criticism. Lest those objections be misinterpreted, I would 
like to end by casting them within some more concrete frame. 
Throughout this study, I have insisted that sympathy has 
reference to one of several dominant discourses— ethics, 
aesthetics, religion, or metaphysics— all of which are 
involved in the self-conscious writing of value. Each of 
these disciplines would have us believe its own claims to 
ontological, metaphysical, or psychological "truth," and each 
necessarily will define the truth of sympathy in a different 
way. To this list I would now add some types of feminism, in 
which, as we have seen, the writing of value plays a central 
part, even while the historically constructed systems of 
value by which those are underwritten has been increasingly
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obscured. This is particularly apparent in the relationship 
between psychoanalytic criticism and the ethics of sympathy. 
Here critics such as Carol Gilligan not only take the claims 
of sympathy at face value, they perpetuate the doctrine of 
separate virtues itself. What seems to be called for, then, 
is re-thinking of the relationship between .ethics and 
psychology from an historicist point of view.
Agnes Heller, a member of the Frankfurt school, has begun 
this project, if only by virtue of her desire to revive 
ethics as a viable and pervasive dimension of culture. Heller 
associates the apparent disappearance of ethics with the rise 
of modern psychology (Heller 1988, 140). Rather than 
assuming, however, that psychology followed and replaced 
ethics in some clean and definitive way, she focuses upon how 
these two apparently discrete and even antithetical 
discourses are mutually implicated. She argues that in the 
early modern age, with the work of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, 
Smith, Hume, and others, moral judgment was increasingly 
associated with theories of perception derived from the 
associationists, or with a fledgling psycho-aesthetics, in 
Heller's words, "emotions and passions gained prominence as 
pains and pleasures in the process of delivering new values 
and norms" (1988, 140). Characteristicks, A Treatise of Human 
Nature, and The Theory of Moral Sentiments ushered in what we 
know as "The Age of Sensibility," which we identify largely 
through its competing theories of "generative feeling" and 
its wholesale cultivation of "sensitivities." Yet according 
to Heller's scheme, what began as the moralization of
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sentiments in the mid-eighteenth century continues, in the 
nineteenth, as the cult of sentiments as virtues in their own 
right" (1988, 143). Through the psychologizing of morals, 
morality increasingly becomes identified with particular 
emotions, or with emotion as such.
Following this analysis, it is easy to why, from a 
contemporary perspective, "sympathy," "compassion," "pity," 
and "benevolism"— even in the nineteenth century— were so 
easily stripped from their discursive contexts, and treated 
as emotions in their own right. According to Heller, 
moreover, the most decisive stage in the collapse of ethics 
as a recognizable discourse corresponds with the work of 
Freud, where any such emotion becomes symptomatic of an 
individual's complex or problem. She complains that within 
psychology, moral norms and virtues, human goodness and 
badness, are no longer explicated, or promoted, but are 
explained away by psychological causes (1988, 143). Within 
the confines of the analytic situation, and under the 
auspices of a seemingly objective theory, norms, perceptions, 
and morality-laden emotions thus "become epiphenomena subject 
to cure":
Choice, moral autonomy, is thus negated and 
people are treated as machines— machines 
which, in the event of malfunction are 
repaired by the professional mechanic, the 
psychologist. (1988, 143)
As a writer who would revive ethics as a viable and pervasive 
dimension of culture, Heller deplores the seemingly
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subversive work of Freud, and presumably, that of neo- 
Freudians, as well. Given the decidedly feminist and self- 
critiquing nature of much contemporary psychoanalytic 
criticism, Heller's may be interpreted as a conservative 
stance. Yet whether or not one shares this distrust of 
psychology— what Heller calls the colonization of the soul by 
scientific discourse (1988, 143)— is less important, for the 
moment, than the effect of the relationship between ethics 
and psychology on feminist theory and practice.
While I do not want to represent ethics as a meta­
discourse which descends from above to endow women and men 
with particular feelings, behaviors, and social roles in some 
unproblematic way, 1 do believe that as one part of larger 
discursive formations ethics can often provide a key to how 
values are constructed, or to how individuals are encouraged 
to react to themselves as social beings within a particular 
culture, at a particular time. In the eighteenth century, as 
we have seen, the writing of value was a "public" phenomena, 
promoted not only through ethical treatises, but through 
literature, political tracts, travel books, and the 
ubiquitous book of "manners." In each case ethical language 
served to create or reinforce social institutions (including 
the middle class family), to define and dictate responses to 
particular social groups (including women and the poor), to 
elaborate "appropriate" attitudes towards oneself (in terms 
of value), and— through all of these— to inscribe culturally- 
necessary forms of community, held together by a vast network 
of ideological bonds, dependent upon the "language of
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feeling.n
Yet in this century, "feeling" is often assumed to be a 
private phenomena. Within the bounds of psychoanalysis, the 
language of feeling can at most be "read" as being
symptomatic of an individual's psycho-sexual structure,
which, in turn, is thought to be derived from the two or 
three persons who constitute the family itself. Missing from 
such accounts is the way that "feeling" functions as a public 
phenomena to create the structures of value by which we are 
all directly or indirectly defined; missing from these 
accounts, that is, is an analysis of the nature of value- 
formation itself, even while, I would argue, the writing of
value provides at least some of the evidence upon which the
interpretive structures of psychoanalysis are founded. It is 
no accident, for example, that the discourse of sympathy 
promotes the importance of the "domestic affections" while 
the psychoanalytic tradition uses those as the basis of its 
assumptions about the "development" of individuals. Nor is it 
surprising that both feminist psychoanalytic critics and 
traditional Christian humanists should come to similar 
conclusions about the nature and value of women in an era 
that promotes "the domestic affections" and "family values.”
It is because psychology analyzes the structure of the 
feelings that the writing of value is designed to promote, I 
believe, that the discourse of sympathy and psychology are 
easily conflated into a single ideology in which the moral 
qualities of women are represented as being both different 
from and more— or less— valuable than the moral qualities of
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men.
This apparent conjunction between the message, if not the 
method, of ethics and psychology is important to the future 
of ethics as a viable means of social reform, but even more 
important, one would think, to feminist politics and theory. 
Given the domination of psychoanalytic discourse in this 
century, it may seem more crucial for literary critics to 
expose the anti-feminist assumptions at the heart of 
Freudianism than to turn, again, to those hopelessly utopic 
or sentimental writers who attempted to inspire "the good 
life.” But such an omission may also reflect a twentieth- 
century tendency towards empiricism that in fact ignores the 
historicity of the problems it seeks to expose.
Our own psychologizing tendencies have colored our 
readings of ourselves, and thus our readings of the culture 
around us, without at the same time dissipating 
institutionalized social values and norms. Through the 
language and assumptions of psychology, ethics as an easily 
recognizable, still-operable mode of discourse has simply 
been obscured, without at the same time being completely 
displaced. In fact, as I have tried to show here, through 
theories of moral development the male-biased structure of 
ethical writing has in some ways been reinforced without 
sufficient attention to the writing of value itself. Given 
that her two-hundred subjects live in an asymmetrical 
culture, it is not surprising to me that Gilligan is able to 
identify a gender-specific morality. In a society which has 
traditionally confined women to specific non-public and/or
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supportive roles— nurturer, housekeeper, secretary, nurse,
assistant— it is reasonable to assume that women would learn
to value the traits to which they have been assigned, even
though those roles may be complicitous in maintaining their
secondary position. The alternative to Gilligan's position,
however, is not necessarily, with Hannah Arendt, to dismiss
gthe ethics of compassion, but to examine those in terms of 
the structures of power which— albeit unwittingly— they 
perpetuate and uphold. Because my own examination has focused 
upon the historical association between the "feminine" and 
"compassion" as that is created through the discourse of 
sympathy, 1, too, can be accused of perpetuating a 
"metanarrative" at least as problematical as Gilligan's; yet 
my narrative, I believe, has less-stabilizing results. I have 
attempted to show, to borrow words from Foucault, how "that- 
which-is has not always been," or how "the things which seem 
most evident to us are always formed in the confluence of 
encounters and chances, during the course of a precarious and 
fragile history" (1988, 37). Having done that, I would simply 
encourage literary critics to examine the language of feeling 
not for what it says about "woman," but for what it says 
about the way women are written into systems of value to 




1. See Newton 1987. By the 1640s or so, feminine
"humanitarianism" would serve a complicated and necessary 
public role: to facilitate a sense of community and social 
concern in "disillusioned" middle-class men which, in the 
words of Judith Newton, "a reformulation of classical liberal 
and masculine ideology itself called for" (128).
2. Prior to that time, Newton continues, "classical liberal 
ideology with its emphasis upon material production...is more 
dominant, and so is its construction of middle-class 
masculine experience as acquisition, competition, 
rationality, self-dependence, and hard work" (1987, 127).
3. Chodorow herself addresses this charge: "I agree that all 
claims about gender differences gloss over important 
differences within genders and similarities between genders" 
(215). At the same time, she insists that there are 
"structural and statistical truths" about such differences 
that are not threatened by such objections.
4. I should emphasize that my objections to Chodorow's 
theories of masculine and feminine moral development have 
little to do with their empirical validity within a 
twentieth-century context. I object, instead, to the way in 
which this peculiarly modern and sociologically-based account 
is often imposed without qualification upon a different 
historical period, in which many of the phenomena that 
Chodorow presupposes— the sexual division of labor, the 
middle-class family, the "absent father," the "isolated 
mother," and, finally, the cult of the child which unites 
those— were coming into being, a process that necessarily 
involves contradiction and struggle. Chodorow's response to 
this charge is somewhat confusing. On the one hand, she 
admits that her account "does not concern the reproduction of 
mothering for all time,” that "different factors have gone 
into the reproduction of mothering in different societies and 
different historical periods" (216). On the other hand, given 
her psycho-sexual account of gender-specific dispositions, 
such differences would not seem to have much of an effect:
"it is probable that the issues 1 discuss are relevant in all 
societies" (216). In this sense, she is at least open to the 
charge of ahistoricity and universalism.
5. This movement in philosophy comes after, or is accompanied 
by, revisionist critiques which have attended to 
"deontological" systems of ethics, or to a tradition of moral 
theory which valorizes "reason" culminating in Kant's notion 
of individual autonomy and categorical imperative at the 
basis of moral theory. Feminist critics have focused on 
Kant's reification of reason at the expense of feeling as a 
masculinist mode of domination; ideological critics have 
concentrated on the relationship between the Kantian 
transcendental subject and bourgeois individualism; both end
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up recommending a more politically progressive relationship 
to the "other." Consequently, in recent years, several anti- 
Kantians have advocated a return to the less systematic 
ethics of Smith, Hume, and others, with a renewed focus on 
friendship, benevolism, altruism, and sympathy. See Young 
57-67.
6. See Deleuze and Guattari 1983. Cornel West has pointed out 
that Foucault and Deleuze were the first important French 
intellectuals "to think through the notion of difference 
independent of Hegelian ideas of opposition" and thus to 
"circumvent, rather than confront, Hegel" (275). For these 
and other reasons, the insights of Deleuze and Foucault are 
central to the discussions that follow.
7. Scholars of eighteenth-century writing will note parallels 
between Scheler's account of the sympathetic imagination and 
Pope's description of the "System of Benevolence" in Essay on 
Man (361-372) in which the source of sympathy is not "the 
maternal body," as in Scheler, but "nature."
8. It is significant, 1 believe, that Gilligan's "solution" 
to this problem, much like Wollstonecraft's , is necessarily 
proleptic— it depends upon the success of future generations. 
In the meantime, she can but counter the asymmetrical 
structure of modern society with a call for a "dialogue" 
between masculine and feminine sensibilities, or between the 
ethics of fairness and care (Gilligan 174). To paraphrase 
Marx, this is simply to fight "phrases" with "phrases," and 
to believe that social change will come about through an 
alteration in "consciousness" itself— if not in this 
generation, then in the next one. For a similar argument that 
reaches different conclusions, see Tronto.
9. In On Revolution Arendt argues that compassion cannot 
serve as the basis of a politics because compassion precludes 
political action. Clearly that is not the case, as Kathleen 
Jones demonstrates. My own argument emanates from concern 
with the relatively conservative and middle-class politics 
that the ethics of compassion have traditionally provoked.
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